Preamble

The House met at Eleven o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

ILFORD CORPORATION BILL [By Order]

Second Reading deferred till Thursday, 15th March.

Oral Answers to Questions — WAR CRIMINALS

Sir Oliver Simmonds: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which foreign Governments still continue to refuse to the United Nations satisfactory assurances that they will not harbour enemy war criminals.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for South Bristol (Mr. A. Walkden) on 6th December last, to which I have nothing to add.

Sir O. Simmonds: Where does this matter stand? Were any decisions taken at Yalta, or are we allowing the situation to go by default?

Mr. Eden: The matter stands where it did in December. The Governments of all neutral countries have been approached on the matter, and have now given assurances on the subject. Broadly speaking, the Government regard these as not unsatisfactory.

Mr. Driberg: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if the names of Dr. Goebbels and Herr Ribbentrop are included in the official British list of war criminals.

Mr. Eden: His Majesty's Government regard these two Nazi leaders as major war criminals coming within the scope of the Declaration on German Atrocities at the Moscow Conference on 1st November, 1943.

Mr. Driberg: May we take it, then, that their case will not be regarded as parallel to that of Count Grandi if they should attempt to take refuge in neutral countries?

Mr. Gallacher: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Dr. Goebbels is likely to dodge them and will he agree that the reprimand made on me for offensive remarks about Ribbentrop should now be withdrawn by the Speaker and the House?

Miss Ward: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is to be the position under the new agreement with Italy of those Italians who are accused of having committed acts of cruelty against British troops and the troops or civilian populations of our Allies.

Mr. Eden: The position of Italians accused of acts of cruelty against British troops and the troops or civilian populations of our Allies has undergone no change. Italian war criminals are being listed and will, as is the case with German war criminals, be punished according to the crimes they have committed.

Oral Answers to Questions — GREECE

Government Changes

Mr. Martin: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the views of His Majesty's Government were sought by the Greek Government in the recent changes in Greek administration which led to the resignation of the Minister of the Interior; and if he is satisfied that the changes will not make more difficult of fulfilment His Majesty's Government's undertaking to ensure complete freedom in the coming Greek elections.

Mr. Eden: His Majesty's Government were not consulted by the Greek Government. As regards the second part of the Question, I do not consider that there is any reason to doubt that the forthcoming elections will be held under fair and free conditions. It is certainly the intention of His Majesty's Government to do all they can to ensure that this is so.

Detainees (Africa and India)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many Greeks are now detained by British authorities in Africa and India; how many have been released and sent back to Greece; and whether he has any information respecting the hunger strike of 3,000 prisoners in a concentration camp near Athens.

Mr. Eden: The number of Greeks detained by the British authorities in Africa amounts to about 12,000. Of these 8,000 are the E.L.A.S. prisoners sent there during the fighting. Arrangements are in hand to transfer all these men to Greece and it is hoped that 1,500 will arrive in about a week's time. Investigations by Greek Government commissioners sent to Egypt for the purpose indicate that not more than about 200 out of the total number will be charged with offences not covered by the amnesty. There are about 4,000 men still detained as a result of the mutinies in the Greek armed forces last Spring. All these men will be repatriated to Greece as and when transport becomes available. Meanwhile, any who wish to do so are being re-employed in the Greek armed forces. Those who do not accept re-employment and those who, from a strict military point of view, are considered unreliable, must be kept together in camps since they cannot be released in the Middle East. Their repatriation to Greece has inevitably been delayed and they cannot expect to return before the loyal units of the Greek forces in the Middle East. There are virtually no Greeks detained in India. Only two cases are known to the Greek authorities.
As regards the last part of the Question, hunger strikes have taken place in two camps under British control near Athens in which a total of 5,000 men were detained. In both cases the strike ended after an address to the men by the E.L.A.S. liaison officer attached to General Scobie's Headquarters. Of these 5,000 men 150 are charged with crimes not covered by the amnesty. Of the rest all except 18 have now been released.

Mr. Sorensen: While expressing appreciation of the action of the right hon. Gentleman, may I ask him whether he can say why these 3,000 went on strike? What was the particular political or economic cause of it?

Mr. Eden: I cannot say, but I am glad to say that they came back almost at once.

Mr. Dugdale: While realising that it is exceedingly difficult to transport these men back to Greece, is there any reason why they should not be liberated and allowed to remain free in the countries in which they are now?

Mr. Eden: That raises complicated issues, for they have to be fed, administered and taken care of, and it is better that they should go back as soon as transport can be arranged.

Mr. Silverman: With regard to those men who are detained as a consequence of so-called mutiny, are they covered by the terms of the amnesty, and when they return to Greece can they be subject to charges not so covered?

Mr. Eden: I shall be glad if the hon. Gentleman will put that down. I do not know what the hon. Gentleman means by "so-called mutiny"

Oral Answers to Questions — YUGOSLAVIA

U.N.R.R.A. Supplies

Mr. Riley: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the U.N.R.R.A. organisation is now working smoothly in Yugoslavia; and whether substantial supplies of goods are now being distributed to the civil population.

Mr. Eden: The position in regard to the operation of U.N.R.R.A. in Yugoslavia is still as stated in the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State to my hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean (Mr. Price) on 14th February. The answer to the second part of the Question is "Yes, Sir."

Provisional Government

Mr. Riley: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the composition of the Provisional Yugoslav Government has now been completed; whether the Government contains representatives of all the main political parties in Yugoslavia; and whether he will indicate the parties which the respective members of the Provisional Government represent, and the names of the ministers.

Mr. Eden: According to my latest information, the composition of the new Yugoslav Government has not yet been


completed. I am expecting its completion to be announced from Belgrade very shortly.

Collaborationists (Trial)

Mr. Riley: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the courts before which political prisoners are now appearing in Yugoslavia are conducted by independent judges under prewar legal procedure, or whether they are set up under the jurisdiction of the anti-Fascist National Liberation Committee.

Mr. Eden: I have received no information of any trials of persons for their political acts in liberated Yugoslavia. If, however, my
lion. Friend is referring to collaboration with the enemy, the answer is that in Serbia special courts subject to the jurisdiction of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation have been set up to deal with offences of collaboration. In the other liberated parts of Yugoslavia, the only courts at present functioning are, so far as I am aware, the courts martial of the Yugoslav Army.

Captain Duncan: Will my right hon. Friend obtain reports of the number of cases with which these special anti-Fascist courts have dealt?

Mr. Eden: I will see whether I can get them.

Oral Answers to Questions — EAST PRUSSIA (KONIGSBERG)

Professor Savory: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what ethnological or historical grounds His Majesty's Government have agreed to the City of Konigsberg being ceded to Russia.

Mr. Eden: As has been frequently stated it is the view of His Majesty's Government that East Prussia should be detached from Germany and the German population removed from it. In such conditions it would seem that the Soviet claim to Koenigsberg has justification. So far as I am aware, there is no considerable Polish element in the city.

Professor Savory: Have we abandoned Clause 5 of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty under which we mutually renounced all territorial aggrandisement in this war?

Mr. Eden: My hon. Friend had better re-read Clause 5 and the second part of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which refers to the post-war period. The Prime Minister

made it quite clear, in respect of the Atlantic Charter, that we did not consider that it applied to enemy territory.

Mr. Gallacher: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the hon. Member is afraid that this might be used as a precedent for ceding Belfast to Ireland?

Oral Answers to Questions — RUSSIA AND POLAND

Tarnopol (Polish Population)

Professor Savory: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware that persons of Polish nationality form, according to the census of 1931, a majority of the inhabitants of the city of Tarnopol; and what steps the Allies are proposing to take in order to safeguard the rights of the Polish majority in this city as well as those in the cities of Vilna and Lvov.

Mr. Eden: The Polish census of 1931 did not give separate population figures for the city of Tarnopol. The figures for the whole province of Tarnopol showed that neither by language nor by religion were the Poles in an absolute majority, though they did form a majority in the urban areas as a whole. The Poles in this area have under the agreement concluded in September, 1944, between the Lublin Committee and the Government of the Ukrainian republic of the U.S.S.R. the same right as those in other parts of Eastern Galicia to transfer to the West of the Curzon Line.

Professor Savory: If the right hon. Gentleman will look up the figures again, he will find that in the city of Tarnopol the Poles have an absolute majority of 77 per cent., and a similar majority in the administrative district of Tarnopol. Further, will he put in a word for the thousands of Poles, Ukrainians and White Ruthenjans who have been arrested and deported to unknown destinations?

Mr. Eden: I am dealing with the last part of the question in another answer. One of the reasons why we were so anxious that these conversations in Moscow should proceed and reach a conclusion was in order that this situation, and reports of various kinds, may be finally checked and, I trust, the situation disposed of. I believe I have given accurate figures but I will check them again.

Mr. Price: Do not those figures include Jews and Greek Catholics as well as Polish Roman Catholics?

Mr. Eden: I do not know. I did not quote the figures.

Professor Savory: No.

U.N.R.R.A. Supplies

Miss Rathbone: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any reply has now been received from the Government of the U.S.S.R. giving permission for a delegation or supplies from U.N.R.R.A. to reach Poland or any districts in Russia where Polish or other deported persons are in need of assistance; and whether similar permission has been given for missions or supplies to be sent by any bodies other than U.N.R.R.A.

Mr. Eden: I am informed that the Russian authorities have promised U.N.R.R.A. facilities for the transit of supplies to Poland. Arrangements for the transit of a delegation are not yet concluded, but the despatch of supplies is not being delayed on that account. As regards the last part of the Question, I have no information.

Miss Rathbone: Considering that the U.S.S.R. was one of the three Great Powers which initiated U.N.R.R.A., is not this very long delay, lasting over two months, in giving permission for a personal delegation very unsatisfactory? Why should Russia be afraid of impartial observers?

Mr. Eden: I am neither responsible for the Soviet Government nor for U.N.R.R.A. All I can do is to give the House information. I also regret the delay and I am glad that at last shipments have apparently begun.

Madame Arciszewska (Arrest and Release)

Captain Alan Graham: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he can yet inform the House as to the result of his inquiries from the Soviet Government in regard to the arrest of the wife of the Polish Prime Minister and other Red Cross workers recently in Warsaw.

Mr. Stourton: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he has any statement to make concerning the arrest in Poland of Mme. Arciszewska, wife of the Polish Prime Minister in London.

Sir Herbert Williams: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he has now received any report with regard to the arrest in Poland of the wife of the Prime Minister of Poland.

Mr. Eden: The Soviet Government have informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow, in reply to the inquiries which he made upon my instructions, that to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government they are taking steps at once to set Madame Arciszewska free.

Mr. Edmund Harvey: Has the right hon. Gentleman any information as to why this lady was arrested?

Mr. Eden: I have been given some but I thought, in the light of the conclusion of my representations, the House would think it wiser to leave it there.

Lublin Administration

Mr. Stourton: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether an approach has been made to the Soviet Government with a view to securing cancellation of the decree of the Lublin Committee outlawing the Polish underground army.

Mr. Eden: I have no evidence that any decree has been issued by the Lublin administration outlawing the Polish Home Army as a whole. The Home
Army has been formally dissolved by
the Polish Government in London. Many of its members, however, are alleged to have resisted the Lublin administration's measures of registration, conscription, etc., and to have refused to submit to its authority. This administration have announced their intention of taking severe measures against these allegedly irreconcilable elements of the Home Army, and against supporters of the Polish Government in London, and special courts have been set up to hold Polish treason trials. In the view of His Majesty's Government, if the necessary atmosphere of confidence is to be created, which alone can ensure the success of the present consultations in Moscow, it is imperative both that the Lublin administration should take no measures against Poles merely because they do not recognise their authority and that such Poles should cease active resistance to the local authorities, which endangers the lines of communication of the advancing Soviet armies. His Majesty's Government will continue to use their influence to this end.

Mr. Stourton: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the proper treatment of the Polish underground army is a vital preliminary step to obtaining lasting accord between Russia and Poland?

Mr. Eden: My hon. Friend will see that I have dealt with that point, not exactly in his terms, but in rather a similar way.

Mr. Molson: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the British Ambassador at Moscow has access to full information about what is going on in East Poland?

Mr. Eden: I should be obliged if my hon. Friend will put that down. The question of information in Poland is one of those at present under discussion in Moscow.

Oral Answers to Questions — INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (REVIEW)

Mr. Martin: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the far reaching changes in political conditions resulting from the war, he will consider proposing to all parties to whom we are related by effective treaties a general review of the same, in order that they may be confirmed, revised or renounced in accordance with the exigencies of present circumstances.

Mr. Eden: No, Sir. It would be premature to propose any such general review at present.

Mr. Martin: In view of the embarrassment caused to many hon. Members and the Question that I personally directed to the right hon. Gentleman last week in the matter of policy, will he not reconsider this matter?

Mr. Eden: I am afraid that I must stick to my point. It would be premature to do so at present. This is not the only question which is concerning His Majesty's Government in the wide world.

Oral Answers to Questions — ANGLO-RUSSIAN TREATY

Sir H. Williams: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the countries which are outside the scope of the second part of Article 5 of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 26th May, 1942.

Mr. Eden: As is made plain in the Treaty, the Article in question will apply to the post-war period, and all countries

will come within its scope except Germany and perhaps certain of her associates in Europe.

Sir H. Williams: I take it that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia come within the scope?

Mr. Eden: It applies to the post-war period, that is to say, the period after the peace. If my hon. Friend wishes to know the Soviet Government's attitude to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, that is another question.

Sir H. Williams: When the treaty was signed, were not these countries nominally independent although occupied by Germany?

Mr. Eden: They were not so regarded by the Soviet Government, and that has many times been made plain.

Oral Answers to Questions — SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE (TRADES UNION REPRESENTATION)

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what grounds the Trades Union Congress, representing the views of a single political party, is to be invited to participate in the forthcoming discussions at San Francisco.

Mr. Eden: No such decision has been reached. The matter is still under consideration.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Is my right hon. Friend prepared to consider representations from other bodies such as the Federation of British Industries?

Mr. Eden: So far as I know I am fairly approachable.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH STEAMER, TANGIER (SPANISH ACTION)

Mr. Quintin Hogg: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any statement to make concerning the incident in which the British ship s.s. "Blackheath" was boarded and looted by Spanish officials off Tangier, her ensign hauled down and replaced by a Spanish flag and in which His Majesty's tug Nimble" was several times chased away from assisting her by a Spanish warship; and whether the incident took place within the territorial waters abutting on the International Zone.

Mr. Eden: Yes, Sir. Reports from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tangier and from the naval authorities at Gibraltar show that the
s.s. "Blackheath," carrying a cargo of war material, was torpedoed on 10th January. She was subsequently abandoned by her crew and ran aground near Cape Spartel in the international zone of Tangier, where the Spanish authorities placed a guard of six men on board her. Information just received from Gibraltar confirms that in the absence of the British crew members of this guard tried to pilfer personal effects which they found on board, but that their efforts were frustrated when members of the crew of the s.s. "Blackheath" returned to the vessel. The attention of the Spanish Government will be drawn to the matter with a request that they should take appropriate action against the offenders. Information just received from Gibraltar also confirms that in the absence of the British crew the Spanish guard took down the Red Ensign and replaced it by the Spanish flag, apparently under the impression that the vessel had been finally abandoned by its crew and that it therefore became open to the territorial maritime authorities (who under the present arrangements are for the time being the local Spanish authorities) to take possession of the ship. The Spanish flag was subsequently struck when the members of the crew of the "Blackheath" returned to the vessel. Representations will also be made to the Spanish authorities in regard to the hauling down of the Red Ensign.
The naval authorities at Gibraltar state that there is no question of His Majesty's tug "Nimble" having been chased away from the ship by a Spanish warship. On 15th January, however, when the s.s. "Blackheath" broke her back, the Spanish authorities temporarily withdrew permission to salvage the ship on the ground that she had become a total loss. In order not to prejudice our efforts, which I am glad to say were finally successful, to obtain permission to salvage the vessel's cargo, His Majesty's tug "Nimble," being a naval tug, was instructed by Gibraltar to leave Tangier territorial waters until permission to reenter them had been obtained, which it subsequently was.

Mr. Hogg: Does this reply, for which I thank my right hon. Friend, mean that

we accept that the Tangier territorial waters are to be treated as wholly Spanish, and will he not say that British naval vessels will be free to go there as and when they please during this war and after it?

Mr. Eden: I could not possibly say that, either during this war, or, under present arrangements, after it, because the Tangier zone has always been regarded by us as neutral waters. It is now Spanish controlled, but previously neutral; but whichever regime, whether Tangier was or was not Spanish controlled, we cannot treat it as other than neutral. It is not an unsatisfactory settlement under which we were able to salvage a complete cargo of war material in what we accept as neutral waters.

Mr. Martin: Does not this incident show it is time that this occupation of Tangier by the Spanish authorities was ended?

Mr. Eden: It does not affect this at all.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE

Surplus Building Materials (Release)

Mr. Burden: asked the Secretary of State for Air if he will release for the purpose of first-aid repair work quantities of plaster board now surplus to requirements at aerodromes in Suffolk and Bedfordshire.

The Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair): Yes, Sir, this is already being done, not only in Suffolk and Bedfordshire but generally throughout the country.

Officers (Pay and Pensions)

Squadron-Leader Sir Gifford Fox: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether (1) in view of the fact that during the war ex-warrant officers in the R.A.F. promoted to officer rank have been expected to bear equal responsibility with the non-ranker officers, he will now take steps to remove the substantial anomalies with regard to rates of pension for R.A.F. ex-warrant officers;
(2) whether he is aware that the maximum retired pay for a group captain who has been promoted from warrant-officer rank is £317 per annum as against a maximum of £750 in the case of group captains, general duties; and what steps he proposes to take to reduce this differ-


entiation which operates so excessively to the disadvantage of the man promoted from warrant-officer rank;
(3) whether he is aware that a warrant officer commisioned before 2nd September, 1939, is limited to a maximum pension of £317 a year, whilst a man commissioned from A.C.2 after 3rd September, 1939, can earn retired pay up to £407 per annum; and when he expects to be able to rectify these anomalies.

Sir A. Sinclair: The scale of retired pay of officers who have served continuously as such is not strictly comparable with that appropriate to officers who have been commissioned from warrant-officer rank, since the former takes into account the fact that the full responsibilities of officer rank have been carried throughout the officer's career. The rates of retired pay of officers who, on commissioning, whether before or after the outbreak of war, were serving as airmen (including warrant officers) on regular engagements, are however now being examined in connection with a review, at present in its early stages, of the rates of retired pay, and the regulations under which they are granted, in the Services generally.

Sir G. Fox: Can my right hon. Friend give any indication when a decision would be taken on this subject?

Sir A. Sinclair: No, I am afraid I cannot, while the review is in progress.

Wing-Commander Grant-Ferris: Will my right hon. Friend also bear in mind that while what he says in the first part of his answer is correct, the officers have incurred further expenditure in education and that it is absolutely necessary that some satisfactory answer should be given?

Sir A. Sinclair: Yes, Sir, certainly that will be borne in mind.

Discharged Personnel (Civilian Clothing)

Mr. Walter Edwards: asked the Secretary of State for Air if he is aware that R.A.F. personnel discharged on medical grounds have been kept waiting over two months for the issue of civilian clothing; and will he take steps to ensure a much shorter waiting period.

Sir A. Sinclair: Airmen who are invalided from the Service normally receive their civilian clothing within fourteen days. A few who cannot be fitted from the

standard range of sizes have clothes specially made, and in some cases of this kind delays of the order of two months have occurred. I regret that in present circumstances some delay is inevitable where clothes have to be specially made.

Mr. W. Edwards: Does the Minister appreciate that when a man leaves the Service without a civilian suit and has to wait two months before one is provided for him he is placed in very great difficulty in finding civilian employment? What steps does he propose to take to see that such men are provided for if they cannot get civilian employment?

Sir A. Sinclair: I see and regret the difficulty in which it places a man if he cannot get his clothes for two months, but the hon. Member must realise that I, too, am in a difficulty, in the present state of shortage of clothes, in providing for people who require suits of special sizes.

Mr. Evelyn Walkden: Will the Minister make it clear that 90 per cent. of the men discharged on medical grounds take a suit on the day of their discharge and that the trouble arises with the difficult cases?

Sir A. Sinclair: I thought I had made that clear, but I am obliged to my hon. Friend.

Sir William Wayland: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether members of the R.A.F. Educational Service are to receive an outfit of civilian clothes in common with other members of the Armed Forces when they leave the R.A.F.; and whether they are eligible for similar gratuities.

Sir A. Sinclair: Unmobilised officers of the Royal Air Force educational service are employed and paid as civilians and are accordingly ineligible for the release benefits to be granted to mobilised officers.

Oral Answers to Questions — AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

Redundant Materials (Disposal)

Mr. Higgs: asked the Minister of Aircraft Production if he is aware of the long delay that is arising in giving manufacturing concerns disposal instructions for redundant material belonging to completed and cancelled contracts; and will he arrange for the contracts disposal branch to accelerate these instructions.

The Minister of Aircraft Production (Sir Stafford Cripps): Every effort is being made to issue disposal instructions to contractors for redundant contract arisings with all practical speed; the main difficulty encountered at present is in obtaining storage space to which redundant materials can be moved pending their final disposal. If the hon. Member has a particular case in mind and will be good enough to give me particulars I will gladly investigate it.

Mr. Higgs: Is the Minister aware that disposal instructions often take as long as six months, while very valuable floor space is occupied, and firms are prevented from changing over to peace-time production?

Sir S. Cripps: We have had one or two complaints of interference with changeover, but none of them have been established, on inquiry.

Aeronautical Research Centre

Mr. McNeil: asked the Minister of Aircraft Production for what reasons he decided to site the new research station in or near Bedford.

Sir S. Cripps: The siting of such an establishment bearing in mind the need for future development is a matter of great difficulty and there are very few places in the British Isles that are suitable. After a careful review of all possible sites, and consultation with all other Departments concerned, it was decided that the new Establishment should be set up near Bedford since that site best fulfils requirements, and in particular because:

1. It is reasonably near, and easy of access from, London, the principal aircraft works and the Universities in Oxford, Cambridge and the Midlands.
2. A large existing airfield is available with good flying approaches and it will be possible to extend at least one run-way to the great length that may ultimately be required for such an experimental establishment.
3. Weather conditions in this area are favourable for flying.
4. The site allows an architectural layout adequate to the needs of the Establishment and,
5. Electric power can be made available to meet the very heavy load expected to be required.

Mr. McNeil: While thanking my right hon. and learned Friend for his very long and explicit answer, may I ask him whether he does not agree that, since His Majesty's Government are attempting to attract private enterprise into the development areas, there is an overwhelming case for His Majesty's Government doing the same with this establishment? Moreover, is he not aware that there are other runways and other railways—and also other universities than those of Oxford, Cambridge and London?

Sir S. Cripps: I am quite aware of that. A very careful review was made of all the development areas but unfortunately it was ascertained that in none of them were the circumstances suitable.

Mr. A. Bevan: Can we take it for granted that this will not be laid down by the Government as a reason for establishing other Government works, as it is entirely against all the principles of national planning of industry in which we believe?

Sir S. Cripps: This is not a Government works. This is a research establishment, which has to be in very close association with the headquarters staff and it is one of the matters which must be borne in mind, with a view to avoiding waste of time in traffic.

Mr. J. J. Lawson: Is the Minister aware that proximity to London has been the reason for establishing almost every factory there during the last 10 years, in spite of the position in the depressed areas?

Sir S. Cripps: That has not been so with the new factories which my Department have put up, many of which have been in the depressed and development areas.

Mr. Buchanan: Where is there a university outside Oxford and Cambridge, in this country?

Sir S. Cripps: There are a large number, many of them equally good.

Mr. McNeil: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman be willing to receive a delegation from the West of Scotland to discuss the difficulty, and to see whether we can help him out a bit?

Sir S. Cripps: I am afraid it would be of no value. We have very thoroughly examined the West of Scotland for this purpose.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL AVIATION (U.S.A.-EIRE AGREEMENT)

Mr. Bowles: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aircraft Production, as representing the Minister for Civil Aviation, whether he is satisfied that the condition as to using the Shannon in the air agreement signed between Eire and the U.S.A. is not inconsistent with the Air Transit Agreement signed recently at Chicago.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aircraft Production (Mr. Lennox-Boyd): Yes, Sir. The International Air Services Transit Agreement only provides for the reciprocal grant between contracting States of the privilege to fly across each other's territories without landing and the privilege to land for non-traffic purposes. The negotiation, by bilateral agreement, of other privileges and associated conditions, such as those embodied in the U.S.A.-Eire Agreement, is not inconsistent with the Chicago Agreements.

Mr. Moelwyn Hughes: Is the Minister not aware that this agreement seems to provide—it is rather difficult to follow—that all American machines coming to the Continent of Europe shall land on the Shannon? Is such a monopoly agreement consistent with other decisions arrived at?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Actually, this agreement does not provide any such thing. It only provides that if aircraft are to land in Eire, they shall land on the Shannon. They are quite at liberty to fly over Eire territory and to land on other points in Europe.

Sir O. Simmonds: Are not this agreement and the method by which it is being worked wholly inconsistent with the procedure agreed by the Commonwealth Air Conference?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As the House knows, efforts were made by His Majesty's Government to get certain multilateral undertakings. Their failure has left the way open for bilateral arrangements of this kind.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL NAVY

Coastguard Service

Commander Sir Archibald Southby: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it is the intention of his Depart-

ment to retain the administration of the coastguard service after the war.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander): The administration of the coastguard is at present carried on by the Ministry of War Transport, acting as agents for the Admiralty, who assumed control of the force in 1940 under emergency powers provided in the Coastguard Act. The post-war arrangements will be considered as soon as the time is ripe, but I think that at present it would be premature to attempt to reach a final decision.

Sir A. Southby: When the time comes after the war, will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the very great benefit which will accrue to the Navy from the retention of the coastguard system, and also the benefit that will flow to the public from the fact that the Navy controls the coastguard service?

Mr. Alexander: I am sure that all the lessons of the war will be taken into account.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Is my right hon. Friend not aware that the coastguard service under the old organisation, in which Service personnel was employed, was much more efficient than the present organisation, and will he not consider reverting to the old Service coastguard organisation?

Mr. Alexander: I must say that I have been very satisfied with the coastguards during the war.

Fishermen (Release)

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Cook: asked the First Lord of The Admiralty how many fishermen have been released from the Navy in order to pursue their pre-war occupations; and what qualifications are required.

Mr. Alexander: Over 400 fishermen have been released up to the present. Preference is given to men with prior claims on an age and length of service basis subject to the requirements of the ports. As far as it is practicable, the men are chosen from those domiciled at the ports from which they are to be employed.

Service Abroad

Mr. Glenvil Hall: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will state the upper age limit for naval ratings posted


to service on a foreign station; and if he will make provision to permit men in their forties who have served two years on such stations to be transferred for service in Home waters.

Mr. Alexander: There is no upper age limit for service abroad. The manpower situation makes it impossible for me to agree to the suggestion in the second part of my hon. Friend's Question.

Mr. Hall: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of these men are in their forties and have served for several years in tropical waters, and that they are suffering badly as a result? Could nothing be done to bring them nearer home, even if they have to continue to serve?

Mr. Alexander: We do everything we possibly can. The length of the tour abroad is about 2½ years. The fact is that I could not man the Fleet if I were to make widespread arrangements of the kind the hon. Member has suggested.

Mr. Walter Edwards: Could not the right hon. Gentleman give sympathetic consideration to the point put by my hon. Friend? Could he not give instructions that men of that age should, when possible, be sent home?

Mr. Alexander: We do as much as we can in that connection and sympathetic consideration has always been given in that way, but I am afraid my hon. and gallant Friend must recognise that I have a very great problem in manning the Fleet with men of experience in leading rates.

River Crouch Estuary (Disused Craft)

Mr. Driberg: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he can make a statement on the proposed use of the River Crouch as a dump for disused craft and scrap; and if he will give an assurance that there will be no permanent interference with the amenities of this estuary.

Mr. Alexander: The Admiralty have no intention of using the River Crouch as a dumping ground. It may, however, be necessary to arrange for surplus craft to be laid up in the area pending disposal. The hon. Member may rest assured that full account would be taken of the amenities of the estuary if, and when, such temporary arrangement became necessary.

Mr. Driberg: Is it expected that these arrangements will have to continue for very long after the war?

Mr. Alexander: I am afraid I cannot make any firm promise. It depends a great deal on the celerity with which surplus craft of that kind can be disposed of.

Mr. Driberg: But will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that Burnham-on-Crouch is a great yachting and sailing centre, and a popular holiday resort of the simple kind, and that its amenities and the livelihood of its people will be seriously threatened unless these things can be got rid of pretty quickly?

Mr. Alexander: I am sure that we shall take every possible precuation to make the inconvenience as little as possible, but I am afraid I shall get the same representations from almost every estuary in the country.

Mr. Driberg: No, many of these are quite different.

Oral Answers to Questions — COLONIAL EMPIRE (ROADS AND COMMUNICATIONS)

Colonel Lyons: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, to save waste and ensure co-ordination of effort, lie will set up in the larger Colonies, regional as well as territorial, road and communications advisory boards, consisting of official and non-official representatives and arrange for collaboration between such boards and neighbouring non-British colonies.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Colonel Oliver Stanley): I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his suggestion, which I will bear in mind when considering the question of the development and co-ordination of communications in the Colonies.

Oral Answers to Questions — ADEN (SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMME)

Colonel Lyons: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether steps have yet been taken to prepare, by means of a joint official and non-official committee, a five- or 10-year programme of social and economic betterment, covering all the territories and islands administered or controlled by the Governor of Aden.

Colonel Stanley: The first draft of such a programme has been prepared and is now under examination. The Governor proposes to appoint a committee representative of the principal interests in the Colony to examine it in detail.

Colonel Lyons: Can my right hon. and gallant Friend say when that committee will be effective?

Colonel Stanley: No, I cannot,

Oral Answers to Questions — WEST AFRICA (EDUCATION COMMISSION REPORT)

Captain Cobb: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has yet received the Report and recommendations on Education in West Africa from the Commission which was appointed for this purpose.

Colonel Stanley: No, Sir. I understand that the Report may be expected within a few weeks.

Captain Cobb: In view of the fact that this Commission returned from its labours nearly a year ago, is It not undergoing an unduly long period of gestation? Can my right hon. and gallant Friend assure the House that if this Report is delayed much longer, he will take the best surgical advice, with a view to expediting its delivery?

Colonel Stanley: Should the necessity arise I would certainly make use of my hon. and gallant Friend's knowledge of obstetric science. I think it is only fair to this Commission to say that they have a very difficult job to do. The Commission is composed of people who hold a number of important posts which must have first call on their time. I know they have been working extremely hard, and I hope very soon now to have the Report.

Oral Answers to Questions —  BAHAMAS (SECRET BALLOT)

Mr. Creech Jones: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what progress is being made in the Bahamas in connection with the legislation for the secret ballot.

Colonel Stanley: From personal discussion with the Governor and leading members of the Legislature during my recent visit to the Bahamas, I am satisfied that all concerned appreciate the urgency and

importance of this matter. On 22nd January the Governor, in a message inviting the House of Assembly to reconsider this measure, expressed the confident belief that they would no longer withhold the secret ballot from the Out-Islands. That message was referred on 5th February to a Select Committee which has not yet reported.

Oral Answers to Questions —  CYPRUS (STRIKE)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the grievances that led to the strike in Cyprus have now been removed.

Colonel Stanley: I presume the hon. Member is referring to the strike which took place in March of last year. I would refer him to a reply which I gave to a question by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Mathers) on 4th October last.

Mr. Sorensen: Do I understand from that reply that no strike is taking place at the present time?

Colonel Stanley: I certainly have not had any information of one.

Oral Answers to Questions — UGANDA (DEPORTATION ORDER)

Mr. Creech Jones: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he is able to make a statement on the deportation to another part of Uganda of Samwiri S. Wanda, lately principal Minister.

Colonel Stanley: Yes, Sir. Samwiri Wamala has been deported by
the Governor, with the concurrence of the Kabaka, by an Order under the Deportation Ordinance. This Order was made as a consequence of the disturbances last January and as a measure of security pending the report of the Commission of Inquiry to which I referred in my reply on 31st January to the hon. and gallant Member for North St. Pancras (Wing-Commander Grant-Ferris).

Mr. Creech Jones: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman say whether it is suspected that this man was one of the instigators in the recent disturbances?

Colonel Stanley: I am anxious not to express an ex parte opinion of that kind before the decision of this Commission of Inquiry.

Oral Answers to Questions — RAILWAYS

Government Control

Sir Geoffrey Mander: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport if he will consider the advisability of introducing legislation to make pertnanent the war-time regulations for public control of the railways.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport (Mr. Noel-Baker): Under the Railway Control Agreement of 1941 the railways will remain under Government control for at least one year after the cessation of hostilities, and probably longer, There will, therefore, be ample time for the consideration of the important questions of the future.

Sir G. Mander: Will my hon. Friend take care that this great public service is not handed back to private enterprise?

Mr. Rhys Davies: Has my hon. Friend done anything to preclude the possibility of any railway company concentrating its productive work in such a way as to make some of their smaller plants derelict as soon as the war is over?

Mr. Noel-Baker: During the war their production is fully controlled in the national interest.

Sir Henry Morris-Jones: Is it not a fact that a continuation of war-time controls after the war is not desired by the Liberals of this country?

Building Materials (Carriage)

Mr. Lewis: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport if he is aware that the restrictions imposed by his Department on the carriage of various building materials and fittings by rail are causing delay in the carrying out of repairs to war-damaged premises in some districts and if he will give permission for such materials and accessories to be moved by rail to places where they are required for such purposes.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I have received no information that repairs to damaged premises have been delayed by the restrictions which have had to be, imposed on the normal acceptance and movement of traffic on some sections of the railways. There are special arrangements whereby consignments of building materials urgently required for the repair of bomb-damaged buildings may be secured, in

spite of any traffic restrictions. If my hon. Friend will let me know of any cases which he has in mind, I will make inquiries.

L.N.E.R. Coaches (Lighting)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport if he is aware that on certain suburban L.N.E.R. lines some coaches have complete lighting and others partial; and whether he will arrange for all carriages to have complete lighting and for the remaining shades to be removed.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am making inquiries, and I will write to my hon. Friend as soon as I can.

Underground Railway Plans, Glasgow

Mr. McGovern: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport what discussions he has had with Glasgow corporation regarding plans for the construction of an underground railway in Glasgow and district for the purpose of relieving traffic congestion in the post-war period; and whether he proposes to inaugurate an inquiry into this urgent question.

Mr. Noel-Baker: No proposals for the construction of an underground railway in Glasgow have been made to my Department, and there have been no discussions with the corporation on the subject.

Mr. McGovern: Is the Minister aware of the desirability of relieving the tremendous congestion in Glasgow, and will he draw the attention of the Glasgow corporation to the need for developing some form of underground railway in order to relieve that congestion?

Mr. Noel-Baker: On so important a matter as an underground railway, I think I ought to await some initiative from the Glasgow corporation.

Mr. McGovern: Are there any plans ready? Has the Minister been informed of any by the Glasgow corporation?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am not aware of any such plans.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROADS

Controlled Undertakings (Vehicles)

Mr. McKinlay: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport the number of additional new


and secondhand vehicles made available to controlled haulage undertakings during the last two years and the number of such vehicles made available to hired undertakings, giving the figures for Scottish undertakings separately.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Like all other road haulage firms, controlled undertakings, which form part of the Road Haulage Organisation, buy their own vehicles themselves. The records which are kept do not distinguish between new vehicles bought by such undertakings and new vehicles bought by other operators. I regret, therefore, that I am unable to give my hon. Friend the figures for which he asks. The purchase of second-hand goods vehicles is not subject to the Control and Acquisition of Motor Vehicles Order.

Mr. McKinlay: Is my hon. Friend aware that controlled undertakings get the necessary sanction from his Department to acquire new vehicles, and that these permits are denied to hired undertakings of smaller men?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am assured that that suggestion is without foundation. Indeed the controlled undertakings complain that they are less well treated than other people, because the Government have a financial interest in the result, and are more careful about the purchase of vehicles.

Mr. McKinlay: Will my hon. Friend take up this matter with his Edinburgh office and get a return of the additional vehicles being operated by controlled undertakings to the detriment of hired undertakings?

Mr. Noel-Baker: That is a wider question. If my hon. Friend will write to me about it I will see what I can do

Accidents (Cyclists)

Lady Apsley: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport if he can give the figures of cyclists killed on the roads during February, when the black-out was partially raised, as compared with the casualties caused to cyclists during the similar period last year and in a pre-war year.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I regret that the figures of road accidents in February are not yet available. Perhaps my hon. Friend will be good enough to put down another question in the early future.

Oral Answers to Questions — CANALS (POWER-DRIVEN BARGES)

Mr. Chorlton: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether his efforts to increase the traffic on canals by the introduction of power-driven barges have been successful; and will he give the number of these craft now employed.

Mr. Noel-Baker: The number of power-driven craft available for use on inland waterways has increased during the past year from 947 to 970. The improved capacity given by this additional power has been off-set during recent months by a reduction in the volume of traffic available for conveyance on inland waterways. The total traffic carried during the last twelve months has exceeded 11,000,000 tons, which is very little less than the total for the preceding year.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOTEL AND TOURIST INDUSTRY (MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY)

Sir Leonard Lyle: asked the Prime Minister which Minister is primarily responsible for the rehabilitation and development of the hotel and tourist industry in the post-war period; and how far his responsibilities in this connection extend.

Mr. Eden: Several Ministers have a responsibility in this field, including the President of the Board of Trade, the Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade and the Minister of Labour and National Service.

Sir L. Lyle: Is this not a similar problem to the housing problem, in which, when there are four or five Ministers responsible, it is difficult to get something done?

Mr. Eden: I do not think that the analogy of my hon. Friend is at all a correct one. Certainly I should be very reluctant to see a special Minister put in charge of this matter. We have quite enough Ministers already.

Oral Answers to Questions — NORWEGIANS (BRITISH CITIZENSHIP)

Commander Locker-Lampson: asked the Prime Minister whether the offer of British citizenship to Poles who serve with us will be extended to Norwegians similarly placed.

Mr. Eden: In his speech on 27th-February my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that he hoped that it might be possible after consultation with the Dominions to offer British citizenship to any Polish troops who had fought with us who might feel themselves unable or unwilling to return to Poland. I am not aware of any need or wish on the part of Norwegians for special facilities for the acquisition of British citizenship.

Miss Rathbone: In view of the danger to our future security as a great Power, arising from the impending steep decline in our population, should we not welcome the naturalisation of desirable people of whatever nationality, as a means of adding ready-made citizens to our population without the cost of rearing them?

Oral Answers to Questions — FOOD SUPPLIES

British Tomato Growers' Union

Mr. James Griffiths: asked the Minister of Food the reasons for his refusal to recognise the British Tomato Growers' Union; and whether, in the absence of recognition, he proposes to give consideration to the complaints of the members of the union against the existing Tomato Order.

The Minister of Food (Colonel Llewellin): I can assure my hon. Friend that all representations addressed to my Department, whether from associations or from individual growers, are and will be given most careful consideration.

Beet Sugar (Production Cost)

Colonel Sir Arthur Evans: asked the Minister of Food the cost per cwt. of producing beet sugar in this country in each of the years 1938 to 1944; and how much of this cost was paid by public moneys in the form of subsidies, deficiency payments, etc.

Colonel Llewellin: As the answer is rather long and includes a table of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the statement:

The table below shows in terms of a rate per cwt. of sugar produced the cost of producing beet sugar in this country in each of the years 1938–44, and the payment provided from the public funds.

Year.

Net cost of Production.
Rate of Assistance from Public Funds.




s.
d.
s.
d.


1938/39
…
20
2
5
5


1939/40
…
19
2
5
4


1940/41
…
24
1
4
3


1941/42
…
28
3
8
6


1942/43
…
33
3
9
4


1943/44
…
33
3
7
5

The net costs of production represent the costs of sugar production, including the cost of sugar beet and processing costs, after deduction of the proceeds from the sale of by-products.

Coffee Shortage

Mr. Rostron Duckworth: asked the Minister of Food to what he attributes the present shortage of coffee; and whether he has any plans for improving the position.

Colonel Llewellin: The answer to the first part of the Question is that more people are buying it; the answer to the last part is that when we can import more we shall.

Liberated Territories (Food Packets)

Mrs. Cazalet Keir: asked the Minister of Food whether, in view of the increased weight of one pound allowed for letter packets sent to France and four pounds to Belgium, he will permit these packets to include food.

Miss Rathbone: asked the Minister of Food whether permission can be given for packages of food and medical necessaries to be sent to France or any other liberated territory, through some appropriate organisation in this country, at least where evidence is furnished that the designated recipients urgently need such gifts for medical reasons.

Colonel Llewellin: The suggestions made by my hon. Friends, and other matters affecting supplies for civilians in liberated territories in Europe, are being carefully considered. I am not at present in a position to make any statement on the subject, but I hope that it will be possible for such a statement to be made shortly.

White Fish (Price)

Captain McEwen: asked the Minister of Food whether he has come to any conclusions regarding the memorandum, re


cently submitted to him by the Scottish Federation of White Fish Catchers, protesting against reduction of summer prices; and can he now make a statement.

Mr. Henderson Stewart: asked the Minister of Food if he has reached any decision on the request of Scottish inshore fishermen for a review of the proposed summer prices for white fish.

Colonel Llewellin: I am not able to make a statement on the matter at present, but hope to do so shortly.

British Restaurants

Mr. Glenvil Hall: asked the Minister of Food if he will give a list of the local authorities who showed a deficit on their British Restaurants at the close of the financial year 1942–43.

Colonel Llewellin: Yes, Sir. I will send a list to my hon. Friend within the next few days.

Agricultural Workers (Rations)

Mr. Edgar Granville: asked the Minister of Food if it is his intention to increase the rations of agricultural workers and members of the W.L.A. in the coming months.

Colonel Llewellin: I would refer the hon. Member to the full reply which I gave to the hon. and gallant Member for East Norfolk (Colonel Medlicott) on 16th January last.

Mr. Granville: Why is it that, although reports constantly appear in the newspapers, obviously inspired by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's Public Relations, or Press, Department, nothing is done about this matter? Will he take into consideration the fact that industrial canteens have given industrial workers hot meals all through the war, while nothing has been provided for agricultural workers?

Colonel Llewellin: It is obvious that we cannot run industrial canteens in the country districts, but we are giving them meat pies and the extra cheese rations. My hon. Friend will find full details in the reply to which I have referred him.

Whale Meat

Commander Locker-Lampson: asked the Minister of Food whether he will take steps to make full use of the available supply of whale meat, which is at present going to waste.

Colonel Llewellin: Whale meat has a strong fishy smell, and there is therefore considerable difficulty in getting people to take it. If my hon. Friend knows of any way of getting over these difficulties, perhaps he would be good enough to let me know.

Commander Locker-Lampson: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend allow Members of this House to taste and sample this meat?

Wing-Commander Grant-Ferris: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that whale flesh is just like good meat, and that we had quite a lot of it in South Africa?

Mr. Cocks: Will the Minister remember that "the whale that wanders round the Poles is not a table fish"?

Oral Answers to Questions — SALVAGE COLLECTION

Sir Percy Hurd: asked the Minister of Supply whether the compulsory collection of waste food by local authorities will be continued after the war, in order to maintain the supply of sterilised feeding stuffs for pigs and poultry; and, if so, will he advise local authorities to make arrangements accordingly and, where possible, to increase their collections.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. Peat): I am advised by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture that kitchen waste will be wanted as a feeding stuff for pigs and poultry for the next four years, and possibly longer. Every effort is made to stimulate collections when necessary, and local authorities have recently been notified that the maximum collection of kitchen waste will be required for some time after the end of the European war.

Sir P. Hurd: Has my hon. Friend any information that any large number of local authorities are failing to answer the Government's appeal in this matter?

Mr. Peat: Not a large number; and where they are failing, pressure is being brought to bear upon them.

Mr. R. C. Morrison: asked the Minister of Supply whether he can make any statement as to the continued importance of salvage collection by local authorities.

Mr. Peat: Over the country as a whole arisings of certain kinds of waste material


are now sufficient. But there is still a need for special effort in the salvaging of various materials, such as waste paper, rags, bones and kitchen waste, and this need will continue after the European war is over. While I recognise the difficulties with which local authorities and merchants have to contend, from the unavoidable shortage of labour and other causes, I hope that both they and the public will do their best to maintain the supplies of these materials at the highest possible level.

Mr. Morrison: Will the Minister take steps to see that the reply he has just given is communicated to the local authorities?

Mr. Peat: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Alexander Walkden: As a lot of work is being held up through lack of labour, will the hon. Gentleman do all he can to provide labour for the local authorities?

Mr. Peat: Yes, Sir,

Oral Answers to Questions — WAR SAVINGS CERTIFICATES (ARMY POST OFFICES)

Mr. R. C. Morrison: asked the Postmaster-General if he will make arrangements for war savings certificates to be on sale at Army post offices overseas.

The Postmaster - General (Captain Crookshank): An experiment is now being made to see whether the administrative difficulties in selling national savings certificates at Army post offices overseas can be overcome. Meanwhile, national savings certificates can be obtained by soldiers overseas through the unit group savings scheme, or may be purchased through their credit pay balances by completing a Post Office Savings Bank remittance form.

Mr. Morrison: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman keep in mind the fact that it might be useful, particularly on the Italian front, if more facilities were given for soldiers to purchase war savings certificates when they want to send gifts to their relatives at home, as this would save them having to spend their money on rubbishy articles at exorbitant prices?

Captain Crookshank: That is why the experiment is being made. My hon.

Friend will realise that Army field post offices are not places where it is easy to keep a lot of valuable things, like war savings certificates.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOUSING

Temporary Houses, Scotland

Mr. McKinlay: asked the Minister of Works the number of temporary houses of the Phœnix type erected in Scotland to date; where they can be seen; what test has been applied to prove their suitability; where the test took place; and will the suppliers be held resonsible should their prove to be uninhabitable.

The Minister of Works (Mr. Duncan Sandys): No Phœnix houses have as yet been completed in Scotland, though a number are in course of erection. The prototype was thoroughly examined at all stages of construction by the Building Research Station and was approved by the technical Inter-Departmental Committee on Housing Construction. The responsibility for approving the specifications rests with the Ministry of Works, whilst the contractors are responsible for good workmanship in erection.

Mr. McKinlay: Is it fair to local authorities to ask them to accept deliveries of houses of which they have no knowledge? Has the right hon. Gentleman satisfied himself that this type of house is suitable for erection in Scotland?

Mr. Sandys: I have no reason to suppose that Scottish conditions are so different that they will make this type of house unsuitable for use in Scotland. As regards the local authorities, I think that they are for the most part well aware of the different types which are being offered to them. As I have explained previously, this particular type is still in the experimental stage. We are putting up a number in order to test man-hours, costs and certain other questions.

Mr. McKinlay: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if this is an experimental type it is too much to ask local authorities to accept 200 or 300 of them—none of which has arrived? Does not the right hon. Gentleman's answer bear' out the contention that the Ministry of Works would do much better to evacuate Scotland, because they know nothing about conditions in that part of the country?

Mr. McKinlay: asked the Minister of Works if he is aware that the temporary houses built by the Special Housing Association to the specification of his Department are in most cases quite uninhabitable; that tenants are withholding their rent; and if any action is contemplated against the persons responsible for the material and design.

Mr. Sandys: I assume my hon. Friend is referring to the emergency accommodation erected in a few areas in the west of Scotland in 1943. I am aware that in this case trouble has been experienced. Accommodation built elsewhere to the same specifications has, however, proved satisfactory. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland is arranging for an inquiry.

Mr. McKinlay: Is the Minister aware that some of the houses repaired were only completed in the last seven months; that they have been a soggy mess ever since they were erected, and that the Scottish Special Housing Association has been employing, I should say, at least too men filling in the seams of the houses to make them habitable for the people even after they have been occupied? Is this not further proof that the Ministry of Works do not know anything about the job in Scotland, and that they really ought to clear out?

Mr. Sandys: I really do not think that this is a nationalist issue.

Mr. McKinlay: I agree.

Mr. McGovern: It is not; it is a practical issue.

Mr. Sandys: This method of construction does require considerable skill in handling, and that skill has not been available in all cases. This particular method is not being pursued in future, because we tend to have trouble where the necessary experience is not available on the spot.

Building Repairs Limit (Relaxation)

Sir Leonard Lyle: asked the Minister of Works how many persons in southeastern England have so far been prosecuted for carrying out repairs to their premises themselves and for exceeding the—10 limit by reason of the value of materials and their own labour involved; and what action he proposes to take to ensure that this regulation is not applied with undue rigidity.

Mr. Sandys: No prosecutions have been undertaken in the circumstances referred to. I have been considering methods of ensuring that the £10 licensing limit is not too rigidly applied in cases where the householder carries out repairs with his own labour. As a result, I have arranged for the issue of specific guidance to local authorities on this point. In future, applications for licences for repairs and essential maintenance will be freely granted in cases where the only labour to be employed is that of the occupier of the property and members of his family or household. Provided that scarce materials or components on the controlled list are excluded, no limitation will be placed on the materials which may be used. Applications for the repair of small shops will be treated in the same way.

Sir L. Lyle: May I ask the Minister whether that does not still mean that licences will have to be obtained, with all the attendant delay; and whether it would not be better, taking everything into consideration, to do away with this trivial and petty regulation?

Mr. Sandys: I shall send my hon. Friend a copy of the instructions that have been issued. I think he will see that they represent a very considerable relaxation for this class of repairers, and will, I believe, go a very long way to meet the objections to which he has referred.

Lieut.-Colonel Dower: Can the Minister answer my hon. Friend's Question about the difficulty of delay? Very frequently, two or three months are taken in the reply of certain local authorities to the application, and that is what we want to avoid.

Mr. Sandys: I am not prepared, at the moment, to abandon, for this particular clas of work, the use of licences altogether. It would make it only too easy to drive a coach-and-four through the regulations if I am not a little careful.

Technical Publications

Mr. Rostron Duckworth: asked the Minister of Works what information of value to his housing programme has been produced by his research department; what publications are available containing this information; and whether he is satisfied with the degree of publicity they have received.

Mr. Sandys: I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT particulars of the


technical publications issued by the Ministry of Works. I am considering ways of securing a wider circulation for this information. The size of circulation of these publications has varied considerably.

Following are the particulars:

Technical Publications issued by the Ministry of Works.

Housing Equipment (Birmingham).
Housing Manual.
Housing Manual. Technical Appendices.
Demonstration Houses.
Use of Standards in Building.
Method of Building in U.S.A.
Post-war Building Studies;

1. House Construction.
2. Standard Construction for Schools.
3. Plastics.
4. Plumbing.
5. The painting of Buildings.
6. Gas Installations.
7. Steel Structures.
8. Reinforced Concrete Structures.
9. Mechanical Installations.
10. Solid Fuel Installations.
11. Electrical Installations.
12. The Lighting of Buildings.
13. Non-Ferrous Metals.
14. Sound Insulation and Acoustics.
15. Walls, Floors and Roofs.
16. Business Buildings.
17. Farm Buildings.
18. The Architectural Use of Building Materials.
19. Heating and Ventilation.
20. Fire Grading of Buildings.
21. School Buildings for Scotland.
22. Farm Buildings for Scotland.

Plaster Supplies (Liverpool)

Mr. Kirby: asked the Minister of Works whether his attention has been called to the shortage of plaster supplies in Liverpool and the consequent hold-up in building work in that district; and if he will take immediate steps to remedy this shortage.

Mr. Sandys: The demand for hardwall plaster far exceeds the present available supplies. In view of the difficulties experienced in Liverpool, some 60 tons of plaster have been, or are in the process of being, despatched to that area.

Mr. Kirby: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that answer, may I ask him if he will pay particular attention to this matter in that district, and if he can tell us why thousands of houses blitzed over four years ago are still vacant and wanting repairs?

Mr. Sandys: Certainly.

Mr. Logan: Can the Minister give us any idea when the material was despatched, having regard to the immediate need for this particular plaster?

Mr. Sandys: I have not got the figures with me, but I believe I am right in saying that, during the last week or 10 days, 25 tons were sent and that another 35 tons will be sent in the next fortnight.

Mr. Sliverman: Will the Minister say whether it is still his policy to prohibit the transport of all building materials to any part of the country except London? Is that policy still in force?

Mr. Sandys: That has never been the policy. Our policy is to distribute the available building materials over the whole of the country according to need. The needs of London have, of course, been very great in the last few months.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Arthur Greenwood: May I ask the Leader of the House if he can make a statement about the Business for Friday?

Mr. Eden: Yes, Sir. In addition to the Business already announced for consideration on Friday, we propose to take, if there is time, the Lords Amendments to the Teachers (Superannuation) Bill. I understand that these are not formidable.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS

That they have agreed to,—

Compensation of Displaced Officers (War Service) Bill.
Police (His Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary) Bill.
Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, without Amendment.

SELECTION (STANDING COMMITTEES)

Colonel Sir CHARLES MACANDREW reported from the Committee of Selection: That they had discharged the following Member from Standing Committee A: Mr. Henry Brooke; and had appointed in substitution: Mr. Emmott.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Proceedings on Government Business exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. Eden.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1945

Order for Committee read.

12.2 p.m.

The Fist Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
It is my privilege once again to give the House some account of the services which
the Navy has rendered to the country, and to the cause of the United Nations, during the past year. A year ago I spoke of three events which stood out like peaks on the road to victory. This year, all other events have been overshadowed by the operation which brought Allied forces once more to the coast of France, and started for them the last campaign in Europe, which will end only when Germany is defeated. This operation was described by the late Admiral Ramsay in an Order of the Day, as the greatest amphibious operation in history. That description is the simple truth.
The object of an assault operation of this kind, is to secure a lodgment on hostile shores, from which offensive operations can be developed. The naval problem is to break the strong crust of the coast defences by assault, to land the fighting army formations, promptly to reinforce those formations, and to continue to do so, without pause, for five or six weeks at the highest possible rate.
The naval forces required for the assault landing consisted of four main classes: minesweepers, to clear the way for all the ships and the craft which would follow; landing craft and ships of all kinds to carry the soldiers and the guns, tanks, the transport and the other equipment with which they would fight; bombarding ships, whose task, with the Air Force, would be to destroy the enemy's opposition to the landing, and enable the Army to gain the lodgment which it requires before it can begin to deploy its

own weapons; and finally, escort and antisubmarine forces. The minesweepers, the bombarding ships and escort vessels already existed, of course, in the Fleet, though they were required in exceptionally large numbers for this gigantic operation. The landing ships and craft did not exist. They have all had to be developed and provided during the war from our own resources and from those of our Allies.
The process was started as soon as the armies of the United Nations were driven from the Continent, many months before it became fashionable to chalk up on the walls demands for a "Second Front." In the days of the Battle of Britain, however, and for many a month thereafter, our resources had to be devoted mainly to the defensive battle for existence. The urgent need for more and more escort vessels for the defeat of the U-boat, on which all else depended; the need for fighter and bombing aircraft; the need for re-equipping an Army denuded of its weapons—all these had to take priority over the production of the vessels, which one day would carry the fight back to the enemy. Nevertheless, even in the days of the Battle of Britain, a start was made on the special craft and ships which were to make landings in North Africa and Italy, and ultimately the landing in France.
This vast additional programme of construction and conversion, could not be undertaken without interference with existing naval programmes, to repairs and refitting, and to merchant shipbuilding. That interference had to be accepted. Even so, the great numbers- of craft required could not be provided by
existing shipbuilding resources. There were not sufficient men in the industry, and the war against the U-boat was making heavy demands. The Admiralty, therefore, turned to firms of structural engineers for tank landing craft, and to joinery and woodworking firms for the smaller landing craft. These firms and their workers up and down the country, far removed from the sea, and without knowledge of shipbuilding, have, nevertheless, since built hundreds of the craft used on the beaches of Normandy. In the first quarter of 1942, four times as many major landing craft were built as in the first quarter of 1941; in the first quarter of 1943, ten times as many, and in the first quarter of 1944, sixteen times as many.
The larger landing ships, however, could not be provided by this typically British method of adaptation and enterprise. The first two tank landing ships were merchant ships, converted first by Greenwell's, of Sunderland, and Vickers, at Walker-on-Tyne. The first new construction tank
landing ships were built by Harland and Wolff at Belfast. But, with all the other demands on the industry, it was clear that the full programme was beyond the resources of the United Kingdom at the time. Once again the great resources of the United States came to our aid under the Lend-Lease arrangements, both for the larger ships and for very many landing craft. Our pioneer experience was placed at their disposal, and I would like the House to know that the design of many types of United States built landing ships and craft came from Britain.
In this way, the great new Fleet, to include ultimately thousands of ships and craft, was created. While the Fleet with which we are familiar—the battleships, the carriers, the cruisers, the destroyers, the escort vessels, the minesweepers, the submarines and the coastal forces—was still being built and maintained, and was carrying out its traditional and unceasing task of keeping the seas open to ourselves and our Allies, and, of course, denying them to our enemies, this strange new Fleet, containing ships of all sizes and the oddest shapes, each designed and developed for its special purpose, was brought into being. It included ships and craft for landing tanks and infantry, for giving close support fire, for landing guns and transport, for making smoke and even floating kitchens and craft fitted with extending fire escape ladders to put men up cliffs. In all, 4,066 landing ships and craft of over 60 different types took part in the operation.
The creation of a new Fleet was, however, but one part of the Navy's share in the preparation of the assault. The coasts from which the armada would set forth, and which were to maintain the ships supplying the Army when it gained the far shore, had to be so prepared and equipped as to ensure not only that our military power should be firmly established, but should be reinforced thereafter more rapidly than the forces of the enemy. Reinforcement across that unstable and

treacherous element the sea, is much more hazardous and complicated than reinforcement by land. The task was formidable. The ship repairing resources of our country are continuously and heavily engaged in war-time, but special preparations had to be made on a large scale to deal with the shipping casualties to be expected in an undertaking of this kind. An appeal to specialist shipyard workers in the North, to volunteer for repair work in the South, met with a ready and generous response. Men engaged in building new ships and small craft in the South, were drawn on to help with repairs, and the labour force was still further augmented by transfers from local industries of skilled men who, although they had no experience of work on board ship, rapidly adapted themselves to the new conditions. The repair facilities for warships and merchant ships alike employed in the operations were pooled and administered by a central organisation.
Shore works costing several millions of pounds had to be provided before the assault could be launched. These included massive concrete "hards" for embarkation at various points on the coast, with dolphins for mooring the landing craft whilst loading and fuelling, and watering installations for supplying the craft; suspense stations in the back areas and assault stations nearer the embarkation points, to accommodate the personnel of the naval forces before the operation; maintenance bases and repair yards, with slipways for the repair and maintenance of landing craft; bases and areas for training and rehearsal; operational headquarters and miscellaneous requirements, such as covered storage for landing craft, dredging, and emergency dumps. An extensive organisation was set up for the repair of damage to the shore installations during the assault period, manned by Royal Marine engineers and civilian workmen. The whole of this great programme, requiring months and months of planning and labour, was completed by D-Day.
Another massive enterprise, with which several Departments and agencies were associated, was the creation of the two artificial harbours, upon which the success of the whole operation depended. Adequate ports on the enemy shore were essential, to enable the Army to be reinforced sufficiently rapidly to make head against the enemy. Assault against an


established enemy port, however, was certain to meet the most powerful opposition, which would probably delay the gaining of a lodgment sufficiently long to enable the enemy to bring up reinforcements, which would drive our forces back to the sea. An assault over open beaches, much less strongly defended, offered by far the best hope of getting a large force ashore quickly. But this was only half the problem. Once ashore, the Army had to be reinforced more rapidly than the enemy. To rely on the quick capture of an established port was to run great risk of disaster. The only answer was an assault over open beaches, accompanied by the creation of ports for rapid unloading and reinforcement.
The conception, like all great conceptions once made, seemed simple. Its fulfilment was an immense task. It required the preparation and sinking of 60 old ships, which provided breakwaters for both the British and American forces by the fourth day of the assault. In addition to these shelters for shallow draft vessels, two full scale ports, the "Mulberries," as we now call them, were constructed from 6,000-ton concrete caissons towed across the Channel The British port alone used four and a quarter miles of these caissons, weighing approximately 550,000 tens. On the twelfth day of the assault, 1,600 tons were discharged at this port, and by the thirty-fourth day an average of 6,000 tons a day was discharged at that port. One hundred and thirty-two tugs, including British, American, French and Dutch, were employed in towing the units of this harbour from sheltered anchorages in the United Kingdom to the Normandy coast. Nearly 1,000 tows were made for this purpose in June and July. Tugs were mobilised from far and wide to accomplish this mighty task, made the more daunting by the rough and unseasonable weather in the Channel. The moorings in the British area alone included 242 buoys, requiring the handling of 3,265 tons of mooring gear.
Another important part of the preparations was the provision of large coastal areas for combined amphibious assault training. These areas were taken over at the end of 1943. All the inhabitants, with their property and live-stock, had to be removed, in order that training could be carried out under completely realistic con-

ditions. This was vital to the success of the operation. The requisitioning of these areas inevitably caused great inconvenience to the inhabitants, but all possible steps were taken to prevent unnecessary hardship. It may be some satisfaction to those who suffered discomfort and hardship to know that their sacrifices were not in vain.
I have told the House something of the material preparations for the assault of liberation. There is so much more that I could tell, but I must not stay too long over a subject which will be fully described in the histories. I must, however, mention the highly successful operations which were carried out by Coastal Command of the R.A.F. and antisubmarine vessels against enemy U-boats before and after D-Day. These operations so smashed the U-boats that very few penetrated to the convoy routes. Sea mining by the Navy and Bomber Command is continuous, but for some months before the assault the mining programme was planned to give direct assistance to the operation, and achieved considerable success. I must also mention the hazardous and lonely reconnaissances which were made in the very area of the assault to check the depths of water and to examine the nature of the beaches. These highly adventurous missions were carried out with great courage, skill and success right in the face of the enemy for many weeks before the operation and were largely responsible for the smoothness of its execution. The proportion of the total number of landing ships and craft actually available for operations on D-Day was substantially higher than even the high figure assumed in the plan, and reflected very great credit on the maintenance and repair organisations and the men who had volunteered to help.
Apart from the material and operational preparations there was, of course, an immense amount of complicated and detailed thinking and planning to be done over many months, both at the headquarters of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Ramsay, and at the Admiralty. An operation of this complexity and magnitude could not possibly have succeeded without long hours of study, conference, and co-operation between all the elements of the great administrative machine which directs the modern Navy.
With this inadequate survey, however, I must leave the stage of preparation of the operation and come to the assault itself. No single topic was more anxiously debated in the planning of the operation than the date and hour at which it should take place. The appropriate choice depended on conditions of tide, conditions of light, the possibility of postponement for bad weather and other considerations, all of which were most carefully weighed. The date finally chosen was 5th June, with the 6th and 7th as possible alternatives. It was realised that the decision which the Supreme
Commander would have to make actually to launch the operation would be one of the most difficult and far-reaching of the whole war. Not only was good weather necessary for the assaults, but also for the period immediately following them, to ensure a good start for the build-up. The decision was made harder by the fact that one Force had to sail 36 hours before arriving at the point of assault, and we know what changes of weather can take place in so long a period.
No one, however, expected the decision to be as difficult as it actually was. Even those of us who were in London may remember the week-end before D-day, as we watched the low scudding clouds and heard the squalls of wind, as a time of almost unbearable anxiety. For those on whom lay the responsibility for the decision it must have been agonising indeed. The first meeting to discuss the weather forecast for D-day was held on 1st June. The outlook was not very good, and it deteriorated during the next three days. On the evening of 3rd June, however, the Supreme Commander decided to allow the forces to move, despite the unfavourable outlook, in order to gain the many advantages of launching the operation on the first possible day. At 4.15 on the following morning, however, it was clear that conditions the next day would not be acceptable, and a postponement of 24 hours was ordered.
By this time, the whole of one force and a portion of another were at sea, and all these ships and craft had to reverse their course, and return to harbour with some difficulty against a head sea. To make quite certain of their return, aircraft and destroyers were sent after them at full speed. On the evening of the same day, the forecast stated that weather conditions

were very unsettled, and quiet periods were likely to be of short duration. There was a chance of suitable conditions on 6th June, but it was quite impossible to forecast the weather to be expected on 8th June. On the morning of 5th June, the forecast stated that developments overnight showed slight improvement in the general situation, which appeared at that moment more favourable. On the strength of this forecast, the irrevocable decision to make the assault in the early hours of 6th June was taken.
The decision was a terribly hard one. Events leave no doubt that it was right. Had the opportunity been missed, the operation could not have taken place for another fortnight, and by then the weather was even worse. In its combination of high winds and cloud June, 1944, was the worst June of the present century. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the wildness of the weather may have led the enemy to believe that we should not launch the assault, and it may therefore have contributed to his apparent unreadiness, and hence to the astonishing success of the assault. We have every reason to be thankful to the Supreme Commander and his advisers for their courageous decision to launch the operation when they did.
When the assault forces again sailed on 5th June the weather was still unfavourable for landing craft, and the waves were 5 to 6 feet high in mid-Channel. These conditions made the passage difficult, and certainly caused considerable discomfort to the troops embarked in the landing craft. Nevertheless the assault forces all drove on, and almost without exception arrived off their beaches to time. The performance of the leading groups of one of the United States Forces was particularly praiseworthy. Some of them had been unable to enter harbour after the postponement, and by "H" hour their Commanding Officers had been on their bridges continuously for about 70 hours.
Admiral Ramsay said in his despatch that during the passage of the assault forces across the Channel there was an air of unreality, curiously similar to that of the day before the assault on Sicily. The achievement of tactical surprise in the operation against Normandy had always seemed extremely unlikely. But as our forces approached the French coast, without a murmur from the enemy, it was slowly realised that once again almost complete tactical surprise had been


achieved. This can be attributed to a number of causes, amongst them the great air superiority attained by our air forces, which drastically reduced the enemy's air reconnaissance; the bad weather, which caused the enemy to withdraw his E-boat patrols to Cherbourg; and the very high standard of security which had been maintained, although many hundreds of people necessarily knew the details of the plan.
To the minesweepers fell the proud and dangerous honour of leading the assault forces to the beaches. The sweeping of ten approach channels was the largest single minesweeping operation ever undertaken in war. Three hundred and nine British, 16 Canadian, and 22 United States minesweepers took part in these operations. It was only possible to provide all the minesweepers required by drawing upon some which had had little opportunity of practice, though it was realised that to carry the minesweeping operations through successfully would demand a high degree of skill from all. The problem was aggravated by the fact that the strong Channel tides ran east and west, and happened to change direction during the actual passage of the assault convoys. All flotillas were compelled to change sweeps during passage, to avoid sweeping with an unfavourable tide. Because the minesweeping flotillas had to lead the convoys, the accurate navigation of every convoy fell on the senior minesweeper officers. Moreover, the numerous assault convoys all had to arrive simultaneously at a given point, although their speeds of advance must vary. The whole of this phase of the operation went without hitch—a great achievement. It was only the beginning of the task of the minesweepers, which then had to widen all the approach channels and to sweep areas off the beaches for the reception of the vast numbers of ships needed to keep the Army supplied. This was in the face of the heaviest concentrated minelaying attack ever carried out by the enemy, and-sustained against us for over two months. For the minesweepers the operation was the greatest single achievement of a never-ending labour in which they have now swept over 15,000 mines in the swept channels and the port approaches since the beginning of the war. If every one had taken a ship we should not now have any ships. The mine-sweeping forces have, indeed, throughout performed their duties with an efficiency and gallantry

deserving high praise, or in other words, so often roughly summed up by the naval officer as having been "correct conduct."
The next forces to go into action were the bombardment ships. These comprised several battleships, including the old and trusted warriors "Warspite" and "Ramillies," 22 cruisers, and many destroyers and gun support craft. These forces took part in the drenching of the beach defences immediately before the assault. Their fire was accurate and heavy, and the defence was neutralised and demoralised, except on one beach, where for special reasons the opposition was much stiffer than elsewhere. As one of the bombarding forces arrived in position at 5.15 a.m., four enemy E-boats and some armed trawlers from Le Havre made a half-hearted attack, and sank one Norwegian destroyer by torpedo. Our forces sank an enemy trawler, and damaged another, and the attack was not renewed. The fire from enemy batteries was generally not over severe. At first it was directed against the bombarding ships only, and was largely ineffective. This no doubt reflected the success of the bombing carried out before D-Day, and the heavy air bombardment in the early hours of D-Day.
Then came the moment for which the whole world had waited: the moment when Allied Forces again set foot on the soil of France. Our stricken Allies on the Continent had waited with never dying hope; our enemies with dread; ourselves with an impatience which might have provoked leaders less resolute and wise to rash and premature enterprise. But now the hour was ripe. Now did our Forces
stand like greyhounds in the slips.
Now the flood would roll on until a whole Continent was cleansed. The landings went closely to plan, though in one sector the rough sea impeded our forces, and enemy opposition was particularly severe. The support destroyers and gun support craft, however, stood close inshore during the fiercest fighting on this beach, and gave support to the American troops, whose gallantry and determination won unanimous tribute from the naval forces who observed them.
The outstanding fact of the day was that, despite the unfavourable weather, the naval operations were carried out in every important respect as planned.


Tactical surprise, which had not been expected, was achieved. Losses of ships and landing craft of all types were much lower than had been expected, though damage to tank landing craft and smaller craft, aggravated by the rough weather, was higher than had been estimated. Before the operation, we had to count on heavy and bitter casualties as part of the price of gaining a foothold on the Continent. The smallness of the actual casualties is something for which we can never be sufficiently thankful. Of course, to the relatives of those who were lost, the loss is none the less grievous. To them I beg to offer sympathy. Their grief is the heaviest part of the burden of rescuing the world from a monstrous evil. I only hope that the greatness of the cause may comfort them in their sorrow.
No air attacks were made on our shipping or on our landing beaches during the day. This was striking witness to the air superiority attained before D-day. By the end of D-day there was immediate anxiety on one score only: whether the weather would improve sufficiently quickly to enable the build-up to start as planned. The main tasks of the Navy after D-day, were to bring the Army and its supplies across the Channel, and to support the Army in its progress inland by fire from naval guns. The military supplies and personnel were carried in a great number of naval landing ships and craft, in some 250 British and American ocean-going merchant ships and troop transports and in about 500 British and Allied coasting vessels. This mass of shipping had to be loaded at widely separated ports and bases, sailed to join convoys to the far shore, to be discharged and then to return in convoy for reloading, at a rate far greater than any similar movement by sea previously attempted. During the first three days of the operation, 38 convoys, comprising 743 ships and major landing craft, were sent across the Channel for the build-up. This, of course, excludes the assault forces. A convoy system of such complexity and speed could only be maintained by the untiring efforts and devotion to duty of the naval and military shore stations, and, of course, of the crews of all the warships and merchant vessels employed.
I do not claim that everything went precisely "according to plan." The weather alone prevented that. On 19th

June a great gale blew up and at once stopped all unloading to the beaches. The sea did not finally go down until 23rd June, and, meanwhile, we had suffered severe delay in unloading and damage to a great number of craft. The Army were naturally urgent in their desire for the maximum rate of reinforcement and supplies of all kinds, but it may be said that the position of the Expeditionary Force was never in doubt after the third day of the assault. On 1st July the Chief Administrative Officer to the Supreme Commander was able to report that
the Commanders in the field had complete freedom of action so far as the administrative arrangements were concerned.
I think therefore that it can be claimed that, in spite of all difficulties, the Navy had met the Army's requirements of reinforcement and maintenance. Naval bombardment of enemy targets was maintained until our forces had passed beyond the range of the Naval guns. By common consent, including the, enemy's, this fire was of great weight, accuracy and effectiveness. A total of 56,769 rounds of ammunition of a calibre of 4.7" and over was expended in bombardment in the course of the operation, including nearly 3,000 rounds of battleships' heavy ammunition. The great value of this form of bombardment is that it can be maintained against a given target as long as required. The naval fire undoubtedly helped the Army greatly, in gaining sufficient ground to assemble its forces and material for the attack which was finally to flood across France and Belgium.
The Royal Marines found full scope for their unique qualities in an amphibious operation of this kind. They discharged a variety of tasks in a manner befitting the highest traditions of the Corps. In the Fleet, they manned a quarter of the main armament of battleships and cruisers. They manned two-thirds of the assault landing craft
which landed the first waves of infantry on the beaches. They manned all the minor landing craft in the build-up squadrons. They provided the, gunnery officers and guns' crews for support landing craft, gun landing craft and flak landing craft, which gave close support to the assault and helped to defend shipping in Seine Bay. Five Royal Marine Commandos were employed in the assault. Amongst other tasks, these assaulted and captured Porten-Bessin between the initial bridgeheads


of the British and American forces. This particular Commando lost one-third of its assault craft by mines in the landing. Many personnel, however, swam ashore and re-equipped themselves with enemy weapons, which they captured while fighting their way ten miles across country towards the port, which they then took by assault on the second day. At a later stage of the operations the Royal Marines, as the House will remember, carried out a most gallant and successful attack against Walcheren Island, for the clearance of the Scheldt, which I have previously described.
With sixteen convoys and about the same number of landing craft groups at sea in the Channel at any one time, open to attack by mines, E-boats, aircraft and U-boats, with an enemy on both flanks using light naval forces and shore guns, the days did not pass without incident. Every day a number of actions would be fought, and our ships would suffer casualties and damage. But no matter how the enemy tried to sink our ships, he was fought generally with success. In spite of all, the build-up went on quickly. By the tenth day half a million men and 77,000 vehicles had been landed. The one
millionth man was landed by 6th July; by the end of July over 1,600,000 men, 340,000 vehicles and 1,700,000 tons of stores had been landed. The volume of stores handled on the beaches of Normandy in June and July was more than one-third of the total imports of dry cargo into the whole of the United Kingdom during the same period. These astonishing results could not have been achieved, of course, without great
exertions and good organisation by the Home Commands, with Portsmouth in the central position. Admiral Ramsay paid a notable tribute to their co-operation and smooth working.
There are many other features of this great operation which I could describe to the House if there were time. For example, the great labours of the salvage organisation, and the work of the members of the Royal Observer Corps who were specially appointed to merchant ships to assist in aircraft recognition. All these matters will find their place in the histories, and become an imperishable part of our country's story.
Although the operation itself was carried out so smoothly, and although

success has attended our arms since that time, for the people of the occupied countries the joy of liberation has been tempered by the sacrifices which they have been called upon to make. The driving of the foe from their territory has not meant the end of privation, of shortages of food and of other necessities. These sacrifices have been necessary in order to free their countries, and they have been accepted as such. One of the great difficulties has been the shortage of shipping, and it is a big problem to find enough ships to supply our forces in Europe and other parts of the globe, and to take supplies to stricken Europe. The repair yards of our country, too, have had an enormous extra strain put upon them by the concentration of shipping which has had to be made in United Kingdom ports over the last year. Great efforts will be called for to make every possible ton of merchant shipping available for the many tasks that confront us, and I ask the help of both employers and workers in the yards.
I have made few specific references to the work of the Americans, the Canadians and our other Allies in this operation. This is not, of course, because I do not recognise the tremendous part which they bore in the enterprise, but because the enterprise was essentially one of the United Nations, and not of any nation in particular. It would not, I think, be the wish of that great and generous man, General Eisenhower, and it is certainly not my wish, that we should attempt to estimate the exact share of each of the Allies in this crusade for the liberation of Europe and mankind from the German plague. Let it suffice that all bore their part bravely, and worked together as one company.
Before I turn from this part of my account, I should like to ask the House to remember with me for a few moments the distinguished Admiral whose loss we mourned a few weeks ago—Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay—who, under General Eisenhower, commanded all the naval forces taking part in this historic mission. The record of Admiral Ramsay in this war is truly remarkable. Recalled from retirement at the outbreak, he found himself in 1940 in command of the naval base at Dover. Thus it fell to him to be the chief organiser of the withdrawal from the Continent of our Army and the remnant of its equipment. It had seemed impossible


that we could rescue these men from their desperate plight after the fall of France. By a supreme effort 335,490 officers and men of the Allied armies were brought back to England, under fire and in the face of great difficulties, in about a thousand of His Majesty's ships and other craft between 27th May and 4th June. Admiral Ramsay's courage, drive, and skill as an organiser enabled us on that occasion to retrieve sufficient from the wreck to begin to build again, and to carry on in faith at a time when the world believed that we were defeated.
After planning the invasion of North Africa in 1942, Admiral Ramsay was appointed Naval Commander of the Eastern Task Force, to plan and conduct, under Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, the British naval part of the operations against Sicily. He planned wisely and carefully, he executed skilfully, and the operation was a conspicuous success.
It was supremely fitting that the man who brought the Army away from the Continent at a bitter time should have the task of organising the naval assault which was to place our soldiers once more in contact with the enemy in France, re-equipped and superbly confident. The withdrawal from Dunkirk was made in every kind of craft, with every kind of crew, hastily brought together from all the rivers and ports of the island. The return to the Continent was made in a fine new fleet of craft, each specially built for its purpose, manned by crews who had undergone prolonged and rigorous training. The whole enterprise was planned to the last detail, so that not even bad weather could seriously divert it. If Dunkirk was a miracle of improvisation, the naval assault on Normandy was a masterpiece of organisation, and Admiral Ramsay was the architect of both. Deeply though we must deplore his loss, we cannot but rejoice that he lived to see the full cycle from the desperate days of Dunkirk to the triumphant return to France.
A year ago I described to the House the decisive turn which had taken place in the war against the U-boats. The mastery
which was then achieved has been maintained. At the beginning of 1944 the main U-boat effort was in the North Atlantic. Here the U-boats were so harassed by surface forces and by shore-

based and carrier-borne aircraft that they achieved very little, and suffered heavy losses. In the Spring the U-boats began to withdraw from the North Atlantic convoy routes, probably to re-train and re-equip after their defeat, and to prepare against the threat of our landings on the Continent. During these operations they suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Allied Navies and Coastal Command. With the loss or neutralisation of the Biscay ports, the U-boats were withdrawn to operate from the Norwegian bases, and they are, as a result, considerably further from their old hunting-ground in mid-Atlantic. The enemy has, however, managed to maintain small numbers of U-boats in widely separated areas with the object of dispersing our anti-submarine forces. The U-boats have operated off the Canadian coast, West Africa, Gibraltar, Iceland and in the Indian Ocean. From Norway they have made their biggest concerted effort against the North Russian convoys, with results inconsiderable to them in proportion to the forces they employed. In spite of appalling weather during these convoys, heavy casualties have been inflicted on the enemy.
The Prime Minister and the President of the United States announced last August that more than 500 German U-boats had already been sunk. The number continues to increase satisfactorily. We have also destroyed a number of enemy midget submarines. Despite these continued and encouraging successses, however, it must certainly not be assumed that the war against the U-boat is over. The enemy is employing new equipment, and new types of U-boat may be used at any time. With this new equipment we may be sure they will develop new tactics. In recent months, after a long period of comparative quiet, U-boats have appeared in the coastal waters around the United Kingdom. So far their successes have been small, but we believe that the enemy has been making great efforts to renew the U-boat war on a big scale. It is highly significant that after the trouncing which the U-boats suffered in 1943, the enemy should consider it worth while to continue to devote so large a part of his resources to this form of warfare. It shows that he still considers it to be his best hope of averting defeat against a nation which lives by sea-borne supplies. This is a highly im-


portant fact which will, I trust, never be forgotten by future First Lords, future Boards of Admiralty, or future Governments, or by the people of this country.
The Home Fleet, now under the command of Admiral Sir Henry Moore, had no opportunity during the past year to compare with the sinking of the "Scharnhorst" in 1943. The "Tirpitz" was finally disposed of by
Bomber Command, after being immobilized
for long periods by midget submarines, by the Fleet Air Arm, and the R.A.F. Nevertheless, the Fleet has by no means lacked occupation of the most arduous and hazardous kind. It has carried out a further regular series of convoys to North Russia, in which a remarkably high proportion of the merchant ships have been brought safely to port with their precious cargoes. Merchant ships, warships and aircraft have, however, been lost in these operations, at a cost to the enemy of both U-boats and aircraft. The Navy is ready to pay this price and to face appalling weather in order to bring aid to our Russian Allies in the offensives
which have amazed the world. A total of over 4,000,000 tons of supplies has been delivered in convoy to the U.S.S.R., through the North Russian ports, of which over 2,000,000 tons have arrived since the beginning of 1944.
Apart from the protection of North Russian convoys, some 30 operations were carried
out by ships of the Home Fleet during 1944. These included attacks on the "Tirpitz" by carrier-borne aircraft before she was finally destroyed, minelaying operations on the coast of Norway, and attacks on enemy shipping by both naval aircraft and surface forces. For example, the "Tirpitz" was successfully bombed on the 3rd April by Barracudas from His Majesty's ships "Victorious" and "Furious," and put out of action for several months. On 12th November an enemy convoy off the Norwegian coast was destroyed by a force of cruisers and destroyers.
The submarines, British and Allied, have carried out patrols and operations in many parts of the world. They have robbed the enemy of merchant ships, large and small, and U-boats and other warships. They have mined enemy waters; they have bombarded shore targets. In a different role they have rescued friendly airmen. In the Far East they are doing work that only a submarine can do. Their

areas are well outside the range of our shore-based aircraft and surface ships cannot operate in the inland waters into which submarines constantly penetrate. There is no service which calls for more technical skill, cooler heads and steadier nerve than these lonely exploits. The light coastal forces, that dashing company in which nine out of ten officers and men were civilians before the war, have had another successful year, in world-wide activities, sinking, destroying, capturing and damaging supply ships, escort vessels of all kinds, destroyers, E-boats and other enemy vessels. The proportion of continuous service ratings in coastal forces is being increased in order to preserve wartime experience for peace.
The Mediterranean, which for some four years was the scene of some of the grimmest and most desperate naval warfare in history, has had a quieter year. From Spring to early Summer no major operations took place in this theatre, and the Navy was principally occupied in supporting the advance of the Armies in Italy, and carrying out minor harrying operations in the Adriatic and the Tyrrhenian Sea. Minor vessels assisted partisans operating on the Dalmatian coast and islands. Six weeks after the assault on Normandy, however, United States and French troops launched an attack in the South of France supported by naval forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Greece and Poland, including battleships, escort carriers, cruisers and many smaller vessels. I might mention that the Prime Minister saw the operation from the bridge of a destroyer. There was little enemy naval opposition, and that was speedily extinguished.
With the complete success of this operation, major naval activity in the Mediterranean came to an end. To no one can this consummation have been more welcome than to the present First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had led our woefully inadequate forces through the dark days in that theatre with incomparable courage and tenacity. I must, however, mention the operations in the Aegean in September by our escort carriers with cruisers and destroyers in which the enemy's sea-borne communications with Crete were almost cut, and a number of his transport and other ships sunk. In October the Fifteenth Cruiser Squadron with destroyers and


minesweepers led the re-entry into Greece, carrying troops, jeeps and stores to the Piraeus. Afterwards the Navy played a notable part in carrying relief to the liberated population.
Meanwhile we have been building up the British share of the growing might against Japan. The Eastern war is fought across enormous ocean spaces, and brings problems of maintenance, supply, repair, and welfare of a kind quite different from those, for example, of the assault on Normandy. Provision for these problems cannot be made by hasty improvisation, and cannot be left until the German war is over, if the Navy is to play its full and worthy part alongside the United States Forces in the speedy overthrow of the Japanese Empire. Thus, all the time these great events have been taking place close at home, we have been steadily massing Forces for the Far East, with the great Fleet Train of supply, accommodation, repair and amenity ships which they will require to sustain them.
Early in 1944 it was possible to send considerable reinforcements to the Eastern Fleet. Up to that time this Fleet had succeeded in keeping open the vital lines of communication in a vast ocean, although it had at times been very weak, in spite of occasional reinforcements lent from other Fleets. The Fleet now included amongst other vessels the battleships "Queen Elizabeth" and "Valiant," the battle cruiser "Renown", and that fine French battleship the "Richelieu", United States and British aircraft carriers, several British cruisers, Her Netherlands' Majesty's ship "Tromp" and British, American and Dutch destroyers were also included.
With these Forces, Admiral Sir James Somerville launched an offensive against ports, aerodromes and vital oil refineries. On 19th April, an air attack was made against Sabang and North Sumatra, in which two destroyer escort vessels were set on fire, two merchant ships heavily damaged, 23 aircraft destroyed, and port facilities damaged and dislocated. On 17th May, the Japanese naval base at Surabaya was attacked, and the enemy suffered loss or damage to 10 ships, two floating docks and 21 aircraft, and the destruction of an oil refinery. In this operation—which will illustrate the difficulties of the area—our Forces steamed as far as from Southampton to New York

and back. A strike against Port Blair, the bombardment of Surabaya, and the bombing of aerodromes in the vicinity, and a strike on the Indaroeng cement works, and Emmahaven in Sumatra, all followed in quick succession.
In August, 1944, Sir Bruce Fraser succeeded Sir James Somerville as the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet, and in November became Commander-in-Chief British Pacific Fleet, flying his flag in H.M.S. "Howe." He will doubtless have renewed opportunities in this capacity to display the leadership and foresight which enabled the Home Fleet under his command to destroy the "Scharnhorst." At the same time Admiral Sir Arthur Power assumed command of the East Indies Fleet. In the Indian Ocean, the Navy has supported the successful operations of the Fourteenth Army in Burma, and has maintained a series of harassing attacks, including an air strike on the railway repair centre at Sigli in Sumatra, and bombardment and air attacks against targets in the Nicobar Islands on a number of occasions. In December
the harbour, railway yards, and oil installations at Belawan Deli were bombed by carrier-borne naval aircraft, and in January an oil refinery in the same area was successfully attacked. On 22nd and 29th January, the vital oil refinery at Palembang was attacked with great success. The Fleet by then included the battleship "King George V" and the aircraft carriers "Indomitable," "Indefatigable," "Illustrious" and "Victorious." These operations are but the beginning of the tasks of the British Pacific Fleet and the East Indies Fleet, which will continue to be reinforced and supplied, so that they may play an ever-growing part in the defeat of Japan.
The Navy's air power has continued to grow, and to make the most of its opportunities. In the first few months of 1944 carrier strength was considerably increased, and new types of aircraft, both British and American, came into service and enabled the Fleet to destroy and harry enemy supply ships off the Norwegian coast. Operating from escort carriers they had Signal success in sinking U-boats and downing aircraft attacking the convoys to Russia, and the smallness of the losses in these convoys was largely due to their efforts, In all the major assault operations, naval aircraft have provided fighter protection and have


given support to the Armies. A naval fighter wing assisted the Royal Air Force in the Normandy landings, and spotted for the bombarding ships. Most valuable experience was gained in co-operation with the Americans, in providing air cover for the landings in the South of France, and supporting the Army. This experience will stand us in good stead in our united operations against Japan. We hope and expect that, in the Far Eastern war, the Naval Air Arm will have greater opportunities and greater successes than ever before.
The Dominion Navies have grown in numbers and strength, and co-operation between the Naval Forces of the Empire has never been closer. A notable example is the mutual assistance of the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy. During the past two years we have placed at the disposal of the enormously expanded Royal Canadian Navy a number of warships, and large numbers of corvettes, minesweepers and frigates have been built in Canada and transferred to the Royal Navy. Canada has concentrated her warship production resources on ships of the escort vessel type, and the addition of cruisers and Fleet destroyers from United Kingdom construction, has enabled the R.C.N. to attain a balanced force of modern ships. The following ships have been transferred to them:

1 new construction 6-inch cruiser,
1 modern 6-inch cruiser of the "Fiji" class,
2 new construction Fleet destroyers, and
6 escort destroyers.

Units of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy are operating in the British Pacific Fleet, under the command of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser.
A large force of His Majesty's Australian ships, including cruisers and many other vessels, is operating in South West Pacific waters. The South African naval forces have been able to pay off numerous coastal craft. The experienced seamen so provided are manning three frigates to be employed on ocean escort work. South African naval personnel are to be found in many parts of the world, serving alongside the Royal Navy. The Royal Indian Navy has contributed several ocean-going escorts to the East Indies Fleet, in addi-

tion to its normal work on the Indian coast. It also took a prominent and successful part in the capture of Akyab and in operations on the Arakan coast.
I have confined myself in my account to the House to-day almost entirely to the operations which the Royal Navy has carried out in all parts of the world in the past year, and I have left myself no time to speak of the administrative problems which underlie every operation that is undertaken, and whose solution is the first necessity for their success. During the past year we have seen a great part of the results of the planning and toil of the years before, and I thought therefore that the House would be glad to hear in some detail about the operations which have been our goal, and which are now encompassing the enemy's downfall. The administrative problems which I have mentioned include the provision, the training, the health, the welfare and the equipment of the officers, men, and women, upon whose courage and efficiency all else depends; the development and production of ships and weapons, constantly changing, in the never ending battle of the scientists and technicians; the problems of transport and supply; of labour and administration. All these demand unceasing attention. I trust that the account I have given to-day is sufficient demonstration that these problems have, in the main, been successfully solved in past operations. Similar problems are engaging the closest attention of the Board of Admiralty, to ensure the success of future operations for the defeat of Japan. The morale and welfare of our men in the Pacific and Indian Oceans take the highest place in our administrative planning. A large share of the task of defeating Japan will fall upon the men of the Royal and Merchant Navies. They must not be forgotten when war in Europe ends. They, and their dependants, will deserve the full support of their countrymen. We are doing, and shall continue to do, all we can for their welfare.
It is sometimes suggested that the Admiralty is deliberately and unnecessarily reticent in telling the world about the deeds of the Navy. I assure the House that this is not so. The Board of Admiralty is certainly not deficient in parental pride. We are at least as anxious to proclaim the deeds and successes of the officers and men of the Royal Navy as


the world is to hear of them. But the announcement and description of naval operations is subject to limitations
which do not always apply to the sister Services. Operations frequently take place far away in the ocean spaces. Wireless silence cannot be broken to send an account of them home. It may be several days before the Forces return to base and can tell their story, and by then some more immediate event may make a greater claim on the attention of the public. When an escort vessel sinks a U-boat it is rarely possible for a photograph to show the loss; the U-boat is rapidly swallowed in the deep. The Navy cannot show by arrows on a map a front advancing against the enemy; its only front is the boundaries of the oceans themselves. A great part of its service to the nation is unspectacular, the endless sweeping of mines, the dogged patrol, ever alert against the U-boat, the ceaseless watch of the escort vessel against aircraft.
I do not think, however, that this paucity of photographs showing the destruction wrought by the Navy on the enemy, or lack of maps to show its progress against the U-boat, will cause the House or the people of this country really to forget or under-rate its services. The stirring successes of our Armies on the Continent, the tremendous havoc spread by our Air Forces, the very food by which we live, all serve to remind us, daily and hourly, that without the Navy to ensure the safe arrival of supplies in this country we could undertake no offensive against the enemy. We could not even live. I therefore ask the House to-day, not only for money for the naval Service, but for a renewal of that confidence, pride and affection for naval officers and men which is, surely, their due, which they have received so generously in the past, and on which they rely to sustain and strengthen them in the remaining stages of the long and toilsome road to peace.
May I be allowed a personal word? I have just submitted for the fifth time in the course of the war the report of the work of the Navy. It may be that political exigencies in the course of the next year may mean that I shall no longer stand at this Box as First Lord in this type of Government. What the future has in store no one can tell, but I should not like to complete the task of reporting to the House to-day without

saying, first, how enormously grateful I am to Members in all parties, for five years of very great and sympathetic consideration. We could not have done as well at the Admiralty if you had not given us a great deal of "veer and haul." May I say, too, how much I am indebted to the civil and naval staffs at the Admiralty. I should feel that it would be a great remissness on my part if at this stage I did not make a special point of the grand way in which they have backed up the Government and the Forces at sea, in the air and on the land.
May I also record my personal faith? I have never been more convinced in my life of the continuing need of this country for the maintenance of its Navy. We have had five years experience of war, which has shown exactly how the Navy has had once more to fight a long defensive battle at sea, sufficiently long to regain the confidence of the world in us, sufficiently long to get the sea routes clear, sufficiently long to gather Allies and to mount up our land Forces, and finally to throw them on the Continent against the land monster which had encroached upon it. That was the story, in Napoleon's day of Samuel Hood and Nelson. This has been the story, in Hitler's case of Cunningham, Tovey, Fraser and Ramsay. I hope we shall never forget.

1.8 p.m.

Major F. W. Cundiff: We have listened this morning to a moving and glorious account of our Navy at war and I think no one could tell the story better than the First Lord himself. I have listened to him on many occasions, and I think I have always ended up with the same feeling, the thrill of a school boy. The First Lord has to-day expressed his gratitude to the House, but I think this House would be only too glad and too willing to express its gratitude to him. I should like to tell the House, and the First Lord, a story. Some time ago, I joined a minesweeper for the purpose of an instructional sweep. It so happened that, some little time before, the First Lord himself had been a guest aboard this ship and actually carried out an operational sweep with them. Not unnaturally, I asked the commander how he liked having the First Lord aboard. I should like to give the commander's reply verbatim to the best


of my ability. He said, "Well, the First Lord came aboard with a few Staff blokes and we put out to sea. Admittedly the weather was very bad. The Staff members very soon started to throw up their hearts into the buckets provided, bust not so the First Lord. He went down into the little wardroom and had a jolly good meal and a cigar. He stayed with us for the whole sweep. He spoke to every man in the ship and we were thrilled to have him. The weather continued bad up to the time of getting back into port. The Staff members were still doing their stuff with the buckets and the First Lord again went down into the little wardroom and had another good meal and another cigar. By that time he had pinched most of our cigars, but we thought what a grand fellow he was." This is our Navy at war—cheerful, hospitable, efficient, a Service which has never given anything less than its best and its utmost.
I should like to go back to the early part of 1940, when we fought our first naval action, the Battle of the River Plate—the "Graf Spee," a fast, heavily-armed cruiser against a very much lighter squadron. At no time was there a question that we could out-range or out-gun the "Graf Spee" but, nevertheless, she was battered, she was out-fought by smaller guns—a brilliant, tactical display of grand courage. I think I am correct in stating that the fighting efficiency of that light cruiser squadron was so high that, at no time during the action, was any operational signal sent from the flagship. So the naval war went on. We had destroyer actions off Norway, we had the Navy's part in bringing home our men from Dunkirk, we had many actions in the Mediterranean, and the whole of this time we were fighting an enormous U-boat battle in the North and South Atlantic, coupled with very heavy convoy duties. Perhaps the grimmest job of all was the Russian convoys with the intense cold, the long night watches, the enormous strain on watch-keeping officers going ahead at full speed, and suddenly imagining another ship crossing one's bows when in reality there was no ship there at all, and the losses we sustained. I hope that some time in the near future we shall tell the world what we have done for Russia, and the enormous effort which the Navy has put out. It is one of the grandest things which has been done in this war.
I have intervened in this Debate to make two points, and I want to make them in the form of pleas to the First Lord. I know that his judgment is very highly thought of in technical quarters, and I would ask him whether he will do what he can to make sure that we learn the technical lessons in ship construction and armament which this war has taught us. With regard to guns, sometimes I think that our ships have not always been armed in the best possible way. I have no experience of big ships, but with regard to smaller ships, it has always seemed to me that we were much better off with a multiplicity of small quick-firing guns in preference to medium and larger armaments. I think, too, that we might have had a more generous number of depth charge throwers, and I think that there is room for improvement in deck armour and deck protection. Then there is the question of watertight bulkheads. I raise this last point because in battle it is inevitable that some ships will be lost, but what I think is the greater tragedy is the very quick rate at which some of our ships have gone down. I wonder whether anything can be done in the way of more watertight bulkheads so that, if a ship is going down, she will sink at a slower rate and it will give us a chance to get the men up from below decks.
My last point is one which has caused me and many of my friends a good deal of anxiety, and I would plead with the First Lord to give it his serious consideration. I refer to the question of another naval and air base in the Mediterranean, and I make no apology for repeating what I have already said in the House. Never again must Malta be let down as she was in the early part of this war. It has been definitely proved that Alexandria as a port is of very little use where aircraft are employed when we have to consider Malta's protection. Therefore, it seems to me that we require another
naval and air base somewhere in the Eastern half of the Mediterranean on the African coast. I am not concerned whether we have to take something off Italy. We have fought this war for our own preservation, and never again must the Mediterranean be closed. Therefore, if it is thought that a strip of land round Tripoli and another round Benghazi is necessary for our future protection, we


should take those strips. We fought for ourselves; we have not fought for the preservation of Italian colonies.

1.21 p.m.

Mr. Dobbie: We have listened to-day to a statement from the First Lord of the Admiralty full of confidence in the future and pride in the past accomplishments of the Royal Navy. We all share that confidence and pride. In view of the fact that I am a layman and that there are a large number of Members who are experts with experience in the Admiralty, some of whom are still serving, I would like to borrow some of the self-confidence of the First Lord which he showed in presenting his case to-day. I feel rather hesitant in face of all the experience of the experts, one of whom we have just heard. The position of the First Lord in presenting his statement to-day is unparalleled in modern times, if not in the history of our nation. Never in modem times has a First Lord, in asking for the necessary money to maintain the Navy, been able to present such a remarkable record of achievement. He has told us in some detail what we already knew in outline, how the Navy has kept our sea communications in all the seas, from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean, so that the British war effort overseas has been enabled to develop without interruption and the armies of liberation to be landed against the West wall. I wish that that story could be broadcast in its entirety to the homes of the people of this country. They would then understand that the enemy's sea power, which is a combination of U-boats, aircraft, and heavy surface ships, which reached its zenith in 1942 and early 1943, has to-day been practically shattered.
The Minister has issued a word of warning about the likelihood of a resurgence of U-boat activity. Again I speak as one who has very limited knowledge, but I have a tremendous confidence in the power of our Navy, and it seems to me that our sea communications will not be menaced again to the same extent as in the years through which we have just lived. The greatness of our danger and the smallness of the resources with which we had to meet it, has made a story which nothing in the traditions of the Royal Navy excels, and it will, I believe, go down on record through posterity as

one of the most magnificent fighting organisational achievements of all times. I believe that, and I believe that it has convinced opinion of the people of the country behind it. If the U-boat should come back in strength with new devices, new apparatus and a new determination at this late stage of the war, I think that, with our experience and the courage and capacity of those at the Admiralty and those who man the ships, we need not doubt that, though we may suffer some losses, we shall once again master it. There is one thing about the U-boat war which is worth noting. Although so terrible and so drastic, it is very unspectacular. It is an aspect of the Navy's work which, by its very nature, cannot be adequately presented at the moment when it takes place. When it is presented to the general public it has not lost its value to the nation, but, so far as the Press and the general public are concerned, it has lost news value. I am confident, however, that the House will permit me to say that we in the House of Commons and those we represent are under no illusions about the nature of the threat to our freedom and to victory. We are under no illusions either as to the skill, bravery, courage and determination by which it has been surmounted.
Twice in a generation we have been attacked, and on both occasions our shipping losses have been so great and the situation has been so desperate that verily we might truly say we have passed through the valley of the shadows. Let it be a lesson to us that in future we never under-estimate the threat and never reduce the Navy below what the Board of Admiralty assures us to be the minimum of preparations essential to deal with U-boat warfare, no matter what Government is in power, unless we have machinery of an international character in existence which is determined and has the power to prevent war altogether. That is the hope which all men and women of good will have, in all parties, although at the moment it seems a little bit far off. The First Lord made it clear that in 1944 the U-boat menace, which was ever present, locking up large numbers of men and ships, was never a real menace to eventual victory.
Probably the greatest naval achievement of 1944, at which the world wondered, was the landing of the Allied Armies on the Northern coast of France.


The First Lord has dealt with the topic at length and has taken us behind the scenes and shown us the brilliant planning which took place, some of it months before the operation. The first part of the operation was the crossing of that 100 miles of sea. That was a naval matter and its successful accomplishment was a naval victory of the most decisive kind. Behind that victory lay another, about which I am speaking, the maintenance of our sea communications, without which everything would have been lost. The safe transport of the Armies to France was a culmination of the Navy's work, which began when the war broke out and reached its first climax when our Army was withdrawn from Dunkirk. It continued under conditions made immensely more difficult by the occupation by the enemy of the Atlantic coast of France.
In circumstances like those, reviewing the position again, thinking of those dark days, one can understand—and I can understand it a little bit, having spent some time in France during the last war—how supremely confident the enemy would feel that he could not be dislodged from the situation, because of the strength of his position on that coast. I have sometimes thought, although not in a critical way, that I would like to have the professional opinion of men who knew the situation because of their long experience and study, military geniuses, men who had authority in the Navy and who were specialists in tactics. What would their view have been if they had been asked about the possibility of successfully sustaining resistance to Germany, with the whole of the coast of Europe, from the North Cape to St. Jean do Luz, in the hands of the Nazis? Many times I have wondered what the opinion of those knowledgeable experts would have been if the problem had been put to them.
My right hon. Friend is in a unique position, in that he presides over a Department which not merely administers a Fighting Service, but is responsible also for its equipment. The Board of Admiralty has the responsibility not only for planning the operations of the British Naval Forces which took part in the assault on D-Day, but for constructing the enormous masses of special naval equipment which in these days is so necessary for the success of any landing where the enemy may show opposition in strength. The variety of that equipment is bewildering.

There are large landing craft of various types for infantry and so on, smaller landing craft for personnel and guns, certain components of artificial harbours. What a story there is for the
future historians to write of the building and the making of the artificial harbours and their ferrying across the sea. The production of naval designs, on the top of other vital warship programmes, had to be undertaken, and they had to be ready at the appointee time. That must have called for research, ingenuity and ability of the highest order.
When we think of these things, we are inclined to say that we do not often enough put all our own goods in the window, and are prone to underrate ourselves. That is why I am glad that the First Lord has to-day stated in a most emphatic way a story which must have made everybody in this House, and will make the people in the country, feel proud not only of the Admiralty, over which my right hon. Friend presides, but of the Navy itself and the nation which is ready and willing to give everything that the Admiralty and the seamen need and desire. We understand that 4,066 landing ships, and craft of more than 60 different types, took part in the operation. The figures are really more than one can grasp. One has to read and think to try to find what the different types of craft were, and what resources were behind the organisation of building and preparing as well as leading them to their destination. Is not this fact alone a devastating answer to those who say that State planning is inefficient? If ever that story got the lie it has had it to-day. This is a definite demonstration.

Mr. Pickthorn: What a pity there is only one Member of the hon. Member's party interested in it.

Mr. Dobbie: They are all so sure that they do not need to be converted. We believe it. We have told this story so often.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Charles Williams): I do not think that political conversion can have anything to do with the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Dobbie: I am very sorry. I was very foolishly dragged off my course by the hon. Member opposite, but I do not think he will do it again. What we have heard to-day goes to show that State planning is not inefficient, and that the fight-


ing Services are not dull or unimaginative and are not bound up in red tape. If we have men who can organise such programmes of production in war time, cannot they do equal wonders in peace? If we have the skill and ability at the top and at the bottom—we have it in both places—to achieve these wonders, need we doubt that the same skill and ability can reap the reward of these momentous enterprises when the time comes to create in this country conditions in which all men and women can live a full and happy life?

Mr. Pickthorn: What has this to do with the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Dobbie: I congratulate the Minister and his Department on what they have done towards bringing Hitler and his satellites to the verge of defeat. I congratulate them on having shown what a Department of State, well-organised and well-conducted, can do, though the stimulus be not private gain but the welfare of the nation. To the men, British, American—all the Allies, not excluding the Soviet—who man the warships and those who have manned the landing craft which have done their duty in dangerous seas during the war, many tributes to their unbelievable courage have been paid. I cannot let the occasion go past without adding my tribute to the courage, the doggedness and the unfailing good humour which are always met with in these men who go down to the sea in ships.
When the war in Europe ends, as we all hope it will before very long—and it will make still further calls on our Services before it ends—there will remain the enemy in the Far East against whom, as the First Lord has said, a substantial portion of our naval forces is even now engaged. They have to be defeated before our men can settle down with their families, back in the ways of peace. As the war in Europe draws to a close it spells the doom of the Japanese Empire. The power of America creeps nearer to the homeland of the barbarian people. Our men will be there at the finish. Let us hope that the finish will not be so far off as it seemed only a short while ago. The record of foresight and planning which my right hon. Friend has given to the House leaves us no room to doubt that the Admiralty have carefully taken into consideration plans for dealing with

Japan. At the conclusion of his statement, the Minister made reference to the probability that when we assemble here next year we shall hear from him or from his successor a continuation of the story. I fear that we must contemplate that this may be the last occasion on which my right hon. Friend will give an account of the work of his Department in this Government. If I may say so, I think he has presided over the Department with much distinction in very strange times. We shall, I hope, when the next account is given, hear of how the surrender of the German Fleet, or what remains of it, has been carried out, and how our Forces have been in decisive action with the barbarian Navy of Japan.
In conclusion, I would say that at many gatherings, and in many places, not least here, great tributes have been paid to the men who go down to the sea in ships, beside which anything that I may have said here, or may say, would seem very modest. There is something we must do, if there is a desire to pay a lasting tribute to the efforts of those men and women who helped to make it possible for the Navy to do its work, the men and women in the shipyards who built and repaired the ships of the Navy, the crews of the Merchant Navy, those brave, fearless men, who in the days of terror, when the protection for them was not very good, kept the "Red Duster" flying. They sailed the seas, carrying help and succour to our Allies, and bringing to this country the food which probably saved us from capitulation through starvation. We must present to them conditions of life worthy of the services rendered, new social services of a kind never known before, opportunity of employment for those able to work, rehabilitation services for those who need them, and pensions of a more generous character than are envisaged at the moment. Then only will we have proved sincere in the tributes paid to those who have served the nation so well.

1.47 p.m.

Viscountess Astor: I wish to congratulate the First Lord on two things, first, his complete loyalty to the Admiralty. He has served it well and we should be deeply grateful to him for it. I also congratulate him on the very interesting account which we heard from him to-day. I deeply regret that the


House was not full to hear it, but I am not surprised, when speaking on the Navy Estimates, to speak to an empty House. It has always been thus. For 25 years I have represented a naval port, and I have never known the House of Commons take its proper interest in the Navy. Down in their hearts Members are very grateful, but they do not realise it. I hope that the First Lord, who has done such good work, will go on doing it. We know that he has great influence in the party of which he is such a distinguished member. The First Lord might explain to the hon. Member who has just spoken that it is possible in war-time to do things which are not really so easy in peace-time.
One thing I should like him to do is to make every co-operator in the country read his speech. That he can do. As the House knows, I am not a great believer in newspapers, but I must tell the House an instance of what a good, honest Press can do. I remember in 1918, when my husband was fighting the election at Plymouth, going down one night and seeing some of my naval friends. They rather avoided me, and I asked them what was the matter. They said: "You will not like what we have to tell you." I told them I would like to hear anything they had to say, and invited them to see my husband. They had to come after dark to tell him of the condition of the Navy. The Navy was in a very parlous state in 1918. My husband took a list of their complaints and promised then and there to get them to the Prime Minister. The night after I took the train to London, and gave the complaints to the then Prime Minister, now Earl Lloyd George, and he guaranteed to look into the grievances of the Navy. We did not stop at that; we got "The Times" to publish articles about what the Navy had done, and its grievances. The Gerram Committee was set up, and made a great advance in regard to the Navy. I am grateful to that kind of Press. I know what good articles in responsible newspapers can do. But I also know there is a certain part of the Press of the country which never reports anything unless it is what I call bad news, exciting news, sensational news, and which fails to tell the people of the country the magnificent work which our men and women in all the Services are doing. I recommend the First Lord to get the Co-operative papers going, and

to use all his influence to have his speech given to the country.
I am also grateful to him and to the Government for standing steady when we heard all this talk about "We want a Second Front," a slogan which was also printed and posted up. I had to suffer from that campaign, because it was brought to my constituency. It must have been very difficult to stand firm, but thank God they did. Those agitators who wanted a Second Front did not know what a Second Front meant. I hope that they too will read the speech of the First Lord because everybody in the country ought to realise what a Second Front meant, and what a difficult and magnificent job the Admiralty have done. They did it because they kept their heads and stood steady.
I have suffered a good deal from this kind of thing. I have been one of the chief targets of propaganda, in the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. To my utter horror I heard it was said that "Lady Astor was responsible for taking the hard-lying money from the men of the Navy." As a matter of fact I did not know at the time what it was, and I was so busy at Plymouth that I did not stop to deny it. The second thing I heard only the other day, which was brought to my notice by a Labour friend, was that "Lady Astor had said that the men of the Navy should stop at some island off Cape Town." It was said that I had been there and that I said that it was good enough for the British Navy for two years. I do not know where the propaganda comes from, but it is uncomfortable. It does not very much matter, because nobody in the world is more proud of the British Navy than this particular woman I have just mentioned.
I was bold enough, in the very worst years, when things were not going so well in America, to go there and speak, and I said there that the Monroe Doctrine would not have been worth the paper on which it was printed but for the British Navy. It took some saying, but it is true. The world can never be grateful enough for the British Navy, and I hope they will never forget. I have had to sit in the House and see efforts made to try to do away with Singapore. We had an awful fight to get the Singapore Docks. All the House, and all the parties, are keen on the Navy when it is fighting. It is when we are at peace that we have to look out, and


when we must not forget the work of which the First Lord has told us. That is when we must keep our consciences bright and clear about it. Then we can do a great deal.
I put a Question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other day, but it was badly expressed. It looked as if I wanted to save money for the Revenue at the expense of the Navy. That is the last thing I want to do. My aim was to do what I think the present First Lord did when he was previously in office, in regard to the rum ration. He enabled the men in the Navy to choose money instead of the rum. I remember what a fight it was. It is always the same old story of the pride of the working man, of his freedom, and so on. My Question the other day was designed to see whether we could not do something for the officers in the Navy who do not drink, and there are thousands of them. Their numbers are growing every day. I wanted to see whether, instead of the concession which is made to those who drink, there could not be a division of the money which the Chancellor of the Exchequer gains on that drink. I do not know how much it would amount to, but it ought to be done. I do not know if the House realises how difficult it is for married officers to live on what they get. We had an awful time trying to get officers' allowances, and I know that a few shillings would be a great help to them. I do not want to give a wrong impression. I know that the Navy is sober. I know that it is not possible to get very far in the Navy unless one is sober, its requirements are too technical, both for the upper and the lower decks. One has to be very alert and very sober indeed, and the last thing I want to do is to appear to be saying that the Navy is drinking too much. I do not believe it is, but I do not want drinking made easier for anybody, whether in the Navy or out of it. I hope that the First Lord will see—I think it was he who got the rum ration turned into 3½d. a week for the men instead of the rum—

Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: The Noble Lady has used the analogy of the rum ration for the lower deck, and has suggested that similar machinery might be introduced for officers in the ward room. But there is no spirit

ration in the ward room. How is it possible to contract out of something that does not exist?

Viscountess Astor: A bottle of gin costs 5s. 6d. on land and 1s. 3d. on a ship, I believe. I want to know if that difference cannot be divided in some way for those who do not drink.

Colonel Viscount Suirdale: Will the Noble Lady disclose the source of supply from which she can get gin at 5s. 6d. a bottle?

Viscountess Astor: All I can say is, "Join the Navy." What I want may be difficult. That is what I want to know, and I hope I shall get an answer. Equally important and of vital interest is the question of putting dieticians in naval hospitals. It is perfectly amazing that of two hospitals, in one good food can be obtained at all times of the day, while, in the other, half the food is wasted. I know how difficult it is to change anything in the Navy but I think there is a chance now, if the First Lord would take it, of getting dieticians in naval hospitals. The food is monotonous. I do not say it is always badly cooked but very often it is.
When the war is over we wish to do something for our sailors, and I mean the Merchant Navy as well as the Royal Navy, because they are more or less one now. It would be a good thing if, in ports, we could get those people who are grateful to the Navy, and want to do something for it, to build flats for officers and flats for men. The position is awfully difficult in ports. I know it is in Plymouth. Before taxation got so high and one had to pay 19s. 6d. in Surtax I had hoped to get some model flats built at Plymouth in which officers' wives and children could live in comparative comfort. Something of that sort would make a far better memorial than anything else we could provide. I would like to say how proud the women are of what the W.R.N.S. have done, but they are not more proud than the men are. I saw a very young thing down at Plymouth looking a little weary. Another girl said: "If it were not for Iris you would not have had D-Day." This frail slip of a thing was one of the girls who carried the messages from the big ships to the little ships on the night before D-Day. The work these girls are doing is beyond praise. The officers and the lower deck men appreciate it, and have


treated them with the greatest respect and courtesy. May England always have a Navy.

Mr. Kirkwood: What about Scotland?

Viscountess Astor: It is about time some Members became keen about the Navy. When the war is over I will remind them. I ought to have said the British Navy, but so much of it comes from Devonshire that I had really forgotten about the rest of the country.

2.3 p.m.

Mr. Kirkwood: I want to pay my tribute to the First Lord of the Admiralty. I come a good deal in contact not only with the First Lord but with the Admiralty in general, and no one can come in contact so much as I do with the Sea Lords and with the ordinary rank and file of the Navy without having a great regard for them, apart from all the romance that surrounds our wonderful Navy. The First Lord said to-day that he hoped that we should never see again what happened after the last war, the depletion of the Navy. I have always been a supporter of the Navy—there is no greater supporter in this House. It means bread and butter to my constituency. That is why I am so sore when people talk about the English Navy. We build the Navy—that part of the Navy that matters—in my constituency.
The finest ships that sail the seas are built on the Clyde. It is that aspect that I wish to speak of to-day. The last great ship that we hunched was the greatest battleship that has ever been built—we can talk about it now, but it was launched secretly. The First Lord was there, and with him were the Sea Lords. One and all told me that the workers, the shipbuilders, the engineers, had never let them down; there was nothing that the Admiralty had asked for that they had not provided. Not only that, but the First Sea Lord told me: "And never have we had finer ships than you are producing at the moment." It is for the future of those ships and for the future of the British Empire that I ask the House to bear with me. I have seen, with the Minister of Supply, a good deal of the building up of those wonderful harbours that enabled our Forces to land in Normandy. They were built all over the country, but tribute has to be paid to

the Firth of Forth—to Leith. The Minister of Supply said that what they asked of Leith they could never forget. It was considered an impossibility by the Admiralty at the time, but they met the demand.
Everyone knows about the wonderful battleships, but what is the situation of the workers to-day? We cannot have those battleships without them. There is a seething discontent, because of the wages paid to those workers, the engineers, who produce the finest machinery in the world. Last June they started an agitation for increased wages, in order to find the necessaries of life, to supply their women and children with food. I am not speaking of Russia, or of Germany, or of Greece, but of our own native land. In every shipyard in Britain overtime was stopped; the men were put back to 47 hours a week; and what did that leave them with? Here are the pay rates, sent to me from the different shipyards in Britain. My union, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, has now almost 1000,000 members. What are the wages paid? A wage of 1s. 11⅜d. per hour—fancy, ⅜ths of a penny—is paid to the men on whom we depend to build the engines for our ships. At 47 hours a week, that works out at £4 11s. 8d. We shall not get many millionaires on that.

Viscountess Astor: What are they paying the sailors who fight on these ships?

Mr. Kirkwood: Income Tax on that £4 11s. 8d. amounts to 14s., leaving £3 17s. 8d. National Insurance costs 1s. 10d., hospitals 3d., and war fund 9d. These deductions amount to another 2s, 10d. and so the men go out of the shipyards with £3 14s. 10d. These are the wages that are paid. Is it any wonder that the shipyards are a seething mass of discontent? What aggravates the situation is this. They started the agitation for increased wages in June. The House has heard me say time and again since the war started that the present-day machinery for negotiation is out-of-date, at any rate so far as the war is concerned. It took them from June until Thursday, 18th January, to reach the negotiating stage between the executive of our union and the employers. Here is the statement made by the president of our union to the National Engineering Employers' Federation, in London, on Thursday, 18th


January, 1945. After he had made his statement Sir Alexander Ramsay, who used to be a member of this House, got up, on behalf of the employers, and said—remember the date, 18th January: "Of course, Mr. Tanner, you will not expect a reply from us to-day. We shall have to take it back to our constituents, and as soon as possible we will send you a reply." The engineers of Britain are still wating for that reply.

Sir Granville Gibson: I am sure that my hon. Friend did not intend to mislead the House, but did he mean that 1s. 11⅜d. per hour is the rate for a skilled engineer? Yesterday, I read that the average wages paid in the shipbuilding industry, over the whole of the country, were more than £7 a week.

Mr. Kirkwood: I thank my colleague for doubly drawing attention to this fact, because,
—facts are chiels that that winna ding,
An' downa be disputed.
Those are the figures, and my hon. Friend can have a look at them.

Sir G. Gibson: Are they skilled men?

Mr. Kirkwood: Well, the first one has had 20 years as a fitter—a time-served man. I will quote others. The engineers' basic rate is 1s. 11 3/8d. Hon. Members should get that firmly into their minds, because they can take it from me that it has been burned into those who have nothing else but their labour power to sell. That is all they get in return for a complete week's work—£3 14s. 10d. I have difficulty in getting people to believe that these are the wages being paid to the men who are producing the most wonderful machines that one hag ever seen. Just see what it really means. Three weeks ago, as the result of all this pushing them back—

Orders of the Day — ROYAL ASSENT

2.17 p.m.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.

The House went: and, having returned,

Mr. SPEAKER announced the Royal Assent to—

1. India (Estate Duty) Act, 1945.
2. Road Transport Lighting (Cycles) Act, 1945.
3. Export Guarantees Act, 1945.

4. Compensation of Displaced Officers (War Service) Act, 1945.
5. Police (His Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary) Act, 1945.
6. Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1945.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1945

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

2.27 p.m.

Mr. Kirkwood: I was drawing attention to the discontent in the shipbuilding industry, particularly among the engineers, all over Britain, because of the low wages paid and of the present-day machinery for negotiating on wage complaints. The outstanding feature of all this is the remarkable loyalty of British marine engineers. We have not had a major stoppage of work on the Clyde in this war—in the midst of being treated in this fashion with these ridiculous wages and negotiations going on for months without a reply. As a Scotsman, as a Briton, I view all this with alarm. What is the atmosphere that is being created in every shipyard in Britain? They cannot get apprentices. Nobody is going to serve his time to become a marine engineer in order to get wages less than those paid to the scavengers in the streets. Hitler nearly judged right. Those who had informed him had almost informed him right. They said, "Go to war, there is a dearth of engineers in Britain." The war found us with a shortage of engineers and our union—the men for whom I am appealing to-day—because of their loyalty to their country, gave way. We gave away what I said at the time was not ours to give. We gave away the trade rights for which our forefathers had fought and which were ours to defend. We gave them all up and voluntarily agreed with the Government to a dilution of labour; and not only that, we also gave up the right to strike. And now this is the way our men are treated. Most important work has to be done on the Clyde and they do not want to stop work, They have threatened time and again that they will have to stop work.
I have appealed to Minister after Minister here, and employer after employer, to face the situation. If they do not we shall go down. Ours is a maritime nation


and if we do not have marine engineers to man the ships where are we going to be? Clyde engineers are found on the Seven Seas of the world, and these men come from the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. How many young men from the Highlands and Islands are serving their time on the Clyde to-day? Not one. How many boys are coming from the higher schools at Clydebank, which supplied us with the designers of the "Queen Mary" and the "Queen Elizabeth" and of great battleships? How many are coming from the higher schools to-day? None. Why? I have told the House the reason; it is because of the wages that are paid and the uncertainty of employment. I fear that we shall not be able to go on unless we are able to encourage the youth to come into the industry. When my mother put me to work as an engineer she was proud, and so was I. It was the ambition of the mothers of my race either to make their boys engineers or ministers. That has all gone as far as engineers are concerned. It has no appeal, and that is why I ask the Admiralty to take up this matter.
The men on the Clyde became so exasperated that they decided to have a token strike and stop work for two hours. They made application to the Director of Public Parks in Glasgow to hold a demonstration, as that was all they could do. The Director of Parks agreed to allow them the use of a field in order that they comdemonstrate, but the wiseacres, the magistrates of the City of Glasgow, were going to have none of that. They cancelled what the Parks Director had granted to the workers and took away the right to demonstrate in this field. What happened? Every shipyard on the Clyde stopped work. The shipyard workers were right, and I have taken legal opinion on it. Neither magistrates nor anybody else, not the British Government, have the right to stop a demonstration—

Mr. Speaker: The action of the magistrates does not come under the Navy Vote and is out of Order.

Mr. Kirkwood: Surely this has a bearing on the position.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member can talk about something for which the Minister is responsible, but he cannot be responsible for the action of the magistrates.

Mr. Kirkwood: No, Sir, but it is essential that this House and the Minister should know the actual facts. I am trying to tell the actual facts as I know them, and I am sure that if this House knew the facts it would not tolerate this sort of thing. We cannot get results from men who have to work under the conditions under which these men are working. They are as loyal as anybody in this House. They have their own sons and daughters in the Services, as I have myself, and they do not want to have to stop work. They have been agitating for six months, and at a meeting on 18th January the employers said they would have to have time to consider the matter, and have not sent back a reply yet. I am saying this on what I have always held to be the finest platform in the world for airing our grievances, instead of having strikes and barricades in the streets. That is where we are heading. I was up against this sort of thing in the last war when bayonets were introduced, and we were batoned by the police. I do not want to see the engineers and other Clyde workers come up against a position like that again. Some of us were not in this House in those days, but we are here now.
This is a very serious situation. The Admiralty has had a good many honours showered upon it but with honours comes responsibility. The Admiralty has responsibility not simply for the Navy but for the shipbuilding industry. It is all in the hands of the Admiralty. That is why I am taking advantage of the situation to-day to try to get the Admiralty to use its influence. As I have said already, I have tried every Minister from the Minister of Labour—every Minister either up or down, including the Prime Minister—and we are still waiting for a reply. We British engineers would not be men of the calibre we are if we were to lie down under this sort of thing. No other section of workers in Britain have been treated in the same fashion as the engineers. Upon no section of workers does Britain depend more than upon the British engineers. The highest authorities in the Admiralty have paid the British engineer every tribute that a man could be paid, but flattery and nice smooth words do not affect their wages and do not clothe them. The engineer likes his wife and members of his family to be as well clad and fed as anybody


else, including millionaires, or First Lords or Second Lords or any other sort of Lords.
There is one other item upon which I must touch—Rosyth. There are 1,800 engineers in my union at Rosyth and 5,000 on the East coast of Scotland. After the last war, Rosyth became a derelict area. It took six months after war broke out before Rosyth was put into a working condition again. Our men went there from the Clyde. Two of our most capable managers, at the behest of the Admiralty, went to organise Rosyth. It is now one of the best equipped dockyards in Britain, and I have visited every one of them within the last two years, including Rosyth. In Rosyth we have not only got the machinery but some of the finest engineers and shipbuilders from Scotland and England, and the authorities inform me that Rosyth is a valuable asset, and that it would be madness to allow it to go under.
Surely, these are all things to which it is essential that the Admiralty should pay attention. This House of Commons is the place to explain these things; this is where we have the power, and, surely, we are not asking too much when we ask to see that work is provided. We do not want charity. We do not want the employment exchange. We do not want to be told, as the Minister of Labour said in reply to me: "If that is not enough, they can go to public assistance." What an insult to my race. After the last war I saw men of my race glad to go to the employment exchange. I have seen them forced to go and take public assistance, but I never dreamed that that sort of thing was going to be held out to the men and women who made possible the mighty accomplishment of the invasion of Normandy. It would not have mattered how able, how brave, and how courageous and well led the Navy were unless they had the tools, the ships, the landing craft and the landing platforms that were produced by the workers. There must be better prospects in order to ensure that the workers will continue to give of their best and that young workers will come forward eager and anxious to go into this business instead of, as at the moment, refusing to do so. Engineering firms all over the country require very many apprentices, but connot get them.
My last word is this. If the First Lord of the Admiralty wants to be worthy of the praise that has been poured out to him to-day, and the thanks that I myself have tried to tender to him, he will heed the warning I have given to him. It is quite easy for me because I do not get anything out of my union: I never did, and I do not need it. It is the welfare of my country that causes me to speak to-day. I speak in the interests of the working class in general and of the conditions, especially the wages, that are paid to the marine engineer in particular. I hope that what I have said will receive all the attention and consideration that the First Lord of the Admiralty can give it.

2.50 p.m.

Mr. Henderson Stewart: The hon. Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood) combines in his colourful personality the roles of protagonist for Scotland and champion of the shipyard workers, and in both respects he speaks with an eloquence which the whole House admires. In the past I have sought to acquire for those whom I represent—mainly farnaworkers—the same rights as my hon. Friend has asked for his shipyard workers, and in this matter we can join in an appeal to the Government to ensure that neither of these grand groups of men shall be forgotten when this war ends.
One of the most remarkable features of the First Lord's speech was his confession of faith at the end, in the course of which he pleaded that his successors on the Board of Admiralty would never again allow the British Navy to fall into disrepair or unpreparedness. He said that in the future we must take profit from the experience of the past. The First Lord's remarks and the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Dumbarton Burghs link at every point. I want to take up now the question of Rosyth, which my hon. Friend has just been dealing with, for I think it is admitted all round that without adequate royal dockyard facilities the British Navy could never attain readiness for troubles in the future. One of the greatest naval dockyards in Britain is Rosyth on the Firth of Forth, and I speak, I believe, for every Scottish Member of Parliament of all parties and, I am confident, for every local authority in Scotland, when I tell my right hon. Friend that in our convinced view an announce-


ment indicating the Admiralty's intention to retain Rosyth is clue now. I am not qualified to speak of the technical attractions of Rosyth, but I do consult with those who are entitled to make such claims, and I and my hon. Friends in all parts of the House are satisfied that here is an instrument of first-class efficiency and of supreme importance to the general naval preparedness of this country.
As my hon. Friend has just said, Rosyth played its part nobly in the last war and, at the end, despite its past record, the Admiralty, with a foolishness which is almost incredible, let the whole thing collapse. That great centre of industry, those thousands of houses, streets and services and all the innumerable buildings that go to make up a community of that kind, gradually sank into decay, until a visit to Rosyth after the war made one feel that the British Empire itself was crumbling. That calamity must never be repeated, and I ask on behalf of my country and other hon. Friends for a statement from my right hon. Friend to-day giving some indication that this essential link in the naval defences of our land shall be retained.

Mr. Gallacher: The hon. Member for East Fife (Mr. Henderson Stewart) did say he was speaking for all the local authorities in Scotland.

Mr. Stewart: The hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) and I have been closely concerned in this, and what he says is true. My hon. Friend the Member for Dumbarton Burghs approached the matter, quite properly, from the point of view of his trade union. I am approaching it from the point of view of my own local authority and the authorities surrounding the Firth of Forth. Great plans are now being considered for the development of the Fife coalfields. Whatever may be said about coal in this country, Fife offers a dazzling future for the industry. Under its soil are some of the richest coal seams in any part of the land, and schemes are being made for their development. But neither these nor any of the great housing plans that are now on foot can be brought to completion until we know what is to happen at Rosyth; nor can the other problem, vital to the whole transport system of East Scotland, namely, the Forth road bridge, be settled until the Admiralty makes up its mind on this question. I cannot see why it is not

possible for my right hon. Friend to-day to indicate that, as he saw the dangers of the future, so he sees the necessity for preserving this naval dockyard.
I do not want to detain the House long, but I would ask permission to raise another matter dealing with the post-war situation. I am informed by those closely
concerned with naval education in Fife that the pilots of the naval air service are much concerned about their future. I feel it would be in order, coming as it does under the head of education or administration, to ask my right hon. Friend for an assurance on this matter. This is their anxiety. The Government have indicated very plainly to the House that they intend to create one, or possibly two or three, large-scale air monopolies for civil aviation after the war. That is to say that one way or another the Government will exercise a controlling influence on the development of civil aviation. If that be true, the anxiety of those I speak for is to know what steps the Admiralty is taking to implement its post-war rehabilitation policy in respect of naval air branch pilots, the majority of whom do not hold the qualifications necessary to engage in civil aviation. One knows that these naval airmen are among the bravest of all the fighting men of our Empire. One sees them training in Fife, and one is filled with admiration for their daring and courage and for their achievements. My right hon. Friend has to-day told us something of the epic story of their trials in this war. Many of these men will, naturally, have to leave the naval air service when the war is over. There will not be room for all of them, and yet they are admirably suited for—and most of them are eagerly interested in—employment in civil aviation. But under the present regulations the Admiralty is taking no steps, so I am informed, to give these men a chance to train for the necessary pilot's certificate for civil aviation.
I wonder if my right hon. Friend could tell me how many naval pilots are at present qualified in this respect, how many have applied to him for qualification in this respect, and would he, in his reply, give me the assurance that he will look into this complaint in order that one may comfort these men as regards their future? They look around, just as the Women's Land Army have been looking round, and see a great many plans being made for


other sections of the community. They feel that they are being left out in the cold and they would like some reassurance.
May I say in conclusion that I thought my right hon. Friend's opening speech told one of the most remarkable and stirring stories that I have ever heard in this House? Indeed, the party opposite are entitled to-day to take pride in their spokesman on the Navy Estimates. If ever a man has justified himself in his appointment, it is my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, and it will be, I am sure, for the House and the country a very sad day when he is called upon to give up his great office. I, myself, would hope that that possibility will not arrive. Nothing would please me more than if, by some political arrangement, it were possible for one who has guided the Navy with such care and such brilliant success to continue in that office in the days of trouble that lie ahead of us.

3.2 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies: I at once echo and repeat in my own mind the words that have just been uttered so rightly by the hon. Member for East Fife (Mr. H. Stewart). We remember that the present First Lord succeeded another very great First Lord, and it was a difficult task to take over from one who had had experience of that office in the last war, one who was summoned to be Minister of Defence and afterwards Prime Minister; and worthily, if I may say so, has the First Lord succeeded in discharging this very heavy task. I can say it with all the more sincerity because in the past we have not seen eye to eye with regard to a few things, but he knows that none of that was meant personally. He, like myself, is only anxious about one thing—the efficiency of the war effort. I most sincerely tender to him my congratulations upon the great speech he delivered to-day. How different was it from the scenes which have passed before us as he has recorded them year after year standing at that Box. The terribly serious situation of 1940 to 1941, when we were doing as best we could with one aim, to defend all the seas of the world; and how in 1941, first a small Navy and then, at the end of the year, a very mighty Navy came to our assistance. How near we were to disaster time and time again

only perhaps a few of us know, owing to the terribly serious losses of our merchantmen; and how tremendous were the efforts that had to be made to replace, repair, do anything in order to keep that Service going, protected as it was by only one set of destroyers, whereas, in the last war, we had the protection of five sets of destroyers. To-day it is an entirely different story.
Every war has its record of acts of courage, of heroism, and of triumphs of organisation and strategy, but this, the greatest of all wars, involving the whole world, has undoubtedly the greatest stories of tragedies and of sacrifices, though it also has, as an offset, the greatest stories of heroism and courage, epics which will be spoken of by those who come after us 2,000 years from now.
If one ventured to try to pick out certain great events, I suppose the greatest of all epics in this war was the Battle of Britain, the tremendous fight made by those few men against extraordinary odds, and their wonderful triumph. However, using the word "military" as covering the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, the greatest military triumph in this war, I should think, was the successful invasion again of Normandy, the landing of our troops there, and the defeat of the Germans behind their Atlantic wall. Very properly did the First Lord devote the main part of his speech to that to-day. I suppose we shall in course of time get the full story of the individual acts of heroism. I always feel this with regard to the Navy, however, that they do not get that daily publicity which the Army and the Air Force are always getting. From the early morning broadcast, through mid-day and the evening, and until late at night, we follow with anxiety and with pride the movements of the Army and the work of the Air Force. Every night we hear of their great deeds, but not a word is being said, or can be said, about the continuous 24 hours, day and night, steady vigilance of the Navy all over the great seas of the world; protecting the Merchant Service, without which we ourselves could not exist, without which the Armies could not possibly have carried on; bringing material to them, moving the great armies from one Continent to the other—all the work of the Navy. Very righly did the First Lord pay tribute at the end of his speech to their great work.


Let us realise that we are an island people dependent upon the sea, that on us depends the peace of the world and the maintenance of civilisation as we have understood it, and that it is due to the men of our Navy that the flag of freedom is flying to-day in every corner of the world. We can never pay a sufficiently high tribute to the Navy.
I imagine that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor) will raise again the question which he has so often raised, and rightly, of the differences between pay and allowances in the Army and in the Navy. Surely the time has come when we should not, by differences in payments and allowances, make distinctions in what we owe to the men of the various Services. Cannot something be done whereby there shall be a real equalisation of the pay and allowances of all of them, so that they are treated upon an absolutely fair footing? I am not asking that anybody should be cut down, but that those who are below should be raised up to the proper level. Then why this distinction, that exists only in the Navy, between those who have straight stripes and those who have wavy stripes? Why continue this?

Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: Does the hon. and learned Member mean what is called the "wavy Navy"?

Mr. Davies: They are all volunteers in the Navy. Why should they not be put on the same footing, instead of having that distinction made between the services of one and of the other? The right hon. Gentleman paid a wonderful tribute, quite rightly, to the minesweepers, and I heard him say, I think, that nine-tenths were men who had gone into minesweeping from ordinary civil life. Then there are the ordinary civilians who have gone to sea in Coastal Command: Why carry on this distinction? Has not the time really come when they should be given the equal honours of equal position?

Mr. Astor: Has the hon. and learned Gentleman any authority from the R.N.V.R. for asking this? I think most of us are intensely proud of our wavy stripes and would not give them up for anything.

Mr. Davies: If those are a higher honour than the others, then why not make them all wavy? Why make a distinction? In

the Air Force no distinction is drawn between those in the Air Force before 1939, and those who came in afterwards.

Mr. Astor: Yes there is—they wear a "V.R."

Mr. Davies: No, that has all gone; and there is no distinction in the Army between someone who was in the Army prior to 1939 and one who came in during 1939. If it is a higher honour to have a wavy ling, by all means give it to every one. My last word to the right hon. Gentleman is an appeal which
I have heard made year after year, and to which sympathetic reference has been made from that Box by the right hon. Gentleman. The Navy, as he has rightly pointed out, is 'becoming more and more a mechanised force. When shall we pay proper regard to the engineer, give him a nequal chance with everybody else to reach the highest positions?

Commander Agnew: Does my hon. and learned Friend mean that the engineer-officer ought to be allowed to command a ship or a squadron? Or does he mean that he ought to be able to attain to almost the highest rank, such as engineer vice-admiral, because if so, he does that already?

Mr. Davies: Does he really? Has he the the same opportunities? I have certainly never gathered that from any speech in this House and, what is more, I do not think he has a place on the Board of Admiralty. Why not? Surely the time has come now when there should be no distinction in the positions to which these people can attain. I would like to end as I began, with my warmest and most sincere congratulations to the right hon. Gentleman, not only upon his speech today but upon his record in the office he holds.

3.13 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: There are one or two points I wish to raise on the Naval Estimates this afternoon. The first is the future of Rosyth Dockyard, which is a matter of great concern to us in Scotland. The second, and a rather complicated one, is a question of naval pay, about which I have had a prolonged, but not very satisfactory, correspondence with my right hon. Friend the First Lord and with the Financial Secretary. So far as Rosyth is concerned, it has been touched upon by


both my hon. Friend the Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood) and the hon. Member for East Fife (Mr. H. Stewart) so I will not go over all the ground again. I would say, however, that it is a matter which is causing very intense anxiety in Scotland, because Rosyth has never received fair treatment at the hands of the Admiralty, and we are very anxious to retain it for the Fleet after the war.
I will give, very briefly, three or four cogent reasons why it should be retained as a permanent Fleet base. The first reason was advanced by the First Lord himself to-day, when he said that he hoped the country would insist upon the maintenance of an adequate Navy after the war. If we insist upon that, we shall undoubtedly require more base accommodation than we have had in the past, and therefore, as a matter of broad national policy, Rosyth ought to be kept as a permanent Fleet base. The second point is the question of location. Rosyth is the only naval dockyard of size which faces on to the North Sea, and it has been a great advantage in the present war that it has not been harassed from the air by the enemy so much as any of the southern ports. The third point is the matter of local defence. Anybody who knows the location of Rosyth will agree at once that it is a base very easy to defend from attack from seaward, and also comparatively easy to defend from aerial attack. Then, as to accessibility, of course every important permanent dockyard should be accessible by rail and road communications. I would just remind my right hon. Friend the First Lord that Rosyth lies only a few miles from one of the main north to south trunk railways in this country, and is also very well served by a good road system which will be improved very shortly, we hope, by the construction of a road bridge across the Forth.
Finally, there is the question of the supply of labour. Everyone who knows that part of Scotland will agree that a plentiful supply of competent workpeople is assured from Dunfermline, Fife, Edinburgh and the districts immediately South of the Forth. These are all cogent reasons why Rosyth should be retained as a principal base after the war. There is another reason of a national character. There has not always in the past been such a close

contact between Scotland and the regular Navy as we should desire. The explanation is quite simple. All the manning ports of the Fleet are in the South of England and it is not attractive for a Scotsman to join the Navy. It takes a long time to travel home, he cannot take advantage of short leave facilities, and it is very expensive. As part of our post-war scheme of re-organisation of Naval dispositions and establishments, naval barracks should be constructed at Rosyth, it should be provided with training establishments—gunnery and torpedo schools—and it should become a manning port for sailors and stokers drawn from Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland and become one of the permanent bases, upon the same footing as Portsmouth and Devonport. I would urge the right hon. Gentleman to give the matter his most serious attention in connection with his plans for the future.
I pass to my second subject, the pay question, about which I have had a lot of difficulty. It concerns the pay and service of permanent officers in the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department. I served for the first four years of the war in a temporary capacity in that Department, and I know the background, but my remarks do not refer to officers serving temporarily during the war, because they actually receive full naval rates of pay and allowances. My remarks refer entirely to the permanent officers who were in the Department before the war, and will continue in it afterwards. Actually, there are, very few involved. There were only 88 at the outbreak of the war, and they have now shrunk to 77, showing the very high percentage rate of invaliding and mortality which has been experienced owing to the strain of the work undertaken by them during the war. Every one of these officers is a key man; they are the people responsible for the efficiency of all the new weapons and armaments supplied to the Fleet, and also for the safety of the ammunition sent to sea in our ships. It is their function to train, organise and supervise the vast inspection staffs stationed all over the country, in depots and factories in the industrial areas, where armament stores for the Navy are being produced. Thanks to the vigilance of these officers and their staffs, flaws in guns and torpedoes have been checked, and defective ammunition has been turned down, and, thereby, the lives of thou-


sands of our sailors and millions of pounds of public money and valuable ships have been saved from destruction. In the last war there were quite a number of regrettable disasters, where ships blew up owing to defective ammunition and lack of the proper inspection service that we have to-day.
The officers engaged on this work deserve good treatment for their very valuable services. Unfortunately, their rates of pay are highly unsatisfactory when compared with their brother officers, whether recalled from the retired list or still on the active service list. I should like to illustrate my point by quoting net pay rates received by three different groups of officers of the same rank and the same domestic responsibilities, and I think hon. Members will be startled by the differences. Take the case of three captains first. A man who retired with the rank of captain a few years before the war was called up again on the outbreak of the war and is to-day probably employed in an administrative shore job. Suppose him to be married with two children. He receives a net rate of pay of £1,174 a year. If he had no children it would be £1,054. The second captain is a much younger man, and is still on the active list—he was probably a commander at the outbreak of the war and has recently been promoted. Like many junior captains, his first job in that capacity is a shore job. We will suppose him to- be married with two children. His net pay is £1,042 or, if he is married but has no children, £919. Finally, there is the case of a captain serving in the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department, with something like 15 years technical service, occupying a responsible position, possibly in the Design Department, possibly a member of the Ordnance Board or an Inspector of Naval Ordnance in charge of one of the seven or eight major inspection areas into which the country is divided. If he is married with two children his net pay is £714 or, if he has no children, £664. Here in plain language is the position—the very highly qualfied specialist officer who has under his command perhaps 10 or 15 junior officers and a staff of up to 10,000 examiners inspecting armaments, does not receive much more than half the pay of some long retired officer called up and occupying an administrative job in some, perhaps, quite secondary port. I ask, is that a reasonable state of affairs?
I have similar figures for equivalent groups of commanders and lieutenant-commanders. In each case there is a similar wide distinction between a technical officer of the Inspection Department and officers recalled for service during the war or still on the active list. A commander serving in the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department as a Deputy Inspector of Naval Ordnance draws anything from £285 to £190 less in net pay than his colleagues in the other branches of the Navy. In the case of a lieutenant-commander who is an Assistant Inspector—they make up the bulk of the officers in the Department—he will be drawing anything from £222 to £162 less than his colleagues who are on the active list or who have been recalled from the retired list. I think it will be agreed that these technical officers are very much worse off than their colleagues. In this age of science, when we are so very dependent on technical skill and invention, and there is so much new apparatus fitted in ships, the officers who are responsible for the safety and efficiency of this equipment should receive better treatment than they are getting.
There is, of course, an official answer on these variations in pay. It is what I call a stone-walling reply. The Admiralty point out that the pay rates for officers of the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department were consolidated in 1929 and, once a naval rate of pay is consolidated, apparently it becomes quite untouchable and nothing that has happened since consolidation is deemed to be a reason for altering it. But there have been substantial alterations in conditions in this country since 1929. Income Tax is now 10s. as against 4s, then. Marriage allowance and children's allowance, both tax free, have been introduced since then and a tax free provision allowance has been increased. The basic pay of inspection officers has been heavily reduced owing to the steep rise in Income Tax, but the same position does not hold good with officers re-employed after retirement or active service officers because, though by taxation their basic rate has been reduced, they get these tax free allowances which the inspection officers do not get.
Furthermore, there is this important distinction between these two sets of officers. Last Autumn a White Paper, Cmd. 6553, was laid before the House setting out increased rates of pay in respect


of war service. From it it will be seen that anyone of or above the rank of lieut.-commander with five years' service will draw 35s. a week additional pay, but the unfortunate officers in the Inspection Department are not eligible for that increase at all. That is really unfair, because the charter of these officers, Admiralty Fleet Order 2078 of 1931, states in regard to their rates of pay that they will be comparable to the standard—1919—rates of pay of officers on the active list and will be subject to similar variations as the latter rates. They have been badly treated in not getting the increases which everyone else in the Service is drawing.
An attempt may be made to show that the officers of the Inspection Department are not, in the true sense of the term, naval officers, but civil servants, but while the inspection officers are not entitled to the war service gratuity recently announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, they do not even get the normal Civil Service gratuity on retirement, nor do they get any guarantee of employment up to 60 as do civil servants. In other words, thanks to the ingenuity of the powers that be these 77 unfortunate officers have been manoeuvred into a position in which they have none of the advantages and all the disadvantages both of retired officers recalled, active service officers and civil servants. This matter deserves review and action by the Admiralty. I hope that the Debate will focus some attention on the predicament of these officers and that the Admiralty and the Treasury will be shamed into taking some action to put things right.

3.30 p.m.

Mr. Guy: The House has been privileged to listen to-day to a record of achievement, on the part of the Royal Navy, and, if I may be permitted to add with pleasure, the Merchant Service as well, such as has never been surpassed in the long and glorious history of those Services. We would be failing in our duty to-day if we did not convey our sincere congratulations to my right hon. Friend the First Lord and those associated with him in this glorious year of work and achievement. Especially should we convey, through you, Sir, the sincere appreciation and heartfelt thanks of the nation to the gallant officers and

ratings of all branches of the Service, not forgetting the Fleet Air Arm and the W.R.N.S., for their valour, enterprise and courageous devotion to duty during this exceptional year. I say to the First Lord and those associated with him that we owe a debt of gratitude to all these brave and loyal personnel, whom I hope we shall continue to remember in peacetime as we have in war-time.
There are a few points in which I am interested and which I wish to stress. What I have to say must not be treated in the spirit of carping criticism. I raised the question of promotion from the lower deck last year, and the First Lord gave some interesting figures. These showed that there were four promotions in 1936, 17 in 1938, and an average of 37 for the years 1941–3. I agree that this is an improvement, but it is still not good enough, taking into account the number of personnel serving in the ships and all branches of the Service. I do ask my right hon. Friend and my Lords of the Admiralty to broaden out their ideas a little more in this direction, and to increase the ratio of lower-deck Servicemen who are given commissioned rank. We have fine material in the Service, and it is our bounden duty to use it in the best way possible. The men in every field should be judged by their capacity and not by their bank books.
May I say a word or two about the Dartmouth Training College and its scholarship scheme? Anyone who knows anything about the work of this college must agree that since this scheme was started by my right hon. Friend in 1941 it has been a success. I am anxious that the work of the college should be extended, and every facility and opportunity given to all boys, whether they be sons of dukes or sons of dustmen. We were informed last year that it was intended that there would be an average of 90 scholarships per year from grant-aided schools. Recently the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Rear-Admiral Beamish) put a Question to the First Lord in connection with the Dartmouth College scheme, and followed it with many supplementaries. I gathered from the points which he stressed that he was not in favour of any means test being applied to anyone. It is a new one on me for any hon. Members on the opposite side to be against any means test being applied, and I welcome the hon. and


gallant Member's change of view in this direction. I agree with him, and I suggest that entry for all boys should be free of any kind of financial test of the parents' income. The State will benefit from the service of these boys in the future, and it is for the State to provide free the facilities for their training.
Finally, I would like to say a word about shipbuilding and ship repair work after the war. I trust that there will be no slackening off in the rebuilding and replacement of our naval and merchant ships and that we shall not lag behind any other country in this respect. Our post-war policy should be so regulated and ordered that it ought to be possible to provide at least to years' full work for our shipbuilding yards. This policy should also apply to the ship repairing yards, for it makes one shudder to think what would happen if we allowed matters to drift into the state in which they were after the last war. I do not need to remind the House of the misery and despair of the men who had toiled throughout the last war repairing ships, And of their families being compelled to seek outdoor relief, because patriotic shipowners found it convenient and cheaper to send their ships to other countries, including Germany which had just been defeated, for repair. I warn the Government and the House that our workers will not tolerate anything of this kind happening at the end of this war. Therefore, I urge the Government to prepare and plan ahead while there is yet time, so that those who have so bravely fought our battles and those who have toiled so heartily in our ship repairing yards—those of whom we have spoken all the good things to-day—shall have that which they are justly entitled to when the war is finished, namely, security of tenure in their lives.

3.38 p.m.

Mr. Kendall: The tributes which have been paid by the First Lord and hon. Members to the Royal Navy are very right and just. I add my tribute to those which have been paid and agree with those who have said such nice things about the First Lord of the Admiralty. I would, however, rather deal with the question of the Merchant Navy and the men and officers of that Service. I do not believe that, for the last three years, anybody has really got up and championed that very proper cause.

Commander Agnew: On a point of Order. Are we to understand that for the purpose of this Debate, the Merchant Navy is the responsibility of the Board of Admiralty? Is it not the responsibility of the Ministry of War Transport, or the Board of Trade?

Mr. Speaker: Merchant shipbuilding comes under this Vote, but the conduct of the Merchant Navy comes under the Ministry of War Transport, and to that extent I am afraid that it is out of Order to-day.

Commander Sir Archibald Southby: If my hon. Friend says that he has a grievance in regard to the Merchant Navy, is it not in Order for him to put his grievance before you, Sir, leave the Chair?

Mr. Speaker: If the hon. and gallant Member suggests that the hon. Member should be allowed to raise the question of the Merchant Navy because he gave notice to do so when the Ballot was taken, I would remind him that the only Amendment is that in the name of the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith), and that that will come before the House in due course.

Mr. Kirkwood: Is it not in Order for the hon. Member to use the Merchant Navy as an illustration of what he is about to develop in his argument?

Mr. Speaker: It all depends on how far the illustration goes.

Mr. Kendall: May I ask for your advice, Sir? When I had the good fortune to draw second place in the Ballot, I gave notice that I would move a Resolution in reference to the conditions of employment in the Merchant Navy, and it
was accepted by the Table. Am I not, therefore, in Order to continue on that subject?

Mr. Speaker: I am afraid not. I have never seen the Amendment which the hon. Member would have put down on the Order Paper. As far as I know, he only gave notice that he would draw attention to the Merchant Navy and move a Resolution. It might have happened that the Amendment would have been out of Order in the discussion on the Estimates.

Mr. Kendall: There was a notice on the Order Paper 10 days ago of the Amendment I wished to move, if I had been called.

Mr. Speaker: The only notice I have seen is that of the hon. Member's desire to call attention to the conditions of employment in the Merchant Navy, and to move a Resolution. I have never got to the stage of considering whether that would have been in Order or not. It would be in Order on the Ministry of Transport Vote, and I think that the hon. Member had better make his speech on that Vote.

Mr. Kendall: Perhaps I may be allowed to continue to make my points, and, if I am out of Order, I will give way and sit down. Under war-time conditions, the Merchant Navy without doubt comes under the discipline of the Royal Navy. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I am speaking as one who, many long years ago, belonged to the Merchant Navy, and when I was in port I certainly came under naval discipline.

Hon. Members: No.

Commander Agnew: Is it not the case that when the hon. Member was in port, he was under the Merchant Shipping Act, and not under the Naval Discipline Act, which is the Act for the governance of His Majesty's Royal Navy?

Mr. Kendall: My hon. and gallant Friend may be right, but at the time of which I am speaking I was 15 years old and was not deeply concerned with Acts of any description. I knew very well, however, that if I was stationed in Hong Kong or Gibraltar or Copenhagen, the whole of the ship's company came under the jurisdiction of the Royal Navy and the admiral of the port. [HON MEMBERS: "No."] The admiral may have been wrong, but we accepted that position. There have been many references to the grand job of work done by the Merchant Navy, and quite rightly. My right hon. Friend has himself paid very glowing tributes to the wonderful and extraordinary work of these men, who have manned the transport boats, the majority of which were tramp steamers in peacetime. I want to ask that every consideration—not just glowing tributes by the Minister of the day—should be given to these men. Plans should be put in operation to ensure that practical steps are taken to guarantee that the tributes paid to them shall take some realistic form, when peace comes, in matters concerning their employment—I shall be very careful, Mr. Speaker.

Believe me, I am in great difficulty, now, trying to keep in Order.

Lieut-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: The hon. Member will go over in a minute.

Mr. Kendall: Between watching the nods of approval from the First Lord and watching you, Mr. Speaker, I find it somewhat difficult to steer a course without capsizing. I want to be assured by the Minister that the men of the Merchant Service shall not, once again, become the forgotten men, after the grand job that they are unquestionably doing. How that is to be done, and what suggestion I would like to put forward, I may have to leave to some eloquent speech made by myself on some other occasion. If I am compelled to do it in that way, I hope that on that occasion I shall be able to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker. Till then, I hope that these words of practical experience and constructive thought will register with Ministers who can bring to bear so much influence upon those responsible for the better treatment and better service conditions of officers and men of the Merchant Navy.

Orders of the Day — ROYAL NAVY (POST-WAR RESPONSIBILITIES)

4.49 p.m.

Commander Galbraith: I beg to move, to leave out from "That", to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House, being convinced that the maintenance of adequate armed forces in the post-war era is a necessary condition for the preservation of world peace, the unity of the Empire and the welfare of our people, is of opinion that to enable us to discharge our obligations and ensure the integrity and security of the Commonwealth and Empire the strength of the Royal Navy should at all times be sufficiently maintained.
We have had from the First Lord of the Admiralty this morning a very wonderful review, during which he naturally dwelt on the past for the greater part of the time. The Amendment which I am moving, deals, for the most part, with the future, and I hope that the House will forgive me if, at least in my opening remarks, I make some reference to the past.
At the conclusion of the last war, there was a belief held by people generally in many parts of the world, and not least in this country, that the war to end war had been fought, and that war, in the future,


would be abandoned by the nations as an instrument of policy. That belief was reinforced by the setting up of the League of Nations, whose main purpose was presumed to be to settle by reason and not by force, any dispute which might arise between the nations. It was recognised that sanctions might be required, but the final sanction of war, though it was allowed for, was considered to be remote and probably unnecessary. That led to the days of disarmament. If armaments could only be swept away, it was felt that the rule of law, as represented by the League of Nations, would become unchallengeable. The outcome, so far as the Royal Navy was concerned was this: the strength of the British Navy was ordered by a formula
which failed to take account of our peculiar situation and our complete dependence upon sea-borne trade. You cannot regulate the strength of the British Fleet by any automatic process. If it is to serve its purpose, its strength must depend on a great variety of factors, such as apply to no other country in the world and of which no fixed formulae can possibly take acount. So far as I am concerned, no matter what the strength of other navies may be, the British Fleet must always be sufficient to ensure a constant flow of supplies to this country; but that apart, the result was that the great peace-loving democracies reduced their Armed Forces below the point of danger, while the aggressor nations built up their strength. The frequent disarmament conferences which we had merely provided a fertile field for the growth of international suspicion, misunderstanding and national jealousy.
The desire of this country for peace, and our belief that disarmament pointed the way, led to our being unprepared in many respects to face the present war. It would serve no useful purpose if I were to enter into details at this stage, but I often think how different the position of the British Fleet would have been but for those conferences, and how much better we might have been prepared to face another U-boat war. Memories are very short. We are inclined to forget those things, but in truth this country was placed in the utmost jeopardy from which it has been rescued only by prodigious effort, great skill and high good fortune. Never again, I suggest, should the strength of the British Navy be regulated by treaty. It should be decided rather by

ourselves, in the light of our obligations to others, and in the light of our requirements and our needs.
Now we appear to have learned that, if any international authority is to succeed in the future as an arbiter between the nations, it must have force made available to it, to enable it to uphold its judgments. Accepting that realistic point of view, the new authority proposed by the United Nations is to have available to it, the fighting forces of the British Empire, the United States, and Russia. These three nations, it seems, are, in the future, to guarantee world peace. As I understand it, the forces of these Powers would not be limited. The Powers will be expected to maintain such forces as to ensure their own security, and to enable them to play their part in the maintenance of world peace. In the post-war era, then, we are to have two responsibilities, one to ourselves and the Commonwealth, and the other to the world. In those circumstances, the responsibility of the Royal Navy will be very great, greater in fact than at any previous time, for never hitherto have we undertaken such a commitment to the world at large.
It is not my intention this afternoon to endeavour to prove to the satisfaction of this House that the Navy is the predominant Service, and that its needs must be met before those of the other two Services. Far from it, for in my opinion this war has proved once more that the three Services are entirely inter-dependent and arc indeed three branches of one great Service. As I see it, a strong Navy with a weak Army and a weak Air Force would be a far less effective weapon for our purpose, than would be a smaller Navy with a proportionate Army and Air Force. In the inter-war years, it became fashionable to press the claims of one Service to the detriment of the others. That, in the national interest, was highly mischievous. I trust that we have learned that no one Service can secure our defence nor yet defend our sea communications, which is the principal function of the Navy.
May I give one or two examples of the kind of thing I mean, to illustrate the point I have in mind? It is generally held that the Battle of Britain was won by a mere handful of intrepid and courageous men who, fighting in the air against great odds, succeeded in overcoming the mighty air force of Germany. All honour is due


to those men, and it is true that, but for their skill, courage and endurance, this country might have been conquered. But that is only half the story. The Battle of Britain was but a continuation of the Battle of the Atlantic. Had we lost that battle, which was fought by the men of the Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy with equal courage and determination, the Battle of Britain would never have been fought at all, for the motive power would not have been available to enable the aircraft to fly. Those two were, indeed, one battle to keep our country inviolate. The Navy and the Royal Air Force had both their parts to play, but neither of them alone, nor the two together, could guarantee the safety of this country because the Army also had its part to play.
So, as we have been told to-day already, and yesterday were told by the Secretary of State for Air, in every big operation which has taken place during this war, the invasion of North Africa, of Italy and of France, and the conquest of Madagascar, no one Service could have succeeded by itself. It was the Navy's part to provide transport for the troops and the ground staff of the Royal Air Force, their stores and equipment, to guard them from attack by surface ships and underwater craft, to provide artillery for the opening phases of the landing and see the men taken ashore. The Royal Air Force had to provide against attack from the air, to soften up the enemy before the landing, disrupt his communications, obtain information as to his position and to help the troops to advance. The Army had to fight the enemy on the ground. As in war, so in regard to the control of the lines of communication across the sea, which it is the Navy's duty to secure; and to enable the Fleet to gain and obtain that control, bases in all parts of the world are essential. To protect these bases is the duty of the Army and the Royal Air Force. In future I hope that protection will be adequate. We do not want any more Singapores. The loss of a base of that magnitude may well entail loss of control over a wide area, as in fact it did in the past. Again, the Army and the Air Force bad to protect the bases for shore-based aircraft which play to-day a very considerable part in the control of sea communications.
The Royal Air Force has yet another part to play, for while Coastal Command,

as this war has proved, must be under the operational control of the Navy, which must also have a voice in the type of aircraft, equipment of the aircraft and the training of the personnel, it is convenient that it should be administered by the Royal Air Force. That system has both its merits and its defects, but it has worked well under the stress of war and it has led to a most valuable understanding and liaison between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. It has often been said that the Navy is not air-minded. The Navy has always been air-minded, and experience is making it more so. In the future, there will be an increasing number of naval personnel who will be airmen. That is not to say that the day of the battleship, the cruiser, the destroyer or the escort vessel, is over. That can never be, so long as this country is dependent on overseas trade, which has to be carried in ships, ships subject to attack from surface vessels and submarines.
When the public read of the many victories by aircraft over ships, they are rather inclined to think that the greatest menace to the safety of our trade comes from the air. That is not so. The greatest threat has come and the greatest damage has resulted during this war from attack by submarine and mine. But there is an even more potent form of attack. The submarine is the weapon of the weaker Power. If ever we found ourselves at war with a Power as strong as ourselves at sea it might well be we should not have to face attack from submarines at all. Powerful fighting vessels lying athwart our trade routes would, automatically, bring our trade to a complete standstill. The strongest surface unit, call her the battleship or what you will, is still supreme, but just as she requires to be protected by destroyers against submarines, so she requires protection in the air against attack from that element. That protection cannot be provided by
shore-based aircraft, except in comparatively narrow waters. In the wide open spaces of the ocean, aircraft must accompany our ships, whether they are men-of-war or merchantmen. Hence the ever-increasing importance of the Fleet
Air Arm and the carrier. Carriers are extremely vulnerable and are unable to protect themselves against powerful fighting units, particularly if they happen to have carriers in company.
There have been various illustrations in the present war of the relative weak-


ness of both the battleship and the carrier, experience which goes to prove that the one is complementary to the other. For example, we have the case of the carrier "Glorious," which unprotected by any fighting ship, fell an easy victim to the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau." The battleship "Prince of Wales" and the battle cruiser "Repulse," unescorted by aircraft, fell easy victims to the torpedoes from Japanese carrier-borne planes. It is possible though no one can tell that we may not see again the great line of battleships we knew in the Jutland era. Nevertheless, the days of the battleship are not over. The carrier and the battleship must work together, each giving the other that strength which the other alone does not possess, and each depending on smaller craft for defence against the submarine. There you have the conception of the task force, powerful gun units working together, with carriers and smaller craft.
As I have said, the primary duty of the Navy is to secure our lines of communication across the seas. To that end, aircraft, whether carrier-borne or, shore-based, are becoming ever more important. Flying over the sea is essentially different from flying over land, and the airmen working with the Navy must have a completely different training. They must understand naval tactics, they must be able to pick out the type of ship they sight, be able to see beyond the enemy's screening forces and anticipate what may lie behind. Their navigational difficulties are much greater than and quite different in character from those of other aircraft. The type of aircraft which carriers have, are also different. The responsibility is a naval responsibility, and the Navy must see that they get the type of aircraft required, and that those who man them are properly trained. How that can best be be accomplished I am not quite sure, and I have no wish to be dogmatic on the subject. But I am sure that the voice of the Navy must be listened to on these vital matters. On the other hand, if there is any failure, either on the part of personnel or machines that will be laid at the Admiralty's door, for the responsibility is theirs.
At the conclusion of this war there will be a great outcry for the reduction of taxation. There will be a very great demand for money for social purposes, and, in those circumstances, the Navy and

the other Services will require to be conducted with the utmost economy. But I hope the House will keep constantly in mind that any permanence in the advance of our social services must be founded on a sure defence. There are, as I see it, two great binding forces which hold our Commonwealth and Empire together. Those are the Crown and the Navy. Of course we must have ideals in common, there must be interchange of trade, but be that as it may, the Crown and the Navy predominate. I may well be asked how the Navy comes into that position. As I see it, the great Dominions are quite capable of providing themselves with armies sufficient for their reasonable defence. They are also quite capable of providing themselves with air forces also sufficient for their reasonable defence, but navies operate over far wider areas.
A vital line of communication may be cut thousands of miles from its source. A world-wide network of bases is required. Indeed the naval defence of any one of our Dominions may well involve a Fleet of a size and cost which can only be provided by pooling the entire resources of the Commonwealth. Every part of the Commonwealth has an interest in the Navy, for it is essential for their welfare and defence. I do not want it to be thought for one moment that I am advocating here the discontinuance of those naval forces which are to-day maintained both by the Dominions and by India. It is very desirable, from practically every point of view, that these should be continued, but the types of ship they provide and maintain should fit into the whole, and give us a balanced Fleet. There must be common training, a common doctrine and a constant interchange of personnel and ships. During this war the Dominions and India have maintained the very highest traditions of the Royal Navy, which are indeed our common heritage. I hope they will be given every encouragement to continue so to do in the post-war years.
When the days of economy return, I hope we shall not fall into the many errors we made after the last war. There must be continuity of building, so that we can try out, in practice, new technical developments, new scientific advances, so that the skilled craftsmen so essential to naval shipbuilding shall be retained, and so that progress can be continuous. After the last war, no capital ship, with the


exception of "Rodney" and "Nelson," was built for some 18 years. In consequence we did not really know what we wanted in a battleship, and we found that many of the artisans had either lost their skill, or had gone elsewhere. In future, though our programme may be small, it must be continued in respect of every class of ship. The Navy must be kept at a reasonable size, and reasonably up-to-date. Ships cannot be built, nor can men to operate them be trained, quickly ire case of emergency. Notice of these emergencies is getting ever shorter, as we well know from the unprovoked attacks which have been made in this war on Norway, Belgium and Holland, and the equally unprovoked attack at Pearl Harbour.
The Navy must be prepared to fight at short notice, and it has always to be ready. In the Autumn days of 1939 and in the opening days of 1940, there arose in France a situation which was known as the "phoney war," but so far as the Navy was concerned, it was fighting all out from the start. The enemy's surface ships were out, and had to be rounded up and destroyed; his submarines were active; convoys had immediately to be instituted and escorts provided, and our mine-sweepers had to go into action right away. There can be no delay for the Navy in going to war, for we starve, if our imports are interrupted, even for a few days. Scientific research and development are essential in the future if we are to keep abreast of the times. That is even more essential in times of retrenchment than when the Government is lavish in expenditure. In the past, and even to-day, the Navy spends far too little in that direction. I am credibly informed that it spends less than either of the other two Services, and a mere fraction of what is spent by the United States Navy. To be niggardly in regard to research is the very falsest economy.
I have already alluded to the need for bases throughout the world, adequately protected and equipped. May I, as a Scotsman, be allowed to say just one word about a matter which has already been alluded to by many other hon. Members, and which I feel to be of the utmost importance not only to my country but to the Navy? The home ports, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Edinburgh (Lieut.-Commander Hutchison) said, are all situated in the

South of England. The great naval depots are attached to those ports, and in consequence the Navy draws its personnel mainly from the Midlands and Southern England. Per head of population the Northern counties and Scotland fall far behind those areas. The reason for that is, as my hon. and gallant Friend said, that for men from the North to join the Navy they have completely to uproot themselves from their native soil. On grounds of security and increased immunity from air attack, and because of large stretches of sheltered waters in the vicinity I would advocate—rather differing from some of my hon. Friends—that a great home port should be established on the West coast of Scotland. If for any reason of finance that proposal should be ruled out, I would support the plea that Rosyth should be retained. There is an excellent dockyard there at present, and it is more immune from air attack than the present home ports. It has a deep-water channel from the open sea to the entrance lock, while a sheltered exercising area exists in the vicinity. I suggest that if a depot were established there we should attract a wealth of first-class material of which at present the Navy only scratches the surface.
That leads me to this point. To enable the Navy to shoulder its great responsibilities, it must have made available to it the very best of our manhood, with an assured career, with prospects equal to those in any other walk of life and with equal remuneration. To-day we draw our officers from the lower deck, the preparatory, public and secondary schools. I have no fear whatever for the future of the Navy, no matter from what source the men come, so long as the sole criteria are ability and character. I think it would be wrong if any fixed number of scholarships were granted to the secondary or any other schools, because if that is done, a boy may well get into the Navy with qualifications that are not so high as those possessed by candidates from other sources. That is not in the best interests either of the Navy or the country. Give scholarships by all means, but only to those boys who, in any case, would qualify for entrance to the Navy. What we require is the best the country can give, and no obstacle should be allowed to stand in the way. In regard to the higher training, in view of the interdependence of the Services, I wonder if the time has not


come when there should be one staff college for all, or three staff colleges placed in the closest possible proximity, so that our future commanders and those who will be their staffs will get to know intimately the problems and the difficulties of the sister Services, and, even more important still, that they will get to know each other individually.
For the rapid expansion of the Fleet in a time of emergency, adequate reserves are essential. The Navy cannot plan these reserves until it knows what the Government's policy is to be in regard to National Service after this war. I claim, however, that the Navy should not look to the Merchant Fleet for its principal reserves. The strength of the Merchant Navy in time of peace is an indication of the country's need for shipping. The need for shipping in time of war is never less than in time of peace. We require the same imports, and at the same time there are great demands made on the Merchant Navy for war-like purposes—troopships, munition ships, store ships, and others. As was said this morning by my right hon. Friend, shipping is the bottleneck. If we had only had more shipping available the progress of this war would have been greatly accelerated. When the Merchant Navy is put to that strain, if personnel can be got from other sources do not let us take it from the Merchant Navy. This nation has the sea in its blood. The R.N.V.R. was completely starved before the war, and it is capable of great expansion if only it is given the proper encouragement, such as attractive headquarters with facilities for training, and an opportunity to serve with the Fleet in some active capacity during holiday periods, I am certain that we could then increase it 10 or 20 fold, or even more. The present war has proved that a reserve from that source would provide us with the most admirable material.
I have tried to produce a skeleton, on which I hope that other Members taking part in this Debate may hang some flesh and blood. Let me say, in conclusion, just this. The future responsibilities of the Navy are very great. It is not too much to say that the whole future of civilisation may depend on its ability to play its part, in co-operation not only with the other Services of this country but with those of our great Allies, the United States and Russia, if aggressors ever raise their heads again. So far as

we are concerned, the Navy is not only that Service on which the safety, welfare, and prosperity of this realm chiefly depend, it is one of the great binding forces holding the Commonwealth and Empire to the Mother Country, it is the greatest of all our ambassadors, a great stimulant to trade. On it the prestige of this country largely depends, and it will depend more upon it in future than in the past. So far as the world is concerned, it is an invaluable stabilising influence. A great responsibility rests upon those who administer the Navy, and a great responsibility rests upon this House, to ensure that at all times it has the men, the ships, the aircraft, the bases, the strength, to perform its functions, to guard the integrity of the Commonwealth, and to help preserve the peace of the world.

4.19 p.m.

Admiral Sir William James: I beg to second the Amendment.
The hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) said that he only produced a skeleton, but, as a naval officer, I find it such a well filled-out skeleton that there is really very little more to be said. I would like first to stay a word about the peace-time functions of the Navy. I was on the Board of Admiralty before the war, and I used to read the reports from the foreign stations. It was astonishing how often His Majesty's ships raised steam for full speed to go to the help of someone in distress. One day it was an earthquake, and a whole squadron would go; another day there were floods; then there were British subjects in difficulties; civil authorities for help; and always piracy in the Eastern seas, and shipwrecks. In 1937 not a week passed without one of these calls. Those calls for help can only be met by a man-of-war, because a man-of-war can proceed very quickly in bad weather, embark large quantities of medical stores and so forth, can embark the number of people required, and, perhaps more important still, it can take to the area a large number of well-disciplined men, who can aid the civilian authorities. I wish I had kept a record when I was at the Board of this work of the Navy, because it would be an astonishing record of what they do in peace-time. It seems to me that this work is not going to diminish in post-war years. The world will be in a restless state for a


long time, and very busy years lie before the Royal Navy.
Again, keeping to peace-time, there is the function of the Navy in times of strained relations. It has been suggested that there should be an international air force to keep order in the world. I have asked a lot of people what that force is to do in periods of strained relations, and I have never got an answer. The Foreign Secretaries of the different countries are surely not going to meet at Geneva and order this air force to bomb the towns and cities of people who are not at war. I do not believe that the world would stand for that. It is approaching midsummer madness to look upon an international air force as the sole means of keeping order in the world. Surely the only method at the stage of strained relations is the method that the League of Nations would have used if it had been effective—sanctions, blockade, occupying the enemy's ports if necessary. Therefore, I suggest that what the Powers will need to keep the peace at that stage will be a strong Navy that they can order about. An international air force will come in later on, after first shot is fired, but I do not believe that it will ever come into play when nobody has fired a shot. There will be a great deal for the British Navy to do in the post-war years, and, as the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok said, it will be the nucleus of our main defence if we are ever at war again.
But many difficulties will face those who will be responsible for balancing our post-war defence structure, whatever its size, so as to be sure that we have adequate sea forces. There was a time when balancing our forces was quite easy. We had an Army whose strength was governed by the strength of overseas garrisons, a Navy whose strength was governed by the strength of the Navies of countries that might attack us. The Board of Admiralty of those days had to think only of battleships and cruisers. Then the Navy felt the impact of all those new wonders of science, and very soon a well-balanced Fleet had to be composed of about 10 different types of ships. I well remember our difficulties over that when I was on the Board. We had only so much money, and yet we wanted at least 10 different types of ships. The other point is that no one dare prophesy

to-day what sort of weapons and counter-weapons will be in existence in five or 10 years. The hon. and gallant Member for Pollok referred to these new compositions of the Fleet operating in the Pacific. That is a new advance. It is the air arm that is now taking such a large part in the Pacific war, but, as the hon. and gallant Member said, the air arm has to be guarded by battleships, cruisers and destroyers. Science is moving ahead at such tremendous speed. We have seen in the last few years the bombing-plane grow to its present great size and strength, and then, suddenly, the pilotless bomb appears. We are told by
the scientists that in a few years that pilotless bomb will become a weapon of precision. We are told by scientists who
are working on these wonderful developments of radio that it will be only a short time before a projectile fired from the ground can be held on to a moving object. I have said this in order to point out the great difficulty that lies ahead in balancing our forces of defence.
But in this picture of everything gaining speed, and every weapon gaining more and more power, there is one constant, the merchant ship, the ship of simple construction, that can cross the ocean with large cargoes at economical speed, the ship on which the whole life of this country depends. As the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok said, if that ship stops we stop, everything stops in a very few weeks. Therefore, it follows that our basic defence requirements after this war must be a sufficiency of force to defend our seaborne trade. Our sea armament must be commensurate with the sea armament of every country that might at some future date attack us. The battleship is always changing its form, its speed, its armament, and so on, and it follows that we must have a sufficiency of surface vessels to drive off any surface vessels that attack our seaborne traffic. The hon. and gallant Member mentioned the submarine. I was a delegate to one of the Treaty Conferences in 1937. We tried very hard to get the Powers to agree not to go on building submarines, but they would not agree. I have some doubt whether the submarine will remain a major weapon of war—for reasons which I will not go into here, as they are too long—but if the submarine continues to be built we must have sufficient forces,


air and surface, to make sure that it cannot destroy all our seaborne trade.
As to the air, that is the difficulty. It may be, as some scientists tell us, that the answer to air attacks on ships is going to be the gun—this new form of gun with a projectile that can be held on to what it shoots at. It may be seaborne aircraft, in carriers; it may be land-based aircraft; but whatever it is, we must have a sufficiency of the right form of defence against attack by air, because we have run things much too fine—dangerously fine—twice in the last 25 years. We came very near to disaster in the third year of the last war, through not having sufficient anti-submarine forces. In this war we have run things very fine, not only through not having sufficient anti-submarine forces but because we did not deflect sufficient of our air potential from bombing the Continent early enough for it to take part in the Battle of the Atlantic. A third time we might not be so lucky.
One difficulty which will face those responsible for maintaining this adequate Fleet will arise from the fact that we are the only Power in the world which in recent times has come near to unbalancing its defences by accepting the claims of enthusiastic believers in a new world. I am not going to indulge in any inter-Services talk. I am dealing with a weapon. I say "the only nation," because it has always surprised other nations that we do indulge in that sort of thing. Shortly after the last war, a campaign was launched to abolish all large men-of-war on the ground that the submarine now dominated the sea war. Many hon. Members here now will remember big headlines: "What is the use of a battleship?" That campaign never stopped to inquire how the submarine could defend our ocean trade or how the counter-weapons were progressing. A few years later another campaign was launched to abolish all men-of-war on the ground that aeroplanes now dominated the sea. Again, the campaign never stopped to inquire how the aeroplane was going to defend our ocean trade, nor did those people take any heed of the possibility of counter-weapons being developed.
That campaign, like the previous one, shook the confidence of the people of this country, and the Government of the day ordered a Committee to inquire into the whole matter. I had a good deal to do

with that Committee, because I helped to prepare the Admiralty case, and that Committee, after hearing all the evidence, recommended that the shipbuilding programme should continue, The Government accepted the recommendation, and I think it is no exaggeration to say that that was one of the most important decisions ever made by a Government in this country in its long history. If we had turned down battleships and built no more, the German capital ships would have been in mid-Atlantic and at focal points at home at the outbreak of war, complete with anti-submarine forces and with the necessary oil. No ship would have sailed from the United Kingdom, no ship would have sailed from America, not one, until these German ships had been removed.
But we would have been powerless to remove them. We would have had nothing with which to remove them. Therefore, I have always said that, had the decision of the Government at that moment gone the other way, had they said: "Do not have any more battleships," in the second week of October we would have been asking for terms from Hitler, because there would have been nothing else for it. Our people would have been starving, and there would have been no petrol for any transport. That is why I say it was a most important decision.
What is to happen after this war? I have already suggested that there will be a lot of new weapons. Are we going to experience these periodical campaigns which threaten to unbalance our system? I hope those days are over. We will always have our young men in a hurry, and we all sympathise with them. We will always have our enthusiasts who never stop to think. We will always have a sprinkling of old men who have run to seed but who think they are still fine. There is always a sprinkling of them, but I hope that we are going to be quit of all that after this war, and I think there are some grounds for hoping so, because the policy of purposely disintegrating our Forces at the beginning of the war has now become the policy of the complete integration of our Forces in order to deal the maximum blow at the enemy. On all levels, as I know from experience, the officers are working together, sharing each other's trials, understanding each other's difficulties and sharing each other's


resources; and the officers who are doing this to-day will be the officers who, in a year or two, will be advising the Government on the set-up of our defences. On that account, I think we may have hope that those bad old days, when we got so terribly excited about new weapons and were thrown off our balance by propaganda, are gone for ever.
We must hope that future Governments of this country will always take, as the basic requirements of defence, the defence of the merchant ship, and will maintain a Navy adequate for that purpose, because, if that ship stops we stop and there is nothing more to be said. We might as well adopt the policy of the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) and put down all Army, Navy and Air Forces because they would be no use. We must hope that the most searching inquiry will be made into the war value of any new weapons, and, particularly, into the counter-measures—not only what the new weapon itself can do in battle but also what its possible counter-weapon can do. That is where we have so often nearly come to grief. The Government must never forget that the Navy has very many duties to perform in peace-time which only the Navy can perform, and that it can stop, and very often has stopped, a war breaking out.

4.36 p.m.

Mr. McNeil: I am sure the House is in the debt of our hon. and gallant Friends who moved and seconded this important Amendment. I hope they will forgive me if I neither follow nor join in this endless Debate into which the House has once more been tempted on the value and continuance of the capital ship. Perhaps, most diffidently, I may be forgiven if I add one rider to the general arguments. I take no part in this highly technical discussion. I have myself again and again become a little impatient with even the most distinguished of technicians, of whom my hon. and gallant Friend is one, who assume that, at some time, had we decided to depart from the capital ships nothing else would have been put in its place. That is not the story of any of our Forces, and it is certainly not the story of His Majesty's Navy. If these men and yards had been told to depart from the capital ship, then it is certain that this nation, above all

nations on the earth, would have produced something in substitution and replacement of it.

Sir W. James: I made the statement about capital ships dominating the sea and preventing our trade, because there was nothing we could have built to defend the merchant ships.

Mr. McNeil: Perhaps I do not make myself clear. It would be an impertinence for me to offer a technical opinion against that of my hon. and gallant Friend, but I will never have it accepted that scientists and technicians in this country, if given the command from the Government to pursue a line to produce a definite weapon, could produce nothing. I am certain that we would have produced something in substitution for the capital ship, and if my hon. and gallant Friend is trying to twist my tail—

Mr. A. V. Alexander: The whole point is that it would have been no use if the other Powers, conference or no conference, had themselves insisted on keeping capital ships.

Mr. McNeil: I did not mean to be drawn into this Debate at all, but, if my right hon. Friend is now going to line up against me, then, if for no better reason than that I am a Scotsman, I am prepared to take him on too. The proposition is not that we should, or should not, have any capital ships. The proposition is whether we should have capital ships or something other than capital ships. [HON. MEMBERS: "What?"] Well, I have already said, most humbly, that I cannot offer a technical opinion, but I am going to suggest that the capital ship, about which my hon. and gallant Friend is concerned, is not the capital ship of to-day. I want to suggest that only once in this war have we used a capital ship as one presumes a capital ship should be used, and it was disastrous.

Mr. Astor: As it should not have been used.

Mr. McNeil: I suggest that no one would any longer argue that a capital ship could be used as a capital ship was used 10 years ago. Nowadays, it would be disastrous, as the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok argued, to send in a capital ship without its complementary carriers. Someone says: "What are you going to substitute for capital ships?" Quite plainly, although I cannot answer defin-


itely and technically, that was the line upon which our scientists would have gone if the other decision had been taken. However, my purpose is not to argue with the mover and seconder of the Amendment, but to agree with them, mainly, in their proposition. I am sorry that my hon. and gallant Friend the mover of the Amendment is not back in the House—I see he now is—because, while I want most warmly to associate myself with him, I cannot forbear to say that I am delighted to see in him the conversion which I see in some parts of his party to this line, which my party has taken for some time—that, in times of retrenchment, the remedy is not to cut your cloth still further back, but to set to work, and I agree with him in hoping that research will not be cut back if the time comes for retrenchment. I can remember sitting in another quite important, although minor, body, compared with this House, when my hon. and gallant Friend held other opinions in time of stress and retrenchment.
I want, however, to commend to the House two points without which we cannot hope to have this arm, which the mover and seconder argue is essential to world peace. First the right hon. Gentleman, in his most moving and arresting speech to-day, gave due praise to the little ships. I want to urge the claims of the little ships, and of the little men who man those ships, in our postwar times. If we had yielded to the technical opinion which was urged upon this country in the early thirties, the boatyards, as distinct from the shipyards, which mainly produce these little ships, would have been closed down, and, if we had permitted our fishing industry still further to decay nine-tenths of the men who man these craft would not have been available with the skill they have displayed in these five years of war.
That is the particular argument; my interest in it is that the Admiralty, if they agree that these things are important, should declare their position now. Equally, I want to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) in arguing that there is an almost unanswerable case for developing a dockyard on the West coast. We have had the case for Rosyth argued, and I do not dispute that Rosyth, in two wars, has plainly carried everything that was said for it. But in both wars the

Clyde and the West coast had to make the most Bairnsfather kind of adaptations to meet naval needs. My right hon. Friend this morning talked about the miracles of improvisation which came from Dover at the time of Dunkirk. Equally, at the same time, and for three years thereafter, he could tell us about the miracles of improvisation that took place on the Clyde and the North-West coast of Scotland. It is said that the Admiralty cannot make up their minds on this question just now for two reasons. The first is because we are not sure whether it is to be a national or an international force. But no matter what its composition may be, that force at any rate will have to defend this country and our routes against enemies, who do not come from the West. Wherever our enemies may come from, we do not know, but we know that they cannot come from the West.

Mr. McKinlay: What of Ireland?

Mr. McNeil: I am certain, without entering into any further argument, that the Navy will not be unduly perturbed by whatever force Mr. de Valera could or would put against them. I am told, secondly, that the Admiralty are unwilling to come to a decision because they are still speculating about how rocket projectiles and mechanical projectiles can be hurled against them. Again, if my first postulate is right, then the West coast offers 50 or 100 miles additional distance against such attacks which cannot be purchased on the East coast and certainly not on the South coast. I hope I may say this and that I will not be misunderstood. There is an attractive reason which almost inevitably causes naval experts always to come down on the side of the home ports, and that is their proximity to London. There is a temptation for a man home from arduous sea duties to say that he wants to be near to London, and to him the North-West coast of Scotland, the East coast of Scotland, the Clyde and the Forth, seem distant and unfriendly places. But we are concerned with much more than convenience. We are concerned, as the mover and the seconder of the Amendment have argued, with our safety, and unless my right hon. Friend, or the hon. Gentleman who is to reply, can show that there is no increased safety on the West coast, there is no reply to my argument; and if there is no


increased safety on the West coast then he must explain why, in both areas, these miracles of improvisation had to be accomplished during both wars.

4.48 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas): I hope it will be for the convenience of the House if I intervene at this stage of the Debate. The Amendment is so wide and so important that the House will be glad to know that my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has decided to wind up the Debate. I think we would miss a very great deal if he did not. The House heard from him this morning his faith and his affection for the Service over which he has presided during five continuous years of war. That feeling and affection we, who have the privilege of working with him at the Admiralty, see daily, and I know that it is reciprocated
by the Service to the First Lord himself. I, therefore, think it would be very unfortunate if he had not an opportunity in this Debate to talk about the future of the Royal Navy, which he has served so well.
I am most grateful, and I am certain that the House is grateful, to the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) for moving this Amendment to-day. It sometimes is rather a mixed blessing for the Admiralty when Members of the Service, past or present, are fortunate in the Ballot, but to-day the House showed the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok that they thought his speech a most excellent one, and, from the Admiralty's point of view, it was most encouraging and very welcome indeed to us.
My right hon. Friend the First Lord gave this morning the record of the work of the Navy during the past year. He warned us also of the increasing commitments which the Navy has to face in the Far East, as she joins our American Allies and the navies of our Dominions, in the final blow against Japan. None the less I feel, and I am sure we all feel, that the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok is wise in asking us, at this stage in the war, to look to the future of the Royal Navy. I should like to make it clear at once that I have no intention in this Debate of speaking of the Royal Navy in a sense of rivalry with the other Services. I was very glad indeed that the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok also made that per-

fectly clear in his speech this afternoon. The greatest lesson of this war has been that of the inter-dependence of the Services and it is good to know that this tendency is growing. Surely the important point now is that the correct balance of the three Services should be found and held.
The House will realise that intervening in the Debate on the Naval Estimates it is not possible for me to deal with the whole future of our naval policy. The hon. and gallant Member talked about our co-operation with the Dominion navies after the war. That, of course, is a matter of high policy and a matter for the Imperial Conference in the future and frankly, I am afraid that I am not in a position to deal with a question like that this afternoon. Nobody at this moment can say what future Boards of Admiralty will require, or what the policy of postwar Governments may be. There are, however, certain facts, on which the broad principles of our naval policy must always rest, and I feel that the House today can most usefully consider them.
Ship design and technical equipment may change in a way which is often very bewildering to a layman, and it is certainly very bewildering to me at times. We are constantly made aware of new types of ships and small craft, of new designs of mines, and of new applications of radio-location. New weapons and fresh tactics are always being invented both by ourselves and by our enemies. But I wish to-day to agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok and emphasise that the essentials of naval strategy, the fundamentals of sea power, do not change, for behind them lie the unchanging facts of geography and economics.
It is true that a limited maintenance by air is now possible in certain theatres of war overseas. But with this exception the entire imports of the United Kingdom and the material for the maintenance of our armies abroad, as the hon. and gallant Member said, have to be carried overseas in ships and without the vast imports of oil fuel which come to these shores in tankers, none of the Services could continue to function at all. Our dependence on sea power for our imports is as fundamental to-day as it always has been, and is likely to be so as far as we can foresee the future.
The Amendment speaks of the welfare of our people. We have been considering this welfare particularly during the past months in this Parliament. The hon. and gallant Member for Pollok said that social progress depended on the sure defence of the country. I am sure hon. Members felt, as I felt, a sense of very great relief when they read in the opening sentence of the White Paper on Social Insurance, that the first duty of Government is to protect the country from external aggression. The House, I am certain, agrees that this war, like the last war, has brought us up with a jolt to realise how that welfare depends upon those cargo ships, which we remember so gratefully in wartime but are apt to forget in times of peace. These are the links and they will continue to be the links which connect us, not only with our Empire overseas but with those millions of consumers who sell to us, and who buy from us. We have seen during the last five years how hard the enemy has tried to break those links. The workers of the country have done magnificently, as the Government White Paper on the war effort wisely pointed out, to increase the home production of vital commodities, but, after all is said and done, it still remains true that, if our lifeline across the Atlantic had been broken, we should have been unable to fight on. The hon. and gallant Member for Pollok said that the Battle of Britain could not have been won if the Battle of the Atlantic had been lost. How true that is. Those facts are apt to be forgotten behind other and more stirring incidents of war, but they are continuing facts which are taken for granted, and which do not get into the headlines. The arrival of another Atlantic convoy does not necessarily get into the newspapers. The headlines may carry news of a great air raid on Berlin, or a break-through on the Western front, or of reaching the Rhine, but all these would be impossible without the arrival of these convoys and without the control of sea lines bringing goods to these shores or carrying armed forces to territory which the enemy holds.
One of the strongest arguments for maintaining a strong Royal Navy in times of peace can always be seen most clearly in the opening months after hostilities break out. At the beginning of every war this country and this Empire have found that it is the Navy of all the Services which is called upon to take the strain. The

hon. and gallant Member has reminded us that during the first six months of this war, from September, 1939, until the invasion in April, 1940, of Norway, the expression "a phoney war" was used to describe the static kind of war that was going on in Europe at that time. I can most gratefully and most emphatically back his statement that it certainly was not "a phoney war" at sea during those months. From the moment that war was declared the Royal Navy was winning the command of the seas. There was the very notable example of the powerful "Graf Spee" driven from the Atlantic by the concerted action of three much weaker ships. A very fine result of training in peace not only in this country but also in the Dominion of New Zealand as one of her ships the "Achilles," as hon. Members will remember, was involved in that action.
The House may remember that by Christmas 1939 the number of days spent at sea by a large number of His Majesty's ships since the outbreak of the war was published. In many cases those ships had not remained in harbour more than 10 whole days in 100. Some ships, particularly in the South Atlantic, had spent less, and the result of that great effort in the first months was to drive many German ships off the ocean and to enable us to exercise effectively our maritime belligerent rights over neutral shipping.
It is, as I have said, because the strain falls upon the Navy in this way at the outbreak of the war that the size and contribution of our post-war fleet is so important. To train men to manipulate the equipment of a modern warship, to turn civilians into sailors, takes time and demands all the facilities that our training establishments and our instructors can give.
The hon. and gallant Member for Pollok spoke of the welfare of the shipbuilding industry, and other hon. Members have also spoken of that in the general Debate to-day. The building of warships, as certain hon. Members know so well, cannot be undertaken in a moment. It depends upon our national resources in the shipyards and shipyard labour, and those resources cannot be expanded overnight to meet a sudden emergency. We must never allow the skill of our craftsmen to be lost, or trained men to be dispersed, for it is too late when the crisis comes to put right the mistakes that have been made. We


have been reminded so often that this is total war, that the Services depend upon each other and that they all, in their turn, depend upon the efforts of the civilians behind them to keep the war machine manned. Hon. Members read of strikes in our shipyards, and very often the reasons for those strikes are deplorable, but what I want to bring home to the House to-day is that these strikers form a very small percentage indeed of the thousands of workers in the shipyards who are giving their best to see that the Royal Navy and the Royal Merchant Navy are manned.

Mr. Gallacher: When the hon. Gentleman says that they are giving their best in the shipyards, would it not be good if the Admiralty saw to it that the best was given to them?

Mr. Thomas: I will come in a minute or two to the future of the shipbuilding industry and to the Committee dealing with that, if the hon. Gentleman will allow me to make my speech in my own way. I would like first, however, as a member of the Board of Admiralty responsible to the First Lord for industrial relations in the shipyards, to pay my tribute to-day to the managements, to the workers, the men and the women, in the shipyards who have done a magnificent job during this last five years of war. If I may also say so, I am particularly grateful to the hon. Members of this House in whose constituencies these shipyards lie for, without their help—and I have had it from every hon. Member—my work would have been far more complicated and difficult than it has been for the last one and a half years.
The welfare of the shipbuilding industry, and all the details connected with it, is a matter of the greatest concern to our future security, just as it is to our economic prosperity. Therefore, we have to relate the need for maintaining our fleet with the need for replacing our losses of merchant ships and regaining our seaborne trade. That is one of the reasons why the First Lord told the House in the Debate a few weeks ago that a Committee to watch the whole welfare of the shipbuilding industry had been set up. It includes the experts in shipping and shipbuilding and also includes the representatives of shipbuilding labour. From what I know of the com-

position of that Committee, I think this House will realise that anything that can help the industry itself, or the workers in that industry will receive very great sympathetic consideration from a Committee composed as that Committee is to-day.

Mr. Kirkwood: Before leaving that point, the last time we debated this question in the House I took it up, and the First Lord of the Admiralty in reply spoke of this Committee. Well, even with that Committee, another month is gone and we are still waiting for a reply on behalf of the men for their increase in wages. What is the First Lord going to do now?

Mr. Thomas: I think I have quite unintentionally muddled the hon. Member. The Committee are not dealing with wage negotiations, they are dealing with the future of the industry as a whole. I am sorry if I misled him. Hon. Members dealt with that question of wages in the shipping industry in the general Debate and it is not for me now to deal with that point. I think when this Debate is wound up, the question of wages will be dealt with.

Mr. J. J. Davidson: Surely the hon. Gentleman will agree that wages play a very important part in any welfare arrangements for the future of the shipbuilding industry?

Mr. Thomas: Yes, certainly, but we have divided up the different subjects for this Debate to-day between the different Ministers of the Admiralty, and the questions raised in the general Debate will be answered when the general Debate is wound up at the end of to-day.

Mr. Kirkwood: By the First Lord?

Mr. Thomas: By the Civil Lord, who is winding up the main Debate.
The early months of the war in the Far East were mentioned by hon. Members, and I am sure it is only necessary for us to remember those tragic events to realise how quickly things can move against us once the command of the seas is lost. At a time when our own Navy was fully stretched in the West, the speed with which the Japanese over-ran territory which is so vital to our Empire and to our Allies amazed people who had forgotten the value of sea power. It was not until the American Fleet began to recover from the treacherous blow of


Pearl Harbour that it could begin to win back, assisted by the Australian Navy, in a series of sea battles, the command of the sea in those Far Eastern areas. Then it became possible to concentrate our ships and shipping, to enable our soldiers to obtain a footing abroad from which to advance on that enemy. Each successive invasion needed hundreds of war and amphibious vessels manned by the Navy to assault the beaches and to convey soldiers and airmen ashore and cover their landing, and to bring a proportion of the equipment needed to exploit the initial success. Surely the whole history of those early months of the Far East war give reasons, unassailable reasons, why it is so important that the strength of our Navy and its reserves should be maintained in times of peace.
We have been asked in the Debate to-day whether air power can take the place of sea power. The answer in brief is that so long as bulk cargoes, on which we depend for our national existence, are carried in ships, then it will be necessary to have ships to protect them. Sea power is exercised not only by surface vessels and submarines but involves the control of the sea by whatever means we have. The combination of aircraft and ships in this war has demonstrated what an effective weapon both can be in our armoury when both are used together. The House knows, and it has been shown again today, that there are two schools of thought upon the battleship. The House also knows, I hope, that in every war every arm of the Navy has been required, and not least the battleship, but I think it has escaped the notice of the hon. Member for Greenock (Mr. McNeil) that our American Allies have had to make the battleship an essential feature of their various task forces. So far as Great Britain is concerned, I think this House will agree that the battleship has done its full share. The whole question, of course, will have to be considered at the end of the war, as a result of examination arising out of the experience of battle itself, but this surely applies not only to the battleship but to all types of weapon and to every arm of the fighting Services.
The real question is whether we in this country should be the first to dispense with the battleship. The answer is that we cannot afford to be without battleships so long as other foreign Powers possess them. Again, when weather conditions

or action damage or other causes make it impossible for aircraft to take off from carriers or from aerodromes, the protection of convoys is bound to rest with the guns and the torpedoes of surface vessels. When ships are beyond the effective support of the nearest shore-based aircraft, their defence—whether against air attack, submarine attack or surface raider—must be carried out by ships and by the aircraft they operate.
So it seems to me from all this that the implication is that, in the foreseeable future at any rate, battleships and cruisers will continue to have a very vital function. The aircraft carrier needs protection from enemy attack. She has space in her hull for part only of the anti-aircraft guns required and no space at all for heavier anti-ship guns. This is where the battleship comes in as a support ship capable of swelling the volume of anti-aircraft defensive power as well as inflicting a death blow to the most powerful surface ship.
I hope I have said nothing which would appear to be belittling the value of shore-based or carrier-borne aircraft. Nothing is further from my intentions. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that the Navy has always been air-minded. Aircraft have indeed been the most powerful ally of the escort vessel in the war against the U-boat, which has been waged so relentlessly in the Western approaches to this Island, and in finding, shadowing and attacking enemy surface raiders and warships. Surely my hon. and gallant Friend was right in saying that the battleship and the aircraft carrier are complementary to each other, but I am not quite sure that he chose a very good example in mentioning the "Glorious." She was not at the time of her sinking a carrier in actual fact. Her deck was cluttered up with Hurricanes from Norway. She had no defence nor the ability to search for the enemy. Had she been a carrier at that time with reconnaissance aircraft out, the "Scharnhorst"—if it was the "Scharnhorst"—and the other German cruiser would have been sighted and the "Glorious" might well have evaded them and sent in an effective air strike. So perhaps it was not a very wise case to take. But although the illustration may not be an argument in support of the vulnerability of carriers, it is an argument for a battleship to accompany an undefended ship.
Coming back to the general terms of the Amendment, I hope I have said enough to show that the role of the Navy has been the same historical role which has given us so much pride in the past and that the security of these islands and the Empire depends no less in the future than in the past upon the strength and efficiency of our fleet.
I have been asked about scientific research and development. We have often spoken during the war of the important part played by our scientists in the technical battles that have gone on behind the scenes. The aggressor, with long years of preparation behind him, has frequently had the initial success in these technical battles. Where this has been the case our scientific and technical staffs have always succeeded in overcoming the initial disadvantage. The menace of the magnetic mine, and later the acoustic mine, are examples of the way in which the thrust of the enemy was parried by counter-thrusts of our own, which were very effective in operation. But it has not always been the enemy that has had the initiative. There are many cases in which we have had it. For security reasons I cannot dilate on them now, but the House may feel great pride in the part played by our scientists in the collapse of the U-boat campaign in 1943, when the enemy expected to achieve final supremacy in the Atlantic. We also realise how different scientifically the fighting has been in this war from previous wars, in which capital ships fought chiefly by day and retired to a safe distance at night. It was the development of Radar by our scientists which made it possible for the battle of Matapan and the action of the "Scharnhorst" to be fought out in darkness.
It is always a problem in a defence Service, that the scientific staff is too isolated from the scientific world in general. Secrecy has its disadvantages but, taken over all, secrecy pays a pretty good dividend. In the period before the war, the Asdic was a carefully guarded secret and scientists working on it were, I am afraid, kept secluded with considerable severity. We might possibly have had a better Asdic when the war broke out if we had not had so much secrecy. On the other hand, by these methods of secrecy the Asdic caught the enemy completely unawares. It was over a year before he

could take any counter-measures. I can assure the House that the Admiralty is determined after the war to make proper provision for research and scientific development, not only because it has taken to heart the lessons of its shortcomings in the past but also because modern war equipment has become so increasingly complex.
The problem of finance is not the only one. A much greater one is how to attract into the research service of the Admiralty the right kind of man. We believe that the problem will be solved by the reorganisation of our scientific staff into the Royal Naval Scientific Service, about which a preliminary announcement was made a few months ago. The House might like to know that this will be a civilian service. Its members will be expected to spend a certain amount of time at sea, especially in their early years, and when at sea will wear uniform according to their rank. They will be kept in close contact with naval officers, executive specialists and naval constructors afloat, all of whom play such an important part in development work. But, if we are really to succeed, we must alter the general conditions of service so as to attract the best scientists. We are meeting with a considerable measure of success in our plans and I hope that, in future, the Navy will no longer have to compete on unfavourable terms with the universities, or with industry in general, so far as scientists are concerned. Beside the permanent staff, the Admiralty is considering, when the war is over, setting up a research and development Reserve, and the value of it would be that it could be expanded very rapidly the moment an emergency came along.
The importance of peace-time Reserves is not limited to the field of scientific research. I have also shown that it is because the Navy is called upon to bear the chief burden in the opening months of a war that its peace-time strength is so important. A very fine body of men, to whom great tributes have been paid today, have entered the Navy during the war and have become part of our first-class fighting Forces. But it is still true to say that it is upon the regular personnel and the reserves that the initial strain must necessarily fall.
I have said a good deal about our ships and weapons, and our intentions regarding scientific development, but, whatever progress is made in any of these directions,


the hard fact remains that in the end the nation's security depends upon the efficiency and well-being of the officers and men of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines on the sea, over the sea and under the sea. We may devise the most perfect weapons and instruments, but their efficient war use depends upon the skill, endurance and courage of individual human beings.
I cannot say to-day what decisions will finally be taken, but I can assure the House that plans are being drawn up at the moment to make sure that the naval reserves are kept up to strength and to a very high degree of efficiency. I hope that as a result of the measures that the Admiralty has in mind and upon which it is working at the moment we shall have adequately trained and keen reserves who will perform a purpose which is more than useful in peace-time to this country. The hon. and gallant Member also spoke of care and welfare, and I assure the House that the Admiralty does not forget, and does not mean to forget in the future, the care and welfare of the officers and men of the Fleet. It is determined to see that the best conditions for them are provided in His Majesty's ships. It is constantly our policy that our sailors should be proud of the Service and that each man should be proud of his part in it. The First Lord has rightly said that it is the traditional affection and admiration which have always been felt by the British public for its Navy that so inspires the Fleet.
I understand that the House would like me to speak about our naval bases overseas for the post-war Fleet, and especially about Singapore. I hope the House will realise, however, that these are very big questions and must obviously await settlement until the shape of the world security organisation has been more fully worked out. At the moment, it is not possible for me to go further, except to say that, if we are to discharge our obligations under any international order of security, it is perfectly clear that we shall not only have to have adequate bases from which to operate, but bases both firmly protected and strongly equipped.
The Amendment mentions the need for adequate armed forces to make our contribution to preserving world peace. I am certain that this country and, indeed, the world, knows that, whatever means are devised for the ordering of our inter-

national life after the war, whatever instruments are used for that purpose, the Royal Navy, together with the Navies of the Dominions can be relied on to play its part in the future as she has done in the past. But if we are to play this hand in the post-war world, let us be sure that we lead from strength and not from weakness. We are all agreed that it is in no spirit of aggrandisement that we look upon our exercise of sea power, but that it is in the same co-operative spirit which we saw behind the conference at Yalta.
In summing up, it seems to me that the value of a Debate of this kind is that it makes one turn instinctively to the past, not necessarily to the past of this 20th century, but sometimes far beyond it, in order to draw our lessons for the future. How wise that instinct is, for if ever
our past proclaimed our future, it is surely so in the history of the Royal Navy. Here in this war in Western Europe, we have a parallel in strategy to the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the 19th century. In diplomacy also we find the same danger and mercifully the same deliverance. Lord Auckland, who was a friend of Pitt and one of the wisest diplomats of his day, whom I think I am in Order in bringing into a Debate on the Navy Estimates because he was the father of a First Lord of the Admiralty, looking back on the broken Peace of Amiens, said of Napoleon:
Had he amused us a year or two more our dupery would have been complete and we should not have had a chance of effectual resistance.
Nearly a century and a half later, fortunately for us, the Feuhrer of the Third Reich made the same mistake. It is because we have forgotten our past that we have to re-live it in these grim years of war. Surely this country and the Governments of the future must practise once and for all, the vigilance which this Amendment brings home to us to-day.

5.26 p.m.

Mr. Hore-Belisha: Second only in importance to the instruction and guidance which we receive so eloquently from the First Lord on these occasions are the pleasure and satisfaction which we obtain from the speeches of my hon. Friends the Financial Secretary and the Civil Lord. My hon. Friend the Financial Secretary has just comported himself with grace and elegance. As a Parliamentary Private Secretary he was loyal. He shows


himself now to be a Minister both modest and competent. He has been replying to an Amendment which, as he has said, is drawn in wide terms. It raises in a global way the future of the Royal Navy. It is an Amendment which was commended to the House in speeches of great skill. Among the services rendered by the Royal Navy to the country, we must reckon the contribution which that fighting force has made in providing the House of Commons with the ability and attractions of my hon. and gallant Friends. I would like to congratulate them on their speeches, which were, of course, as we would expect of sailors, technically well-informed.
My hon. Friend, in replying to them, painted, I thought, a rosy picture of the Fleet which we are to have after the war. It is true, and it was said by the mover of the Amendment, that the efficiency of that Fleet will depend upon the policy to be pursued in the bases on which the ships depend. After the last war the policy was pretty miserable. Rosyth and Pembroke, having rendered most useful help to the nation and given of their best—of their utmost—were reduced to a care and maintenance basis. Houses were left derelict, churches were no longer attended, money ceased to ring on the counters of the shops and desolation prevailed. His Majesty's Government to-day offer a better prospect to those who live in the ports. They are embarking, indeed, on expansion. Not only in monetary policy, but in naval policy, the currency is, as it were, to be enlarged. My constituency is to be either a beneficiary or a victim of this policy—it depends on which way we look at it. So are some of the other ports. That is the reason why I rise, late in the day, so as not to interfere too much with the general Debate, to ask for some more precise declaration.
The Navy has been built upon places like Devonport. The Admiralty is to acquire there 220 acres, for the purpose of enlarging the Devonport dockyard. On those acres, 24,000 of my constituents live. They are to be dispersed. The House will see at once the importance of the question which I am going to put to my right hon. Friend. I am not in antagonism to him; he will appreciate that. I am simply doing my duty on behalf of my constituents and, I hope, on behalf of the Royal Navy. The 24,000 people 1ive on the sites to be acquired by the Ad-

miralty in Devonport, for the purpose of enlarging the dockyard. This means that many of the landmarks of my constituency are to be erased—the shopping centre, the Guildhall, the noble column which records the change of the name from the rather commonplace "Plymouth Dock" to the better sounding "Devonport," together with some thousands of houses. They are to be swept out of existence. [An HON. MEMBER: "Including the Member of Parliament?"] If this were the 18th century, I should call this buying of my constituency under me a corrupt practice, but living in better times I must defer, hard as it may be to do so, to the national interest, and put the intentions of the Admiralty upon a better footing.

Mr. Beverley Baxter: Does that mean that the headquarters of the Liberal Party will have to be abolished?

Mr. Hore-Belisha: One of the pleasantest edifices in my constituency is called "The Hore-Belisha Hall." I am sorry to have to inform the House that will also go. It was a tribute to my modest efforts, and it will be wiped away, and posterity will be deprived of the benefit which it would hava had from listening to speeches in its rooms. However, these 24,000 people will be reconciled to this policy if it is in fact to be operated. They will make their own desires, memories and traditions subordinate to the higher claims of the nation. It is important, however, that they should know precisely how the Admiralty is going to put this intention into effect, and over what period of time.
This is the present situation: The area has been heavily bombed; nevertheless, 17,000 people are living on it. Many of their homes—their shops and places of amusement also—are damaged or destroyed. They want them repaired or rebuilt, but they are told that they cannot have them repaired beyond what can be done at a very cheap cost because the Admiralty are going to acquire the area. These people have been reading—I want to put both sides of the case—about the Conferences at Yalta and San Francisco. Many have also read of the necessities of the community in regard to housing and the shortage of accommodation generally. They want to be satisfied, before they are uprooted, that the Admiralty are going on


with this purchase. They want to know whether, in fact, after the war, not in the general terms to which we have quite naturally been treated in my hon. Friend's excellent speech, but in more precise terms, if possible, that the Government are in fact going to expand the Navy and are going to use labour for which there will be a great demand, for housing and other needs, in order to construct a bigger and better dockyard. If that is, in fact, to be the policy, and we can be told so authoritatively, this decision will be accepted; but it is not fair to leave those people in doubt and these areas in decline, and the homes of the people concerned in a state of partial repair, and to put off those who are clamouring to return—as I well know from my correspondence—if this policy is not to be operated.
That is the subject matter of the speech which I wish to address to the House. If the Admiralty are only in a vague way going to acquire an option, it will act unnecessarily in restraint of the amenities of my constituency. If, after the war, the Treasury is going to say: "During the war we thought we would require this extension, but now we have entirely changed our mind and we want to spend the money on other and more urgent purposes," that will not have been fair. I am bound to put this question to the Government, and it is not in the least intended to be hostile, as I am sure Ministers realise. If they represented my constituency in Parliament as well as representing the Navy, they would understand the importance and the gravity of this matter to the thousands of people who have made their homes in this place. I will not further detain the House, but I shall be obliged to the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Civil Lord if they can give me some satisfaction on this point.

5.37 p.m.

Commander Prior: In the very interesting speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) and the speech of the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty reference was made to training. I desire to raise an extremely controversial matter, the training of seamen in sail. There are great training establishments in the Service for gunnery, torpedoing and navigation. Young officers go to Greenwich, where they learn higher mathematics. In

all the curricula of those establishments seamanship is greatly neglected, yet it is the foundation of all sea warfare. It has been essential to train our men in material. The modern ship is so complex that all their time is taken up with electrics, gunnery and navigation, and very little time is given to seamanship, but unfortunately, in battle, and even in peace time, machines fail, ships sink and, in the last resort, the seaman is left to depend on his own skill.
Time and time again, in the course of the centuries, our great admirals and seamen have saved themselves and their country from destruction only by their sea sense and anticipation. Their sea sense and skill did not descend upon them like dew from Heaven. It was gained by the unending patrols off Brest, or by chasing the enemy across the Atlantic. Hon. Members may say that all this history is academic, but I should like to remind them that in the Napoleonic wars, there was continual boat work—spiking of guns, taking of batteries, cutting out expeditions; not very different from what takes place in our assaults in this war. I instance two parallel actions. One took place on 20th February, 1814, when Wellington was held up at Bayonne and wanted to cross the River Adour. It was necessary to build a bridge of boats. Admiral Penrose in the "Porcupine," a ship of 22 guns, was given the task of carrying that out. At the mouth of the river is a bar. Across that bar the sea was very tempestuous. The operation was successful, though many lives were lost. Sir John Hope, the soldier in charge of the Army, wrote:
The zeal, courage and skill of the British seaman had never shone forth in a more conspicuous manner than on that memorable occasion.
I now come to 1942, at about the same date. An expedition went to the River Adour to deliver an assault. There was a slight swell in the bay. Once again across the bar was a tempestuous sea. The officer in charge of the craft considered it was too rough and rightly we were ordered back. I, myself, returned to my ship an extremely dejected and disappointed man, with the bitter knowledge that the seamen in the Napoleonic era, in 1814, carried out a feat, which we, with all the resources of the 20th century, failed to perform.
Plans are now being made for postwar training, to create reserves and to train our men. I submit to the First Lord that we should organise a training squadron, send our young men away from the eternal machine to the best practical school for learning seamanship, to battle with the wind and seas in a ship under sail. In March, 1932, Sir Bolton EyresMonsell, who was then First Lord, introduced the Navy Estimates. In the course of his speech he made the following remarks:
In my opinion, there is no training in the world for a sailor like the training provided by masts and yards, making and shortening sail, reefing top-sails in a strong wind and all sail drill, which necessitates the closest cooperation and trust between all hands, and nothing can surpass it for imparting smartness and discipline, and for developing character and self-reliance. The curious thing is that nearly all other countries in the world have this form of training in sailing ships, but we, who depend upon the sea more than any other country, have none at all, and I think it is the height of folly for us to ignore it any longer. I believe that an early training in sail is the only way to develop that spark of seamanship which is latent in every inhabitant of these islands. Seamanship in the past, in the face of tremendous odds so far as material is concerned, has always been the supreme factor in drawing round this country a ring of fire which nobody has got through for centuries."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1932; Vol. 262, C. 1502.]
That speech was made in 1932. As far as I know, nothing has yet materialised. Immediately after the battle of Quiberon Bay, one of the greatest examples of seamanship we have ever seen, the following doggerel verse ran round the Fleet:
Ere Hawke did bang
Monsieur Conflans
Yoa sent us beef and beer.
Now Monsieur's beat,
We've nought to eat,
As you have nought to fear.
Will hon. Members of this House, casting their mind to the future, say we have nought to fear, and that we shall always be living in peace and security? Although the idea is very pleasing, it is very improbable and unlikely. There is no doubt whatever about the courage and devotion of our seamen, but let us see to it that they acquire that skill on which the safety of the Empire and the world may well depend.

5.45 p.m.

Mr. McLean Watson: We have had two speeches from the Government Front Bench to-day, both of them

very able speeches During the whole time I have been in this House I do not think I have ever heard a First Lord deliver a more interesting and inspiring speech. He had a great story to tell, and I am glad that he told it to the House. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) has moved an Amendment, and although he has had a reply from the Front Bench, I do not know whether he has learned very much or got very much satisfaction from the reply of the Financial Secretary. It was a very able and interesting speech, but I am afraid that the hon. and gallant Member did not get much satisfaction out of it, any more than some dockyard Members who have been approaching the Admiralty on other matters during the past year.
It is very difficult to get the Admiralty to make a declaration of any kind. It may be that the international situation is still so complicated that they hesitate to commit themselves to definite statements. They lost a very important naval base in the Far East, and I suppose they will have to keep at the back of their minds the possibility of having to rehabilitate that dockyard. Then there are the home dockyards. My right hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) has expressed the anxiety of the people of Devonport over the future of that dockyard. I do not need to tell the First Lord that I am just as anxious about Rosyth. I do not believe that the Admiralty will repeat the incredible folly which they committed after the last war in reducing Rosyth to a care-and-maintenance basis, because this is the one dockyard where they have been able to rely upon having ships repaired during the whole period of this war I think it is the only dockyard that has not been bombed. Though it was the first to be attacked I would be surprised if any bombs have fallen on that dockyard. I have said in previous Navy Estimates Debates that it is the best protected dockyard in the whole country. There is plenty of deep water outside and inside the dockyard and it is far enough inland to be well protected, and it is because of the protection that can be given to it that it maintains its reputation as the safest dockyard.
I wish to try, once again, to see if I can get any ray of hope that the Admir-


ally really intend to make and keep Rosyth one of the principal dockyards. Until the First Lord removes some elements which give the dockyard an air of being of a temporary nature, he will not convince the people of that area that the Admiralty intend to keep the dockyard as a working concern. It is almost incredible that, after all the time that has elapsed since that dockyard was created, the Admiral Superintendent is housed in the place where the engineer or the manager had his quarters when the dockyard was being constructed—in temporary buildings. The First Lard should give an air of permanency to the dockyard by erecting really creditable administrative offices. These temporary buildings have been there since the Admiralty began to construct the dockyard, in about 1906, 1907, or 1908. The dockyard was hardly finished when the last war started. Yet the admiral superintendent and his staff still occupy these temporary offices. The administrative staff are scattered all over the dockyard, and now a considerable part of the administrative offices are outside the dockyard, because, with the amount of work that has been done in Rosyth during the war, it has been impossible to carry on with the facilities provided in the dockyard.
In addition, I want the Admiralty to consider the claim of Rosyth to accommodation for something smaller than a first-class battleship. When Rosyth was reduced to a care-and-maintenance basis, in 1925, the then First Lord of the Admiralty argued that Rosyth was all right for capital ships, but that it was not economical to repair smaller craft there. During this war Rosyth has had to take anything—there has been nothing too big and nothing too small to be repaired in that dockyard. But it is true that the dry docks there are for the biggest battleships afloat. There is no trouble at any time about docking even the "Hood" in that dockyard. I claim that, in addition to the big dry docks, there should be accommodation for smaller craft. I agree that it is absurd to see three or four destroyers lying in a great dry dock that is meant for a battleship. In the development of Rosyth consideration should be given to the construction of some smaller dry docks than those there at present.
The hon. and gallant Member for Pollok pleaded for a dock on the West coast of

Scotland. Far be it from me to say one word against the construction of a dockyard on the Clyde. I am not going to offer any opposition to that proposal; but I am afraid my hon. and gallant Friend will have to carry on the agitation for a long time, because the Admiralty have not yet finished constructing Rosyth Dockyard. What I am asking for now was part of the original
plan for Rosyth. We were told that Rosyth was to be a second Portsmouth. It is very far from being that yet, but we hope that the mistakes that were made in the past will not be committed again, and that Rosyth will be properly developed. Already suggestions have been made to the First Lord for the proper development of Rosyth Dockyard, and while I have no objection to other Royal Dockyards being constructed in Scotland, I put forward the plea that before the First Lord starts a second dockyard in Scotland he might finish the first, and, let me say, the best—or, at any rate, it ought to be No. 1 dockyard on the Admiralty list.
I am not going to enter into the echoes of bygone battles. My hon. Friend the Member for Greenock (Mr. McNeil) had an argument this afternoon that reminded me of battles that were fought in the past when we were considering the Navy Estimates. I can remember my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) having great arguments about whether we ought not to abandon battleships and concentrate on bombing. I am not going to enter into that argument, but I am reminded of past Debates on Navy Estimates, when the experts, the men who believed in the big battleships and the men who believed in the bombs, had quite an interesting time. At that time the discussions were largely confined to Members for dockyard constituencies and to naval officers or ex-naval officers.

Rear-Admiral Sir Murray Sueter: I think the hon. Member will agree that those who contended that battleships were vulnerable to air attacks have been proved right in this war.

Mr. Watson: I shall not rise even to that bait. I am not going to commit myself. All I am saying is that I listened with the greatest possible attention to the experts—to the men who believed in the big battleships and also to the men who believed in the big bombs. At any rate, I hope that what I have said will be taken


seriously by the First Lord. The right hon. Gentleman was very good to us in the Rosyth area some time ago, when he met a very large and representative deputation which fully expressed the anxiety not only of the dockyard workers but of the whole community of the East of Scotland. To-day, again, we have had one hon. Member after another urging upon the First Lord the necessity of keeping Rosyth as a going concern and not going back to the situation after the last war, and reducing it to a care-and-maintenance basis.

6.1 p.m.

Rear-Admiral Sir Murray Sueter: I wish to join with other hon. Members in congratulating the First Lord on the wonderful survey he gave of naval work during the past year. I agree with the hon. Member who has just spoken that it was the best speech I have ever heard from a First Lord during the last 24 years. I want to deal with something which has not been mentioned in the Debate, that is the high level administration of the Navy. It is not profitable to dig into the past too much, but I am afraid I must do so. An hon. Member has said that the Admiralty has always been air-minded. He must not say that in my presence, because I recollect when the Admiralty would not build aircraft carriers, even when Messrs. Beardmore offered to build them one before the war. The consequence was that they had to convert cross-Channel steamers into aircraft carriers and we had great difficulty in progressing with aircraft carriers. In the last war, too, the Admiralty did not develop torpedo aeroplanes when they might have done. A very different story of the Battle of Jutland could be told if they had done so. Admiral Beatty asked for 200 torpedo bombers and they were built towards the end of the last war but delivery was too late to be of any use. No hon. Member must come down here and say, in my presence, that the Admiralty were air-minded in the last war.
I came into this House 24 years ago, and, shortly afterwards, feeling very much concerned about the way in which the Admiralty had stopped air progress, I introduced, under the Ten Minute Rule, my Ministry of Defence Creation Bill, which was received very well by hon.

Members of this House. Afterwards, several hon. Members said: "You were on the right lines, Admiral; we want some questioning authority over the three Fighting Services." After that, we disarmed for many years, and, as we disarmed, our prestige and influence in the councils of Europe and in the whole world went down, until they became almost microscopic, and towards 1935 many hon. Members were rather perturbed about our defence position. We questioned what was being done, particularly when we knew that Germany was building a large number of aeroplanes and was drilling her people with spades. We were told that the Chiefs of Staff looked into this, and into how many aeroplanes Germany had got, how many tanks they had got, how they were drilling, and so forth. They were watching the thing closely, we were told.
Then, on 14th December, 1935, we had a letter in "The Times" from Lord Trenchard, who had done great work for the defence of this country, particularly in the air, and to whom we all owe a very great debt of gratitude. Possibly we might not have won the Battle of Britain if it had not been for the efficient way in which Lord Trenchard built up the Royal Air Force. In his letter to "The Times," Lord Trenchard said this (I speak from memory):
The Chiefs of Staff have not studied the problems of defence, much less attempted to solve them.
Yet we had been fobbed off with the statement that the Chiefs of Staff were going to do everything to look after our defence interests. Many hon. Members, and people outside the House, were very much concerned about the defence of out country then. In February, 1936, I won first place in the Ballot for Private Members Bills, and I was offered Bills from all over the country, Electricity Bills, Water Bills, Matrimonial Causes Bills and many others, but I went back to my own Ministry of Defence Creation Bill.
We had a Debate one Friday in a full House, and many Ministers and ex-Ministers came down. I recollect that the late Sir Austen Chamberlain made a great speech supporting me in asking for a Minister of Defence and that very fine Liberal statesman, the right hon. Member for South Molton (Mr. G. Lambert), who was a very great Civil Lord at the


Admiralty, supported me very strongly and said that it was very necessary to create a Ministry of Defence. During the Debate, two Whips came to me and asked if I would withdraw the Bill because the Prime Minister would do something. I thought I had landed a salmon, but I only landed a very large minnow, because the Prime Minister, shortly afterwards, created the post of Co-ordinating Minister of Defence and appointed Sir Thomas Inskip to that post. Sir Thomas Inskip did great work in trying to bring the Services together, but he was not there long, and he was followed by Lord Chatfield, who did equally good work, but was not long in the post.
When the right hon. Gentleman the Member
for Epping (Mr. Churchill) became Prime Minister he took over the post of
Minister of Defence. At one time, there were certain criticisms about the high level administration of the Fighting Services in this war, and many hon. Members pressed for information on what was being done, and we were then given a White Paper called "Organisation for Joint Planning" (Cmd. 6351). Anybody who reads this interesting paper can see that it was drawn up in a hurry. At the end of the paper, it lays out the work of the Chiefs of Staff Committee—Joint Planning Staffs, Strategical Planning Section, Executive Planning Section, Future Operational Planning Section and Intelligence Sections and so on. It was a most valuable statement, and I think every hon. Member will agree that we owe much to this planning staff for the wonderful way in which they have planned this war. We owe them much, but are we, at the end of this war, going to tear this White Paper up and go back to the Committee of Imperial Defence with one secretary? Surely we are not going to do that. We have some of the best brains in the three Fighting Services here, and I hope that something may be done to establish a Ministry of Defence with the assistance of these officers.
There are great problems ahead of us after the war. When one remembers what happened after the last war, when there was great financial stringency, one is led to ask who is going to settle whether we have a big programme of battleships or multiple-engined bombers or both. Surely, not the Committee of Imperial Defence with one secretary. This question will have to be gone into very carefully in-

deed, as will also the question whether we are going to have aircraft carriers of large displacement or of medium displacement, what sort of tanks we are to have, and so on. There are great problems to be faced. We must go into these problems carefully and, if possible, study all those weapons of war, particularly aircraft, rocket bombs, and so on.
We have obligations to our Dominions. Canada has done wonderfully well in this war. As the First Lord said to-day, their shipbuilding programme has surpassed what we thought they could do. Their Armies have been great and they have done fine work in training our airmen, and we owe much to Canada. The same applies to South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. I read in the Press that on Wednesday of last week Mr. John Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, gave to the House of Representatives a three-point post-war policy of national security drawn up by the Australian Government. The points were: "Adequate defence policy," "Development of maximum co-operation in the British Commonwealth," and "Participation in an effective system of collective security." We have these Empire commitments to see that our Empire is secure and is helped in every possible way. We also have world commitments. I do not know what the outcome of the San Francisco Conference will be, but I understand that the three Great Powers are pledging the security of the smaller nations. I am certain that the United States will not like a weak partner, and that Russia will not like a weak partner. We have to study all these things after the war and have our fighting Services as efficient as possible.
When I was at the Admiralty I received some hard knocks for pressing for air developments and warning the Admiralty that battleships were vulnerable to air attack. It did not concern me much because I only laughed at those who criticised all air effort. The First Lord deserves and has earned many laurels in this war. He has worked with the distinguished Admirals he mentioned, but he must not forget the work of the late Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, who helped him so well and rendered great service to our country. The First Lord has earned great laurels and I want to give him another laurel. Will he go to the War Cabinet to-morrow and say to them that the whole question of the administration


of the Fighting Services has been raised in the House, and also say: "Cannot we put all these officers engaged in planning round a table to draw up a White Paper to be submitted to the War Cabinet and then to be brought to this House?"
I am certain he would do a great service to the country if he did that. We should set up a Defence Ministry, if possible. The right hon. Gentleman should go to the Prime Minister and say, "I think that something ought to be done by the appointment of either a Defence Minister or a Minister of Security to carry out the obligations that we have undertaken." I understood that the father of the Prime Minister, the late Lord Randolph Churchill, was the first to suggest a Ministry of Defence and that he did so because there were dog fights between the Army and the Navy in those days over questions as to whether the Admiralty or Army should run the Brennan controlled torpedo mines to defend our harbours and searchlights round our coast. He suggested the creation of a Ministry of Defence to settle the differences. Now we have a third Service—the Air Service—and it is more important that we should have high level bridge administration of these three Services and not go back to the old days of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and sub-committees and sub-sub-committees which never came to any decisions at all. They never helped us much in connection with the air.
One of my tasks in the last war was to create the first anti-aircraft corps for the defence of London. When I looked into the matter I found that there were only three one-inch pom-poms provided for defence of London against enemy air attack by Zeppelins—one over the Admiralty Arch, one over the Crown Colony Buildings, and one over the Treasury. Mr. Edwin Montagu, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury at that time, went to see how the gun was getting on and found no crew there. The poor men had to eat. They had no food provided for them and had to go out and get their food. Surely, we are not going back to that sort of thing.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Charles Williams): We certainly should not go back to that on the Navy Estimates.

Sir M. Sueter: I bow to your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and you are right,

but I was saying that I was given the task at the Admiralty, as Director of the Air Department, to create the anti-aircraft corps for the defence of London. I hope that the First Lord will convey my remarks to his colleagues. I am only a Back Bencher but I have studied these defence problems for many years. Something ought to be done to get better planning for our Fighting Services so that in emergency we can efficiently serve this country, the Empire and the whole world.

6.18 p.m.

Mr. Malcolm MacMillan: I rise as a Member of the Labour Party to add my tribute to the most generous tributes paid to-day to the speech and performance of the First Lord. It was a speech full of vigour and interest, which we, on this side, and indeed on all sides, were proud to hear from him. I would like also to congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) on his good fortune in the Ballot, and on giving us the opportunity of discussing a matter of such importance to those of us who represent sea-going communities like that in my own constituency. I do not want to be drawn into any questions of pre-war policy and armaments except to say, in partial reply to the hon. and gallant Member, that, even though preparedness and great armaments by themselves are essential in war-time, they are not, in themselves, by any means a guarantee that you will not be attacked. There was no such guarantee to Russia and no one can say that they were not prepared. There are greater issues of international organisation to prevent war; and it would be folly not to relate to the wider question of alliance against aggression the important but narrower question of armaments alone.

Sir Joseph Nall: Would the hon. Member agree that their absence might prove to be a guarantee that we would be attacked?

Mr. MacMillan: It is a question of being armed at the right time and in the right way and of the right policy in foreign affairs. For several years pre-war Governments neglected this duty.

Mr. J. J. Davidson: Will my hon. Friend expatiate further on the point and point out that, while we had no preparations, and nothing at all, so to speak, we


paid, with the consent of the party in the majority, handsome profits to munitions manufacturers for many years?

Mr. MacMillan: I do not want to be drawn into this subject any further. I cannot say whether we should have battleships instead of bombers or vice versa; or what the actual ratio should be. I have a layman's great respect in the meantime for the visible battleship; and I am not certain what is going to come out of the scientists' test tubes or laboratories until I actually see it. I was most interested in one point made by the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok on the question of a West coast dockyard and, I take it a major naval base as well. In so far as we can have protection against the new weapons—and we can only look ahead within the limits of what seem to be the likely progress for the next few years in the matter of new weapons and new methods of attack and defence—it is, I think, quite logical to say, as he said, that the West coast is obviously better for strategical defence and, therefore, for naval establishments than any other part of the country.
I do not need to add anything more to what has been said to-day in tribute to the men of the Royal Navy and the ancillary services and the Merchant Navy. These men are men amongst whom I have been born and grown up, and while I was not in the Navy myself—I occupied only a very humble position in the Army—I have a deep and sincere respect for the performance these men have put up, many of them completely untrained before the war in life at sea and in methods of naval warfare, and some of whom had never been to sea in their lives. To tell them to their faces what fine chaps they were would only embarrass them, so it comes better perhaps from Members of this House sitting here to-day to pay tribute on behalf of the nation than it does to speak to them as individuals. They do not like any direct praise, however well-earned.
One of my hon. Friends spoke some time ago about the importance of widening the opportunities of promotion from the lower deck, and I for one know that there is a great deal of feeling, sometimes very bitter feeling, about the very small number of promotions which have been made from the lower deck. There may be many reasons given officially for it,

but there is a strong feeling that when men went up for interview before the Selection Boards and the deciding officers, they were treated in practically the same way as the Selection Boards treated the interviewees before the war. Too much is asked for in the nature of graces. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes—most definitely—too much of social veneer and the social graces are expected of these men in many cases instead of sheer merit, and some of the questions which have been reported to us as having been asked by members of Selection Boards and the officers who decide in these cases make one think that some of these people are perfectly childish in their attitude towards what constitutes merit for the purpose of promotion in the Royal Navy. That is not an unfair statement. These things have been reported to us by men and women we know and it is most disappointing that at this stage of the war we cannot have the assurance that men with merit can have proper and adequate opportunities for promotion in the Navy in sufficient numbers in the interests, not merely of the men alone, but of the nation itself.

Commander Agnew: Is the hon. Member talking about temporary or permanent commissions?

Mr. MacMillan: I am talking about temporary commissions at the moment; but it is always serious.

Commander Agnew: In that case the House ought to know that, as the war went on, eventually the Selection Boards at sea were abolished altogether, and all these candidates were sent up to Portsmouth to undergo the beginning part of the course.

Mr. MacMillan: I know that; and my hon. and gallant Friend has opened the way for me for my next point, which is in respect of the Y-scheme for training. A very attractive publication was issued by the Admiralty some time ago which raised a great deal of hope that boys going forward for this special training were very likely, if they passed the grade of examination at the end of that training, to be commissioned. A great deal of interest was aroused and a large number of boys came forward. Now, however, I understand the situation is that not very many for commissions are required; and many of those boys are now being drafted


to overseas or general duties, and being told that there is little further need for Y-scheme entrants. That publication roused an exaggerated hope, and I think it would do good if my right hon. Friend could clarify the issue and tell the cadets whether the chances are less of getting commissions now and that they are going to be drafted into different branches of the Navy, perhaps specialist branches, perhaps for general or for overseas service. He should tell them now, instead of dashing their hopes after they have come forward full of interest and enthusiasm, believing the opportunities are many.
There is one other point in connection with my own constituency, and constituencies like those of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Major Neven-Spence), and that is the question of travel time of men going on leave. I know they get a certain amount of time, but by the time a man has arrived home it is not only a question of needing time to travel but very often he is in a much more exhausted condition from the long land and sea journeys and bad traveling conditions than he is "after a major naval battle"—as one sailor put it to me. They have hardly time to get home and to recover from the journey before they have to go off again. I know concessions have been made in travel time and in agricultural leaves; but perhaps the right hon. Gentleman could make that more elastic in the case of men who have to travel long distances from their ports to their home villages.
The point has been raised with me of pay for men and women on compassionate leave; especially when that leave is extended. I know that special grants are available in certain cases, but it means going through a sort of means test and a lot of trouble. In the case of a man going home for a few days or weeks, he does not want to take all the trouble to do that in many cases, and is sometimes diffident about declaring his means, and so forth, so I think a little more generosity might be shown in cases of that kind, instead of adding to their anxiety at such a difficult time. Then I have heard objections about the payment of R.N. gunners on Merchant Navy ships. I do not know whether that question has been solved, because it is some time since I have had the complaints that these men

are paid a bonus and ordinary R.N.R. rates instead of Merchant Navy rates. When they go ashore, they find themselves short of money compared with other chaps on the same ships, and I think it would be good if the right hon. Gentleman or the Financial Secretary would look into that question once again.
Then there is a point upon which many of us feel strongly, the problem of men who have had the misfortune to be unemployed before call-up and so are not able to qualify for dependants' allowances on behalf of parents or dependants at home. These men have had enough misfortune already by being unable to earn for themselves, and that is miserable enough, without, when they are called up for the Royal Navy, finding that their dependants are disqualified because of their previous misfortune. Over and above the far too low scales of pay, they have the added burden of giving more than other men to maintain dependants at home. The only other point I want to raise is the question of technical education in connection with that matter of promotions. That is another extremely important aspect of the future recruitment of the Navy.
We have been agitating for a long time for a technical school in the Hebrides in which, with other things, navigation and the practical side of seamanship and of the fishing industry, the study of Diesel engines, and other new methods and subjects can be taught. I hope the Admiralty will give us support, not only in connection with the matter of helping generously the local Navy League cadets who under the resourceful leadership of Canon Meaden have done such good pioneer work, but by giving support for a full-time fully equipped local technical school in which navigation and knowledge of the theoretical and technical requirements for promotion to commissioned ranks in all the Services can be taught. If this school is established, and if that type of training is given, I feel that a great deal of bad feeling can be eliminated, because we are bound, then, to get more men with theoretical and technical kowledge added to their love and knowledge of the sea and seamanship. Some theoretical and technical knowledge added to an inborn and inherited love of the sea and its lore, should give an excellent type of naval officer, a type of which we have had too few from the Islands in the past. The local autho-


rities in Stornoway and in Lewis, representing places which have been extremely useful both in the last war and this, have a feeling, as I certainly have long had, that we ought to establish there permanently a naval training base. There is no reason why men should go away from the Hebrides several hundred miles to the South of England for a few weeks in the year with inadequate retainer fees and pay, to be trained, when, in the atmosphere of the fishing industry, within reach of all the North-West coast of Scotland as well as the Outer Hebrides and the open Atlantic, they could be trained for all the purposes of the Royal Navy. If, therefore, a concession can be made in the matter of establishing a naval base in Stornoway, we shall be extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend.
These things are not simply selfish constituency points; they are all made in the interests of the better training of these men for the Royal Navy and National Service and for the many important purposes served in this war; and to give all our men of ability, keenness and merit full and equal opportunity with all, regardless of means and social status. Even without all these things I am demanding, they have done a marvellous job. Lacking these opportunities, they have still deserved and earned every compliment that has been paid them, and I can gladly and sincerely add mine to those tributes. In view of what they have done, lacking all the opportunities and the training and equipment that I have suggested for promotion and special tasks, what could they not do provided that these other things were added to the natural mariners' and fighting qualities that they possess?

6.30 p.m.

Mr. A. V. Alexander: The general character of the Amendment and the subjects that have been covered are of such importance that the House might think it not courteous if I did not say a word or two, although the Financial Secretary has already made a most excellent contribution to the Debate. The character of the speeches that have been made is most gratifying to the Admiralty. I wish we were always in such full agreement with intervening Amendments, put down in the Debate on the Navy Estimates. The criticism that was advanced later as to whether my hon. and gallant Friend was right in all his

tactical and strategical conceptions of the work of the Fleet, did not impress me very much. My hon. Friend the Member for Greenock (Mr. McNeil) was ready to do battle with all the technicians from the layman's point of view, as to whether the scientists could or could not replace the battleship with something else which would suit the purpose. That is what he really meant. That depends, not on the ability of the scientists to produce something else, but upon whether that something else will deal with the fact of other nations insisting in putting on the sea, and using ever and ever stronger and more greatly protected capital ships. If they do, you will certainly have to meet them. I recalled, as he was speaking, the Debate in 1940 on the Estimates, when the present Prime Minister was the First Lord and he referred to the fact that some people thought it was not much use having capital ships. Here is an extract from the speech:
This is a very superficial view. If we had not got at the present time an unquestioned superiority in battleships, the German heavy cruisers would come out into the Atlantic Ocean and, without fear of being brought to account, would be able to obstruct, if not to arrest, the whole of the enormous trade, without which we could not live."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1940; Vol. 357, c. 1929.]
That was very well stated, and it is a view to which we could very well subscribe today. If the suggestion that has been made by an hon. and gallant Gentleman, for whose opinion and experience I have the utmost respect, that the battleship—which he said was vulnerable to air attack—might not be the ship that was wanted in the future, was intended to convey that the battleship was finished, I would say it depends on the air protection that you send with it. The suggestion made by some in this Debate that the battleship has not been doing its job against surface ships in this war is really not true. The great fight with the "Bismarck" is a case in point. That was a full-dress action between the "Hood," which was sunk, and the "Prince of Wales," which was damaged, and the "Bismarck," and, afterwards she was
brought down by the heavy fire of the "Rodney" and the "King George V."

Sir M. Sueter: When the right hon. Gentleman talks about the "Bismarck" may I say that she was turned into a lame duck by a torpedo from an aeroplane first?

Mr. Alexander: Again, that is not in conformity with the case of the hon. and gallant Member who moved the Amendment. She was turned into
a lame duck by the despised Swordfish, flying from the "Ark Royal." That is how she was crippled. In the case of the sinking of the "Scharnhorst," no such position was created at all. She was within reach, if the weather and the light had been suitable, of shore-based aircraft, but we had no possibility of any air protection there at that time. It was a straight action between one capital ship and another, and ours happened to be the better of the two.
I agree, and the Admiralty agree, and I think I may say that the Government agree with the whole spirit and drafting of the Amendment. We cannot say "Let us proceed to pass it" because we should then not get you, Mr. Speaker, out of the Chair. Before I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to withdraw it, I would mention one or two other points on which I was not quite certain that I agree with him. He referred to the question of the future entry of officers into the Navy and to our scholarship scheme. I have a great personal interest in that. I had more to do with its introduction than anyone else. I was rather disturbed at the suggestion, which seemed to lie behind his speech, that any such scheme might not make sure that the sole criterion for entry into the college and the Service was ability and character. The change that we made in 1940, which came into operation in 1941, certainly takes nothing away from the requirements of ability and character. But I cannot agree for a moment with the suggestion that the scholarships that are given at Dartmouth should be put up for "free-for-all" competition, between boys from any class of school.
We never had any general entry up to 1940 from State-aided schools into Dartmouth. Entry had been the sole perquisite of the preparatory schools. The boys had come from parents who could afford to pay the fees in the preparatory schools, and the preparatory schools were working on the curriculum necessary for them to take the common entry examination of the public schools, which is practically the examination for entry into Dartmouth. Those boys from the preparatory schools have three and a half to four and a half years' training for the

curriculum. The boy from the State secondary school rarely enters it from the elementary school until he is 11, and he takes the ordinary school course—as much as he can get—based upon the course laid down for the examination for boys from 16 to 17 for the school certificate or matriculation.
Therefore, we had to deal with a situation, in laying down the conditions of the scholarships, through which we could first get boys from the secondary school into Dartmouth. They must be of ability and character. Therefore, we fixed a minimum standard of educational attainment below which no scholarship was to be given. That minimum standard is well above the minimum we adopt for the admission of cadets into Dartmouth as fee payers. Therefore, no boy gets a scholarship from a State-aided or preparatory school unless he is above the minimum standard required for a fee payer.

Commander Galbraith: What my right hon. Friend is saying is really that no boy having a higher standard who goes up for that examination is excluded because some other type of boy is due to get a scholarship.

Mr. Alexander: He is certainly not excluded from the college. What we lay down is that there are to be 10 scholarships open to secondary school scholars who reach the minimum qualifications for a scholarship, and there are 10 given to the preparatory schools. You might get, I suppose, in fact from public or preparatory schools a boy who would get slightly higher marks over and above those needed for entry on a scholarship. He would not be kept out of the school, but he would not be eligible for a scholarship. Nevertheless, if his parents are very poor we would be able, as we have always done at Dartmouth, to consider, after a little experience of the boy, whether some part of his fees could be remitted. That has always been done.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: May I suggest that there is a possible danger of cramming with regard to these scholarships? Once you have scholarships there is always the danger of cramming.

Mr. Alexander: If we want to get a Royal Navy which will truly stand in all the difficult circumstances that are coming


in the future, I want it based upon the whole of the people. There should be no favouritism of any section over any others. If we are to have the Dartmouth system of entry, we should have a system under which boys who come from the elementary schools through the secondary schools shall have a chance, irrespective of their financial position, to get into Dartmouth. I will not budge from that, and if anybody tries to take it away I shall fight it, because it is not right to try and take it away. It is the only reasonable basis we can get.
I seem to sense behind letters of the kind that appeared in the "Sunday Times" last Sunday from Admiral Tweedie, and other comments I have seen, an idea that we are on the wrong tack in giving a chance to boys from the State-aided schools in order to get a wide system of entry for officers put on a firm and secure basis. If that is not going to be accepted by some of the people who take up the professional side in the Navy, I will not advocate any entry of officers except from the lower deck and training thereafter provided. I have met the people who favour the Dartmouth system pretty handsomely. I have made provision for entry from the secondary schools, and, at the same time, and for the first time, have allocated 10 scholarships to preparatory school scholars.

Commander Galbraith: My right hon. Friend will realise that the only point I want to make is that these scholarships should not exclude any boys of even greater ability, I do not care where they come from.

Mr. Alexander: If you are going to have a "free for all" among boys who come from differing conditions and have had different curricula, you will always get a section from the preparatory schools who would not need these scholarships. Provided that we have a minimum standard for scholarships, I am satisfied that I am doing the right thing for the needs of the Nation. I wanted to make my position clear. I do not intend to give way, at any time while I am at the Admiralty, on that particular point, and critics might just as well know right away.
As regards the future, my hon. and gallant Friend made a speech which was sailing near the wind all the time, owing to his nearly being out of Order, and I

find it difficult to answer now that you, Mr. Speaker, have returned and will be watching the terms of the Amendment. There is certainly no general argument from the experience of this war against the manner in which the Services themselves have worked together. If there has been from time to time a roughness of tongue and an apparent lack of cooperation at the right moment, I think it has mostly been at the higher level and not among the gallant chaps themselves who have been doing the job. I feel that it would be a very great thing indeed if we could have the same kind of cooperation as we have had in the joint war planning staffs to meet our commitments in peace time. From the point of view of accepting that in general principle, I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that he is pushing an open door with me. Therefore, I shall be able to pass on the opinions which he has expressed, sometimes very nearly out of Order on the Amendment. The great thing I want to come out of this Debate is that the House will feel committed to the main principle, that co-ordinate how you like, allocate expenditure with the greatest justice possible, one thing is essential, and that is that we shall keep an adequate minimum Naval strength to meet the commitments of the Nation.

Commander Galbraith: In view of the very satisfactory replies which have come from the Front Bench, for which I thank my right hon. Friend and the Financial Secretary, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," again proposed.

6.47 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: I regret it should be necessary to detain you in the Chair a little longer, Mr. Speaker, but this is the only occasion on which we have the opportunity of raising what are technically known as grievances. I would like to preface my remarks, even though at this hour they may be a little redundant, by adding my warm congratulations to those which have been showered upon the First Lord from all quarters. I do that, not only as an old political opponent of his, but also as what I may describe as an ageing subordinate now working under his Department.
Last year, when the Estimates were before us, the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean (Mr. Price) moved an Amendment on the subject of education, and it occurred to me that hon. Members would like to have a first-hand report of the progress that is being made in this sphere. I returned only a week ago from a tour of the Mediterranean theatre which I made on behalf of the Admiralty Education Department. My duty was to give lectures to officers and ratings on the procedure of this honourable House. Great strides have been made during the past 12 months in giving information to the Fleet on current affairs, developments on the various fronts, lectures by experts on the Japanese Fleet and the mentality of the Japanese people, together with the various strategic problems which will have to be faced in the Pacific. There has sprung up in all bases and in many ships, information rooms excellently planned, containing the latest maps showing developments on the various fronts, and home newspapers of all sections of opinion. One is glad to see HANSARD appearing frequently in information rooms, where facilities exist for both ward-room and lower deck to keep the personnel abreast with public affairs in a manner not thought of a few years ago. I am sure that the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean will be glad to hear of the fruits of the Amendment which he brought forward a year ago.
In addition to that, the Navy has embarked upon what would have been regarded as revolutionary before this war, discussion groups among ratings upon the problems of the day, emphasising particularly the various aspects of post-war reconstruction with which we shall shortly be faced. I am delighted to find that these subjects are being handled objectively, and are refreshingly free from party bias or party nostrums, such as one might have feared would happen in such an experiment. In regard to the subject on which I was called upon to give talks, I found, what will be extremely gratifying to hon. Members upon whatever benches they may sit, a growing interest in the franchise and its responsibilities. That is undoubtedly bringing to light very rapidly a new point of view. One of the things about which I was asked most frequently was whether election addresses of candidates could be supplied to men serving on

foreign stations when the Election takes place. I was glad to see, on reading the back numbers of the OFFICIAL REPORT, that the Home Secretary gave a pledge to that effect during the Committee stage of the Representation of the People Bill.
These men want a bit more than election addresses. They want photographs of candidates; they want to know the ages of candidates. They want to know whether they are too old and, if the candidates are young, they want to know whether they are of military age and the part they have played in the national war effort in the past five and a half years. The question I was asked most frequently—open confession being good for the soul—showed that there was far more interest taken in how to get rid of hon. Members than in how to elect them. It was: "What do you do if, after an election, a Member absents himself from the House or from his constituency?" I used to reply that this matter was rather like getting married; one must take great care beforehand, because there is not much one can do later on.
In the Mediterranean, there is little or no party allegiance among the new voters, in the terms which we understand in that connection. In fact, the party system,
and particularly what we describe as "the usual channels," come in for the most criticism. They want to know to what extent we are the slaves of those who form "the usual channels" in this House. They tend to say: "A plague on both your houses," or, in fact, "A plague on all three of your houses," but not a plague on the Prime Minister. The First Lord, in the concluding remarks in his introductory speech, waxed somewhat whimsical about his future. He told us that this might be the last occasion on which we should have an opportunity of hearing him introduce the Navy Estimates. He looked rather sadly into the future, at parting company with the office he has filled with such distinction. That gives me the opportunity to mention a constantly-recurring question at these lectures, and I pass it on because it may give the First Lord food for thought. The question was: "Why break up the Coalition which has achieved so much? We like our Prime Minister and we like our First Lord. Why should they be forced into opposite camps?" That question came up over and over again.
Apart from the lectures and discussions, much has been done by the Education Department on the lines of vocational training and correspondence courses, preparing men for demobilisation. I found that the education officers had pushed along very well in that direction, and that the vocational training and the correspondence courses were proceeding apace. That brings me to the complementary topic of those who are conducting this naval education. The hon. Member for the Forest of Dean last year raised the question of the status and pay of schoolmasters in the Navy. I have no doubt where the sympathies of the First Lord lie in this matter. I understand that progress is being made. I merely mention in passing to-day, that there are no volunteers in the Mediterranean, among the temporary instructor officers, to turn over to the regular service. That fact is eloquent on the point raised by the hon. Member a year ago, and I desire to express the hope that an early and satisfactory announcement will be made on this matter, when I am confident that the necessary numbers will then be forthcoming. Once the problem is dealt with, I believe that the question of volunteers for the schoolmaster branches, will be solved.
Now let me turn from education to welfare and amenities in the Mediterranean, which have reached a very high standard. I do not think a finer example can be found anywhere in the world than the Fleet Club which I visited in Alexandria. It was second to none in the general standard of amenities provided. At Malta, conditions were equally satisfactory. I had the good fortune to be there at the same time as the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, and I took the opportunity of visiting the club to see what was provided for the officers and the ratings. Even among the hardships and handicaps of Northern Italy, good efforts were being made to improvise comfortable recreation rooms. These amenities are not confined to male personnel. I was extremely impressed by the standard of comfort and efficiency which prevailed in the W.R.N.S. establishments, both for officers and ratings. These compared very favourably with conditions at home. I mention this because of ill-informed remarks which have been made, some of them unhappily in this House, regarding the physical and

moral perils to which our girls are exposed, if they proceed on foreign service. I will content myself by saying that I wish some parents took as much care over the welfare of their daughters as does the Navy, through the welfare organisation of the W.R.N.S. In addition to what was said by the Noble Lady the Member for Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor), I would like to say that I have had an opportunity of studying this matter at very close quarters. I would endorse the statements that the W.R.N.S. are not only doing work of the highest value to the Service, but that their bearing and conduct are exemplary. I have seen them under active service in four countries bordering on the shores of the Mediterranean, and their bearing and conduct do the utmost credit to themselves and to the country of their birth. Show me higher praise than that, and I will use it. A high standard of morale obtained among officers and ratings of both sexes.
I did find two points not so much of dissatisfaction but of criticism, and I would like to take the opportunity of placing them before the First Lord. The first is rather a psychological matter and relates to the constant use of the adjective "temporary" in official documents, not so much from His Majesty's ships or establishments on active service conditions, but in those which emanate from a certain salubrious West country spa, or on the Welsh border, where they conduct what is known as the "paper war" with unflagging ferocity. I have been asked to suggest to the House that, after 5½ years of active service, the officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, who now form a very large percentage of the Fleet, and who, in some cases, command destroyers and submarines, have by experience removed the stigma of amateurism which might have applied to them in the earlier phases of the war. Most of them have now achieved a long record of honourable service, first on the lower deck and later in commissioned rank. This adjective "temporary" while technically correct, displays a certain lack of tact. It is rather like the term "Hostilities only" applied to ratings, which is surely a masterpiece of over-simplification and under-statement. It was very strongly felt in many quarters which I visited, that those who have fallen in action—and the toll has been heavy among the Royal Naval


Volunteer Reserve—have made no temporary sacrifice for their country, and their loved ones have certainly suffered no temporary bereavement. I do not ask the Civil Lord for a reply but put these observations on record, in the hope that the Board of Admiralty will give them sympathetic consideration.
The other topic which is arousing criticism is the "black-out" on news of naval operations in the Adriatic, and it is being said, "Forgotten Army—Burma. Forgotten Navy—Mediterranean." Many gallant actions are being fought which receive little or no publicity. The work of our minesweepers in the Adriatic remains constant and arduous, and I was glad to hear the First Lord pay the tribute he did to the work of the minesweepers. I think he will confirm that they have had no more arduous work than the work in the Adriatic.

Mr. Alexander: I agree, but I ought to point out that the Commander-in-Chief's staff in the Mediterranean has the control of the issue of communiqués of news of actual actions there. If there is any criticism arising, it cannot be directed at the Admiralty or the Chief of Naval Information.

Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite: I was coming to that point. Surely much more could be done to acquaint the people at home of the details which can now be released without fear of giving information to the enemy, who is only too well aware of the wounds he is nursing. It is no reflection on the zeal of the distinguished author who is in charge of this matter, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to suggest that he should be supported
by someone with more experience in the journalistic and public relations technique of to-day. There is the "Union Jack," which circulates in Italy, primarily under the control of the Army, and deals largely with military matters. Members of the staff have told me how much they would like to publish stories regarding the Navy in that theatre, and feature them in the "Union Jack," but, over and over again, their attempts to obtain information have failed. I pass that on, in the hope that the matter may be investigated.
Finally, I wish to endorse what the First Lord has said to-day about the long sea struggle, and the essential factor of

naval power in this war, as in previous wars. The country owes far more than' it realises to Rear-Admiral Morgan, Flag Officer Commanding in Italy, and Captain Dickinson, Senior Naval Officer, Northern Adriatic, two distinguished officers who have achieved great things in the highest traditions of their great Service, in what has become, owing to tremendous events elsewhere, something of a backwater. I would like to pay my tribute to the services they have rendered, and to the gallant, cheerful and efficient officers and men, who gladly do their bidding.

7.5 P.m.

Mr. Gretton: As has already been mentioned by a number of speakers, the number and kind of ships which will be required in the post-war Navy will be an important consideration. Equally important will be the kind of men who will be called upon to man them. In this connection I should like to refer for a moment to the important work which has been, and is being, undertaken by the Sea Cadet Corps. This is no new movement, nor is it a movement which has been born in war. It has already proved itself over a long period of years. In every walk of life in this country there are boys who are longing to learn about the sea and about seamanship, and who are looking forward to the day when they can put that knowledge into practice. If I may quote the words of a distinguished naval officer who has had many opportunities during this war of seeing the type of young man who has come forward to serve his country in the Navy:
I thought I knew the extent to which a love of the sea flows in our veins, but I never knew to what extent we are a web-footed nation.
There is no doubt that, given the right guidance and lead, we have the young men. It has also been proved from experience that the form of training is one which appeals to those who have the opportunity of taking part in it. No doubt this is to some extent the secret of its success, irrespective of whether a boy ultimately decides to go into the Royal Navy or into the Merchant Navy or whether he chooses some other career.
There is, however, another reason, and it is very well summarised in an admirable little book which has recently been published entitled "The Ship's Company." I should like to read what is said in the foreword:


A ship's company provides the finest example of team work that the world has to offer. It is something far wider and far greater than the team work manifest in games and sports. The ship's company is a team both in work and play. We are accustomed to speak of the Ship of State, and in doing so we should remember that that Ship needs a good ship's company if it is to be a good ship. A good seaman who has been a member of a good ship's company has acquired all the essential qualities of a good citizen. Herein lies the prime value of the Sea Cadet Corps.
If I may try to put that into one sentence, I think it means that a boy who has been attached to a good corps instinctively seeks opportunities to try and serve others before he thinks of himself, and it is not very long before he becomes self-reliant and a natural leader in one sphere or another. These are the kind of young men we want to see coming forward, not only for the Royal Navy but to help this nation as a whole.
May I refer to the special needs of the Merchant Navy? There is no reason to believe that the competition between the mercantile fleets of the world will be any less severe after this war. Again, the Merchant Navy will be expected to make an important contribution towards the expansion of our export trade. Therefore, I suggest that they will need the finest type of young man that the nation can produce. There is another point, which I think is very often overlooked. Every ship's company has great opportunities to further the cause of peace, by fostering friendly relations with the peoples of other countries. It is true that we have our Ambassadors, our Ministers, and other representatives in foreign countries. It is also true that they have opportunities of meeting the leaders of those countries and other interesting people, but I believe that, in the end, it is the man in the street who has the power to do the most good. He will be judged according to the way he behaves and the courtesy which he shows, not only in regard to his own value, but as a representative of the nation from which he comes. We are led to believe that some form of National Service will be introduced in this country when the war in the West and in the East is over. May I express the earnest hope that the Admiralty will not only continue to recognise the Sea Cadet Corps but will continue to give it active support, and that every boy who is a member of that Corps and has reached a given standard of efficiency will have the opportunity of

going to sea and manning a ship as a member of the ship's company?

7.13 p.m.

Mr. Price: I also want to congratulate the First Lord on his admirable statement. I think he can be assured, both from the Debate on the Amendment and from the general Debate, that we are all proud of the Naval Service and are determined to see it kept up in peace-time at whatever strength may be needed to maintain the peace, order, and security of the world. I can remember the time when Britain alone ruled the waves, when we set so-called two-Power standards for the construction of capital ships over other Powers. Times have changed somewhat, and the Royal Navy has to share the glory of maintaining law and order on the seas with other great naval Powers, particularly, of course, with that great Republic across the Atlantic. But even if conditions have changed and the Royal Navy shares the honour with another great Navy, that honour is still none the less.
I want to raise one point, to which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Holderness (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) referred in his interesting speech, when he gave his own personal experiences in the Mediterranean, to which I referred on the Estimates last year, when I was fortunate enough to draw a place in the Ballot, namely, naval education and particularly the status and conditions of the naval schoolmaster branch. On that occasion the First Lord was good enough to make certain statements, and to indicate that he would make a special investigation into the matter. I should like to know what results have been attained, because I have reason to know that there is still a feeling in the schoolmaster branch that reforms are urgently needed. Frankly speaking, there is a danger that a caste system may develop in the educational service of the Navy, and an undesirable line be drawn between the schoolmaster class and the instructor branch. In fact, I am informed that the educational qualifications for these two branches are not so different as they are supposed to be on paper, and that many members of the schoolmaster branch have high university degrees—degrees often as high as those of members of the instructor branch. Moreover, the schoolmaster branch have manifold and very important


duties to perform. The schoolmaster has to be a specialist in many branches of the Service, and to be able to instruct in those specialist branches. He also has important operational duties, both in the plotting room and in meteorological work. He often needs a very high technical training. There is a feeling that the pay and prospects of this branch are still not sufficient.
I know that some steps have been taken, as a result of the inquiries that were made, as the First Lord promised me, but in regard to pay I think I am right in saying that the negotiations which went on with the Burnham Committee have to some extent been reflected in the delay in coming to a decision on the pay of the schoolmaster branch. But recently le Burnham Committee has reported, and there is a new scale of pay. I hope that we may now have an end of this delay, and a statement as to what the pay is to be. In regard to prospects, there is still that long wait for promotion. Formerly, promotion to the senior schoolmaster grade took eight years, but now, I understand, the period has been extended to 14 or 15 years. The chances of promotion are very much less in this schoolmaster branch, and I ask that I may be given a little more hope of improvements in this direction, particularly in regard to the status of the schoolmaster in the Service. I know that this subject is all bound up with the status of warrant officers in other branches of the Service, and that we cannot deal with one without dealing with others, and that consequently this is bound to take some time, but I hope that the Financial Secretary will be able to give satisfaction along the lines which I hoped I had extracted from the First Lord on the Navy Estimates last year.

7.20 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander Tufnell: I intervene only for a very few moments to support the suggestion of one hon. Member, who asked that great encouragement should be given to the Sea Cadet Corps. I have been amazed at what I have seen in the depths of the country, where the boys are very anxious to form these cadet corps, and all they ask is that they shall be encouraged by the Admiralty. I hope the Admiralty will do their very best to encourage them,

because these Sea Cadets are the source from which the Navy should obtain the men to man its ships in the post-war period. They have the necessary enthusiasm, and they naturally acquire that initiative and resourcefulness which is necessary in a Navy which is called upon to deal with all the different events and difficulties which are bound to face it in the future.
For that reason I am very glad to hear of the proposal to have research and scientific boards going into all the new inventions and dealing with counter measures against new weapons. This should be dealt with by practical men afloat, who can study all these measures and produce the necessary counter measures which will ensure, when the moment comes, that we shall be abreast of all the new forms of weapons which are continually being introduced into naval warfare. If these boards encourage the scientific brains in the country, those brains should receive a very high reward. If we are to encourage the very best men in the Navy, we must tell these people that, if possible, we are going to produce a Navy worthy of this country. I am quite aware that it is impossible for us to know what sort of a Navy we shall be allowed, but, at least, we can map out and consider what are the essential needs of the Navy to guard our ships over the blue waters and save us from the strangulation which has very nearly happened in so many different wars.
I know that much has been said about the capital ship, but I feel that, whether the capital ship is with us or not, the fact is that the capital ship takes four or five years to build, and, therefore, when the moment comes and you have not got a capital ship, you are left in the lurch. We do not want to be left in the lurch, as we have been before. Small ships—cruisers, aircraft carriers, escort vessels—can, as they were at the beginning of this war, be improvised and can be built comparatively quickly. Capital ships take five or six years to build, and it takes a very long time to train officers and men for them. If you maintain your fleets on the basis of the capital ship, you are giving a sound basis to the fleets, and you are encouraging the construction of the smaller vessels which can form the nucleus of the necessary protection of our waters against submarine attack and other forms of attack. Therefore, the capital ship is, to


my mind, a very necessary basis upon which to build our Fleet.
I feel I must add this word. I hope that, in considering the basis on which our Fleets are to be established, the First Lord will take advantage of the opportunity when representatives of the Dominions will be over here at our conferences, to get into consultation with them to see to what extent they can co-operate in maintaining the Fleet in the Far East, a Fleet to which the Dominions themselves contribute ships, bases such as Singapore, and men to man that Fleet. I feel that Dominions like Australia and New Zealand would never wish again to be let down by not having a Fleet in Far Eastern waters as they were at the beginning of this war. If we maintain our Fleet, permanently based on its different bases, I feel every confidence that our Navy will be built on a sound basis, and the basis upon which we can rely that in the future the strength of the British Navy will be able to secure and help towards the peace of the world.

7.27 p.m.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: I desire to preface my remarks by congratulating the First Lord upon the admirable speech which he made to-day, and also by congratulating him, if I may, on the great service which he has rendered to the country during his very high office as First Lord during this war, and, finally, to congratulate him on his concluding words. I feel that his experience at the Admiralty during the war has now, for all time, convinced him of the absolute necessity of having a powerful Navy maintained by this country. Throughout the country there is universal admiration for the services which have been rendered by the Navy during this war, and for the unsurpassed manner in which it has carried out the multifarious duties imposed upon it—duties more varied than in any previous wars, and, in many cases, much more exacting.
I wish to pay a special tribute to the R.N.V.R. officers and men who have served in every type of ship in the Navy. They have carried out their work in a most admirable manner. Their officers have filled the most important positions, and in many cases they have been the commanding officers of the ships to which they have been appointed. There is no section of the Navy, including, of course,

the W.R.N.S., which is not worthy of the highest praise. To-day the officers and men of the Navy not only require to be seamen but also to be highly skilled in numerous types of technical apparatus required on board a modern ship, very often of a highly complicated and technical nature. That calls for an even higher standard of intelligence and elasticity of mind than was necessary in the days gone by. In saying that, I do not mean at all that seamanlike qualities are not just as important as, or more important than, they were in the past. For many reasons they are more important than ever they were. Initiative, quick decisions and high seamanlike qualities are essential.
It is in view of these facts that it is essential that the Navy should be certain of attracting to itself a very high standard quality in both its officers and men. In this connection it is important to realise that after the conclusion of the war with Germany and Japan there may very well be a natural reaction against service in the armed Forces of this country, just as there was after the last war, both on the part of the young men and of their parents, and, further, the Navy and the other armed Services will be competing with industry for highly skilled personnel to a far greater extent than ever existed before. On account of that, apart from the natural attraction of a sea life for our people—we are a seafaring nation—it is essential that the personnel of the Navy should receive a reward for their service comparable with the reward for service received in industry. That applies both to officers and men, and I submit for the consideration of my right hon. Friend that the time has come for a reconsideration of the pay in the Navy; and in that particular I would stress the great desirability, as far as it is possible, of a simplification of pay and allowances.
I now come to the particular question with which I rose to deal, and I must apologise to the House for once more taking up the cudgels on behalf of the naval officers. I have fought this battle in this House on many occasions, and I propose to continue to do so till I have won the battle for them, but I hope that this may be the last occasion on which I have to state the case for the naval officer. In 1919 the Jerram Committee was set up to revise the pay of the officers and men of the Navy, and as a result of their delibera-


tions the pay was increased to a considerable extent. After that Committee had sat the Fisher Committee was set up to do exactly the same for the Army and the Air Force as the Jerram Committee had done for the Navy. As a result of the findings of the Fisher Committee the pay in those Services was also increased. At this point I would like to say that in connection with the rates of pay which the Jerram Committee suggested they expressed the following opinion as detailed in the famous Appendix 5 which I chased for so long but a copy of which my hon. and gallant Friend very kindly sent me. This is what the Jerram Committee said:
The Committee are very strongly of the opinion that if a marriage allowance of any sort can possibly be avoided it will be for the good of the Service. In fact, we consider that it is very undesirable to make any difference in the Navy between the married and the single officer. We have, therefore, in computing what we considered to be a far wage for every rank, taken into consideraton the annual income necessary in our opinion for a naval officer to live in moderate comfort, and that state of life which his position and rank in the Service demands.
At this point I would, therefore, give a comparative table of the pay of the officers in the three Services. A lieut.-commander in the Navy received £1 10s. a day; a major, his equivalent in rank in the Army, £1 11s. 6d.; a squadron leader in the Air force, £1 14s. A commander received £2 a lieut.-colonel, his equivalent in rank, £2 7s. 6d.; and a wing commander £2. A captain received £3, a colonel and a group-captain each received £2 15s. But the Army and the Air Force officers, in addition to the basic pay, also received a marriage allowance. The naval officer did not. It has always been the contention of the Treasury that in 1919 basic pay in the Navy contained an element of marriage allowance which was not contained in the basic pay of the Army and the Air Force, because they received marriage allowance as a separate payment. That being so, one would imagine that in the case of naval officers that their pay would be higher than that of their equivalent ranks in the Army and the Air Force. However, the facts are that a commander received 7s. 6d. a day less than a lieut.-colonel although he received the same as a wing commander. A lieut.-commander was lower paid than the corresponding rank in both the Army

and the Air Force by 1s. 6d. and 4s. a day respectively.
We thus have the situation that after these Committees have sat and after the pay of the officers has been raised and stated to have resulted in an equitable equalisation of pay of the officers of all three Services, that so far from that being the case, in the instances I have stated, not only was Army and Air Force pay higher than in the Navy, but in both the Army and the Air Force officers were receiving marriage allowances in addition. Therefore for the space of 19 years officers in the Army and the Air Force were, in the majority of cases, better paid than the officers in the Navy and received marriage allowance in addition, so that the naval officer was very much at a disadvantage.
In 1938, the naval officers' marriage allowance was introduced and, on its introduction, it was specifically stated that as the 1919 payment contained an element of marriage allowance it would be necessary to reduce the basic rate of pay of the naval officer by 2s. a day. This, I would like to inform the House, applied not only to the married officer but to the bachelor as well. In the case of the commissioned warrant officer, his pay was reduced by from 1s. to 1s. 8d. a day, depending upon his seniority. Two shillings a day was considered to be the amount of marriage allowance increment included in the 1919 pay.
I mentioned that the 1919 comparison made the naval officer's basic pay not higher, but in most cases lower than that of the corresponding ranks in the Army and the Air Force, and that situation was still maintained in 1938, before the reduction of 2s. a day, the figures being as follow:



£
s.
d.


Lieut.-Commander in the Navy
1
7
2


Major
1
8
6


Squadron-Leader
1
10
10


Commander
1
16
2


Lieut.-Colonel
2
3
0


Wing-Commander
1
16
2


Captain
2
14
4


Colonel
2
9
10


Group Captain
2
9
10


This comparison shows that the same relationship existed in 1938, when the naval officers' marriage allowance was introduced, as in 1919, namely, the commander was worse off than the lieutenant-colonel, and the lieutenant-commander


was worse off than either the major or the squadron-leader. When the 2S. a day was deducted from that basic rate of pay, the naval inferiority was still further aggravated.
One may ask at once, what was the excuse for this unfavourable position with regard to the naval officer? It was understood to be that the naval officer was generally younger on promotion than obtained in the Army and the Air Force, but I trust that argument was finally disposed of and buried for ever by the answer which my right hon. Friend the First Lord gave to me in reply to a question, when he stated that the emoluments of naval officers related to rank, which, of course, is as it should be. In any case, this argument—so far as it was valid in 1938—very soon became obsolete. In the same year, in 1938, the Hore-Belisha reforms were brought in with regard to the Army, which reduced the age at which officers were promoted to captains and majors, and, since the war, the pendulum has swung heavily over on the other side of the Army and the Air Force.
The marriage allowances of the three Services are not on identical lines, which makes a direct comparison very difficult and very confusing. For example, in the navy there is a marriage allowance for a wife, and in addition there is an allowance for each child, whereas in the other two Services, there is a comprehensive allowance for a wife and children—in their case there is no additional allowance given for children at all; there are also other differences. As an example, let me take the case of a lieutenant-commander living with his wife, not provided with Service quarters. He does not receive his lodging allowance of £80 a year to which he is entitled because the Service cannot provide him with quarters. He receives instead marriage allowance under the latest scheme, which has only just come in, 2s. a day extra marriage allowance. Although he receives this 2s. a day extra for marriage allowance, he is, on balance, £44 a year worse off. Whereas in the case of a major in exactly similar circumstances, he receives marriage allowance, and also other allowances for fuel, light, etc., which, I may add, gives a major 4s. 10d. a day more than the lieut.-commander.
On the childless basis the captain in the Navy is 4s. a day worse off for marriage allowance than a colonel in the Army,

and the captain has to have three children before he gets more for marriage allowance than the colonel in the Army. The commander is 5s. a day worse off than the lieut.-colonel for marriage allowance, and he also has to have three children before he gets more than a lieut.-colonel. In the case of a lieut.-commander, he is 3s. a day worse off than a major, but in his case he only has to have two children before he gets more than a major.
In addition to this, in accordance with
the latest scheme, 1s. of the marriage allowance of the naval officer is subject to Income Tax. It may be said, "Well, that is very small," but all these things add up. That does not apply to the officers in the other Services, whose allowance is free of tax, and quite rightly so. The naval officer has to be subject to income tax on 1s. of his marriage allowance—

Mr. Kirkwood: But surely they are all subject to Income Tax?

Vice-Admiral Taylor: No, they get them free of Income Tax entirely. No admiral receives marriage allowance, but the officers in the highest ranks in the other Services do receive marriage allowance.
To sum up, in the case of the majority of naval officers, their basic rate of pay is lower, their marriage allowance is less favourable, and their age for rank to-day is higher. Their responsibilities—and I say this without fear of contradiction from any quarter of the House or the country—are far greater than the responsibilities of a corresponding rank in the other two Services. I have not raised this matter in order that the pay and allowances of the officers in the other Services should be reduced—far from it; I would never dream of doing that—but I do maintain that at least the officers in the Navy should be as well paid as the officers in the Army. On the facts that I have given, which are indisputable, they are worse off. This is not a state of affairs which I consider should ever have obtained. It is certainly not one which should be allowed to continue. I am at a complete loss to understand why successive Boards of Admiralty have been satisfied that naval officers should be worse off all along the line than their opposite numbers in the other Services. I am sure my right hon. Friend is desirous of having the matter put right. I believe he is anxious to


see that naval officers get a fair deal. I ask him with all earnestness to have the whole matter of pay and allowances reviewed afresh.

7.51 p.m.

Commander Agnew: No one who heard the speech in which the First Lord introduced the Estimates could have failed to feel a sense of gratitude for the work of the Royal Navy during the past year. It was indeed a remarkable achievement that he unfolded, all the more so when account is taken' of the fact that all but a very small percentage of the Navy consists of officers and men who before the war had no experience of naval life and training. May I include in the credit which has been given to the Navy the work of the Women's Royal Naval Service? Its members have played an increasing part in assisting the Navy in its task. Not only has the increase been one of numbers but the scope of the duties that they have been allowed to undertake has been very greatly widened in the task few years and we owe very much to them. As the result of this the Navy is today all one. It is almost impossible, except for the uniforms, to distinguish the attributes which their wearers possess. There never was only doubt that, when the test came, the Navy would be equal to the colossal task imposed upon it by the fact that we are an island Kingdom with an ocean-wide Commonwealth and a maritime Empire.
I should like to say a few words about the problem of the post-war manning of the Navy. Any plan that is made when peace comes must be based on two assumptions. The first is that we are going to have a large Navy. I am glad to say that, if we lacked it before, which I do not think we did, we have ample evidence that that question is not going to be any matter of politics. The whole country will be agreed about it. The second assumption is that in peace-time some form of compulsory National Service will be retained for young people. Any plans for the manning of the Navy must be fitted into the framework of those two assumptions. Before the war the main source of supply—to take the ratings first—was the continuous-service system, by which a man joined as a boy to be trained and thereafter signed an engagement to do 12 years and, if he wanted to

do it, and the Navy wanted to have him, a further 10 years, and then retired with a pension. In more recent years, to supplement that, there was introduced a short-service scheme by which men came in for three to seven years straight away as ordinary seamen.
How are we going to make our postwar arrangements fit in with those two ideas? It is essential to retain, and indeed to start at the earliest time that we can, the continuous-service system. I think it is not an over-statement to say that the Navy could not have successfully undergone the great expansion that it did but for the fact that there was a nucleus of long-service trained officers and men who could train others to take their places and undertake greater responsibilities themselves. Then, if we are to have compulsory National Service, I am sure it will be the case that a proportion of younger men, as they come up to the appropriate age, will be allowed to select service in the Royal Navy. Obviously it cannot be said now how long that period should be. It might be two years, or even three, but I can indicate what I hope would be a feature of that scheme: that, just as the system during the war of producing temporary officers after they had had a period of service on the lower deck has been so successful, so I should hope that in any conscript sailors scheme after the war there will be a provision that those most fitted shall, half way through their time for example, have a chance of being selected to be temporary officers and undergo a period of training and experience at sea as officers. Then they will pass out into their occupations in civil life. But, when war comes, we shall have a greatly increased hidden reserve at once, able to take up their positions as officers without going through the mill once again. I hope the Financial Secretary will be able to give me some indication what the post-war plan will be in regard to ratings.
I doubt very much whether the system of creating officers from the lower deck permanently ought to continue. I wonder whether it is not very much better to take them younger, as the First Lord has begun to do, straight into the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth. They have the advantage of being trained as officers at a much earlier age and they will not find it so difficult to acquire the higher educational attainments that an officer must


need with all the technical detail that he has to master. What is to be the system for producing officers? Is the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth to continue? I think it is inevitable that it must continue, but I should like to see even greater steps taken than have already been taken to broaden the education that is given there. It is not so narrow as it used to be and some improvement has been made, but it is still, in my submission—although perhaps I am prejudiced, because I was a public school entry—not so broad as that given at public schools. I am certain that a greater emphasis could be placed on such subjects as history, literature and languages even at the expense, temporarily, of some of the mathematics that they study there. There will be resulting benefit to the boys, because I think that the senior officers of the Fleet will agree with my right hon. Friend that the public school entry officers are able to acquire all the necessary technical and mathematical knowledge after they have been taken into the Navy.
May I ask the Civil Lord a point with regard to the actual building where the Royal Naval College is to be housed? At present the cadets are housed in a mansion at Eaton Hall, near Chester. Although I say "housed", the cadets live and have their being in Nissen huts. Unless a move is quickly made back to the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, where the cadets ought to be, there are some who will pass straight out to sea after having lived all their time in Nissen huts without the proper naval atmosphere and sailing facilities which the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth provides. I hope that this matter is receiving the earnest attention of the Board of Admiralty and that there will be no delay in moving the cadets back.
May I pass to a subject which was introduced by my hon. and gallant Friend in such great detail, that is to say, certain anomalies in naval pay? The pay of the ratings has properly received the attention of the Government on more than one occasion during the war. I think that when the final post-war scheme comes forward, the whole of the naval pay, as the pay of all the Services, will have to be raised again. I do not think there is any particular anomaly with regard to the pay of naval ratings, but in officers' pay there are still certain matters that need to be

put right. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor) gave a lot of figures with regard to the pay of lieutenant-commander, commander and captain, which are the main ranks under consideration, because an officer spends at least 12 years on the average in the rank of lieutenant-commander and commander, and, if the rank of captain is added, he spends 20 years in the three ranks, in fact, the bulk of his career. The position is that, taking a married officer who is childless, a lieutenant-commander receives no less than £115 a year less than his opposite number, a major, in the Army. In the case of the commander the anomaly is even more glaring. He receives £252 less than his opposite number, a lieutenant-colonel in the Army It levels out approximately when the rank of captain is attained, in that a captain only gets £27 a year less than his opposite number, a full colonel. When all those sums are added together, however, in the course of that 20 years it does mean that, taking a married naval officer with no children and a married Army officer with no children and the marriage allowance and basic pay that each receives, the naval officer is over £1,300 down on the deal.
I do not want to say anything else at this moment, but I think, especially after the repeated assurances given in this House by the First Lord himself that the pay was worked out on the basis of the rank held in the Services, that such a state of affairs and such an anomaly as this ought not to continue. Not only ought it to be rectified, but it ought to have been rectified a long time ago. No argument that can be put up as to whether marriage allowance is included or not could vitiate the figures which I have given. They are actually taken from those which were kindly furnished to me in connection with my interview in the Admiralty itself a few days ago. I hope that this matter will receive very earnest and speedy consideration by the Board of Admiralty with a view to its being rectified.
At this very late hour I do not want to say very much more except that we have had ample evidence to-day of the work that the Royal Navy has done during war time. Many hon. Members have begun to fasten their thoughts upon the role of the Navy in peace-time. In the troublous years that lie ahead, when con-


fidence and good will among people all over the world has to be created once again, I believe that the calming influence of the Royal Navy will be of very great help to that end. I trust that my right hon. Friend the First Lord, who has been holding the helm at the Board of Admiralty for so many years of tempestuous seas, will have the opportunity before he relinquishes office to guiding the Admiralty back into the calmer waters of peace.

8.8 p.m.

Mr. Hubert Beaumont: I do not propose at this late hour to keep the House for more than a few minutes, because I know that there is not only a great desire to hear the Civil Lord but also great expectation of the rescue operations that may take place after this Debate is concluded. The majority of speeches that have been made this afternoon were by representatives of dockyard constituencies who have used the Debate as a means of presenting certain particular features and matters peculiar to and advantageous to their constituents. It is desirable that the voice of one who represents an industrial constituency far away from the sea should be heard in the Debate. I would congratulate the First Lord on his magnificent exposition of a most wonderful story. The industrial constituencies, though they may be remote from the sea, are conscious of the daring, gallantry and resourcefulness of the Navy, and they recognise that in the dark days of the first two years of the war the Navy saved not only the nation and Europe, but possibly humanity as well. I want to express the hope that closer contact may be possible between the Navy and the industrial towns of this country. It is obviously not possible to take a battleship into my constituency in the heart of Yorkshire, but it is possible to take the personnel of the Navy there. Perhaps one of the things that did most of all to bring the Navy close to the industrial constituencies of this country were the Navy Weeks. The association of towns with specific ships is not only of great advantage during war-time and during the War Savings Campaigns, but can wisely be carried on after the war is over, preserving contact between ships and individual towns.
Years ago the First Lord was the doughty warrior and exponent, in this

House, of Co-operation, and it seems to me that in the Admiralty and the Navy he has found perhaps the highest form of co-operation. In presenting his speech to the House to-day he could have said: "This is what it has cost to maintain our freedom. This is the dividend you have got from the Navy" and what a dividend. I am glad to think we are beginning to be conscious of the greater debt we owe to the Navy. It is known as the Silent Service and the majority of its deeds are unknown to the great mass of the public. Will the First Lord and his colleagues give consideration to the possibility and desirability of bringing to the notice of the general public, the common people of this country, in some way, the exploits and deeds and the work of the Navy.
The other night I listened on the wireless to a very brilliant dramatisation of the "Mulberry" Harbour and its operation. I became conscious of knowing only a little of what had been involved in all that wonderful, magical work which was done, not only in creating "Mulberry" but in putting it into the place desired. I realised how little I knew of what had been done by the industrial workers of this country, and of the great part which the Navy played in taking "Mulberry" across and fixing it in position. I am convinced it would be possible to dramatise many other exploits of the Navy in such a vivid form as to bring home to the people of this country not only the debt we owe to the Navy, but furthermore, that this country, though it may be an industrial country, does produce men, and women too, fit, ready and willing to undertake service in the Navy.
I am glad that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Camborne (Commander Agnew) made reference to the W.R.N.S. Anyone who has had contact with the Navy is conscious of the great work the W.R.N.S. have done, and the magnificent way in which the women have taken on what were hitherto thought to be men's jobs. They have justified themselves and proved that they are as worthy to belong to the Senior Service as the men of the Royal Navy themselves. My last word is this: We have to remember that after this war our Navy must be strong. We are not a Continental country, and perhaps the greatest contribution we can make to world security is having a great Navy, powerful in effect


and swift in action, a Navy which can contact all the various parts of the Empire. Therefore I hope that in our post-war planning we may see to it that we have a Navy powerful enough to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and that that Navy shall offer to those who wish to join it not only a tradition of the past, not only a glorious service, but an advantageous and favourable career. I hope that we may continue to consider, as some folks still do in the towns, that it is lucky to touch a sailor.

8.15 p.m.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Captain Pilkington): It is a very pleasing fact that so great an amount of this Debate has been carried on with so much harmony. I am particularly glad that I can agree with all that was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Batley and Morley (Mr. H. Beaumont), especially about the need for the nation to realise fully the tremendous debt which all of us owe to the Navy. My hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. Dobbie) paid a tribute to my right hon. Friend which has been endorsed by practically every other speaker. My right hon. Friend himself spoke of the great esteem and affection which he felt for the Royal Navy. I believe that that is reciprocated by the Admiralty and
the Navy, for they realise how he has thrown his whole heart and soul into the work which he has performed so admirably. It has been an honour and an education to serve with him. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Rusholme (Major Cundiff) said that it was most important when this war is won for us to profit by the lessons we have learned in ship construction and in armament. There, too, I am in complete agreement, and I can assure him that we are endeavouring now, and shall continue in future, to tap as wide a field of knowledge and ingenuity as we can. We hope to learn both from our Allies and from our enemies, just as our Allies are learning a certain amount from us.
My hon. Friend the Member for the Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) aroused the interest of the House when she referred to getting gin at 5s. 6d. a bottle, but I was not able to follow the plan she had in mind when she said that officers who did not drink should derive some alternative financial benefit. No doubt she will elaborate it on another

occasion. She referred, and so did other hon. Members, to the part which the W.R.N.S. have played in this war. It was my good fortune about two years ago to reply to a Motion dealing with the W.R.N.S., and during the time that has elapsed since then the W.R.N.S. have done even more to earn the admiration of this country. Their greatest test came in the months immediately prior to and after D-Day. The work they did then was invaluable to the success of that great operation. Also it should be said that the degree of security which was maintained at that time has dispelled for ever the myth that a woman cannot keep a secret, at any rate so far as some things are concerned.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Edinburgh (Lieut.-Commander Hutchison) raised the very complicated question, as he himself admits, of the Ordnance Inspection Department and their pay. He described how the anomalies arose in 1929, when the pay was consolidated. I hope he realises some of the difficulties in the way of getting rid of those anomalies. To make a change in their case would mean excepting one particular group in this country from the effects of Income Tax, which applies over a very wide field indeed. It must be realised that officers who are called up out of civil life because of the war are obviously given the normal pay and allowances. But working alongside the permanent inspectors, does, I admit, give rise to a certain degree of anomaly. Still, the fact remains, that the permanent inspectors, unlike the others, had their jobs before the war, during the war and, we hope, will have them after the war. The war has not completely upset their system of livelihood, as in the case of the others. At the same time, my hon. and gallant Friend made a very strong case, and we will look into it and see if anything can be done.
My hon. Friend the Member for Poplar (Mr. Guy) and also the hon. Member for the Western Isles (Mr. MacMillan) raised the question of promotion from the lower deck and quoted certain figures which have been given. I would like to repeat that promotion is given on merit, on ability, and on nothing else. Our need of officers in the different Services fluctuates from time to time, as is only natural. Sometimes it increases; sometimes it de-


creases; but promotion depends upon ability and upon ability only. The hon. and gallant Member for Aston (Commander Prior) raised the question of training in sail, and put forward some of the arguments for a reintroduction of this training into the naval curriculum. This was most exhaustively considered by the Board of Admiralty 12 years ago, and they came to the conclusion that, whatever the merits, the disadvantages would outweigh the advantages, for the reason that the curriculum for training was already so crowded. Whatever merits might accrue from training in sail could be achieved in sufficient measure by the present methods of training, which would also have the advantage of being of real practical value to the man in later life and in the rest of his career. If that applied 12 years ago, it applies even more to-day, when there has been such a tremendous advance in the technical and scientific knowledge which seamen are called upon to possess. If we are to insert training in sail into the curriculum we should have to take something out. It is not proposed to do that for the reasons that I have given.
The hon. Member for Dumbarton Burghs (Mr. Kirkwood) said there was discontent on the Clyde because of the low wages, and he quoted some figures. What he did not say was that those figures ignored piece-work and overtime, and in reply to his figures, I will quote these: The average gross wage for a man over 21 in the marine engineering industry in June, 1944, was £6. 8s per week. I do not think that the picture which the hon. Member drew was completely accurate in all respects. My hon. Friend said that the A.E.U. were still waiting a reply to their claims, but, of course, he knows that their claims apply not only to these men in the dockyards but to the men throughout all the other types of the engineering industry in the country—that cannot be discussed to-day. My hon. Friend emphasised the need of keeping up employment in the shipyards, and said that his family's ambition for him was that he should either be an engineer or a minister, and I would congratulate him upon being in the transitional stage at the present time.
My hon. Friend, and almost every other Scottish Member who spoke, advocated the desirability both of maintaining Rosyth after the war and, perhaps, of

having a manning port in Scotland as well. These Members of Parliament have put forward their case to-day, and they have put it forward on other occasions, I can assure them that we are kept very much alive to all the arguments, but there are a great many considerations which we have to take into account. There is the broad strategic post-war set-up, there are demands the demands for employment and of industry and also technical considerations. If, for instance, there is to be a port in the North, we have to investigate the possibilities of building a large dock in the various areas we may have under consideration. I realise the desirability of making a pronouncement on the subject as soon as we can, as pressed for by the hon. Member for East Fife (Mr. H. Stewart). Work is going on, if not very speedily, at any rate steadily. The hon. Member for Dunfermline (Mr. Watson) asked whether we could give him to-day a ray of hope. Though I cannot exactly do that, I can at any rate, say that the window is open through which the ray may come.

Mr. McNeil: I hope that the hon. and gallant Member will not depart from the subject without dealing with the case of a West coast dock.

Captain Pilkington: I should have mentioned that. Some rival claims were put forward by hon. Members as to which side of Scotland the manning port or main dockyard should be.

Mr. McNeil: Not rivalry.

Captain Pilkington: There were claims put forward and I cannot add very much to what I have said, beyond saying that both sides of Scotland are being considered. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha), again dealing with dockyards, mentioned that we were making provision for taking over a large area in Devonport. Our reasons for this are threefold. First, we felt that, if ever the Royal Dockyards were to be enlarged, now was the time to do it. We could not afford to wait for some other war to come along. Secondly, it must be accepted that a great naval power should have not only adequate but excellent dockyards, and that was what we hope to have by taking in some extra land. Thirdly, one of the lessons of this war has been that we should have a certain degree of dispersal and also that we


should have a margin for expansion in future years. Those were the considerations
which led us, some time ago now, to start negotiations with a view to taking in some more ground. We appreciate the argument which the right hon. Gentleman advanced that his constituents want to know at the earliest possible moment when we are going to take over which particular piece of land. We shall certainly try to tell them that, and, in fact, we are arranging a meeting with them to tell them as much as we possibly can. I agree with him that it is only fair that we should do that as soon as possible.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Holderness (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) stressed the great improvements—and I am glad he did so—which have been made in education during the last year or so. Any one visiting naval establishments now would agree with that. Both he and the hon. Member for the Forest of Dean (Mr. Price) referred to the pay and status of schoolmasters in the Navy. I am afraid that at the moment we cannot say anything further about that. He will appreciate, as he himself said, that the suggested introduction of the Burnham rates of pay has some reaction on this and at the moment I have nothing to add. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Cambridge (Lieut.-Commander Tufnell) and the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Gretton) stressed the role which Sea Cadets had played in this war and asked for the future support of the Admiralty, and I can assure them that that will be forthcoming.
I now come to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor) who, curiously enough, raised the question of marriage allowances. He quoted certain figures, which I will not go into now beyond saying this, that one cannot judge this case merely upon basic pay without taking into consideration a host of other allowances and the like. He asked why successive Boards of Admiralty were satisfied with the position. The answer to that is that we are familiar with that mosaic of details—and I agree it is a mosaic of details—which makes up the whole. We have to take into consideration the different circumstances in the three Services, the different allowances, the different ages at which officers attain different ranks—

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Not now.

Captain Pilkington: The answer of my right hon. Friend, to which he referred, does not qualify that in any way.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Vice-Admiral Taylor indicated dissent.

Captain Pilkington: Again, the instances which he advanced to the House were in every case of childless officers. I submit that unless those four considerations are taken into account, one cannot get a complete picture. However, let me just say this: We realise that it is almost as important that it should seem that justice is being done as for justice, in fact, to be done, and my hon. and gallant Friend's campaign has had, to some extent, at any rate, the effect of people feeling that perhaps they Are being unfairly treated.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: I do not think that was necessary at all.

Captain Pilkington: Well, that is the fact. What I can tell my hon. and gal-land Friend is that we are considering a revision of pay with these two considerations in mind—first of all, the principles upon which the pay rests and, secondly, the object of getting the greatest degree of simplification that we possibly can.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Camborne (Commander Agnew) spoke of post-war manning, and there again I can say that we are examining that. I am not going to comment upon the very useful suggestions which he made, beyond saying that we will take them all into account. He asked one specific question about the Royal Naval College. As I think he probably knows, it is being used for an important function at the present time. We want to get back there as soon as we possibly can, and we shall do so, though he will realise that a certain amount of reconstruction has to be put in hand first.
I have dealt very quickly with a number of the different points which have been
raised and, in conclusion, I want to say this. As my right hon. Friend said, the main focus of our effort now is rapidly being transferred to the Far East. We have to keep the two great Fleets commanded by Admiral Power and Admiral Fraser maintained over tremendous lines of communication. I do hope it will be realised by hon. Members that even when Germany has surrendered we still have to


have in this country very substantial training facilities, storage space, and so on. We shall not be able to give up as rapidly as we would like to all the things which we are now using. We have said that we shall make the biggest contribution we can to final and complete victory in this war. We have promised that to our Allies, but that is not our main incentive. We have our own account to settle with the Japanese, and we like to pay our debts. We remember not only Hong Kong but also the brutish behaviour which has characterised the Japanese on land and sea and has long since robbed them of any claim to being a civilised nation. The iron ring to-day is tightening round them. The invincible core of unbeaten China, the British Armies moving South under General Leese through the Burmese jungle, the mighty springboard of India and Ceylon, the great continent-base of Australia, and the powerful blows which are being delivered by the Americans ever closer and harder against the heart of Japan. The momentum of our onslaught will increase in force and fury until victory is won. We have brought peace to Africa, we are bringing it to Europe, and soon we shall bring it to Asia as well.

Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

Orders of the Day — NUMBERS

Resolved:
That such numbers of Officers, Seamen, Boys and Royal Marines and of Royal Marine Police, as His Majesty may deem necessary, be borne on the books of His Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1946.

Orders of the Day — WAGES, &C., OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL MARINES AND OF CERTAIN OTHER PERSONNEL SERVING WITH THE FLEET

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expenses of Wages, &amp;c., of Officers and Men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines and of certain other personnel serving with the Fleet, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1946

Orders of the Day — NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1944

Resolved:
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1945, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Navy Services for the year.

Schedule



Sums not exceeding


Supply Grants.
Appropriations in Aid.


Vote.
£
£


1. Wages, &amp;c., of Officers and Men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines and of certain other personnel serving with the fleet.
10
40,000,000

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.

Orders of the Day — AIR MINISTRY (ADMINISTRATION)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Cary.]

8.36 p.m.

Earl Winterton: I am sure the House will be sensible, as I am, of the consideration shown by the Prime Minister in waiting through a long and most important Debate in order to reply to the points which the hon. and learned Member for Carmarthen (Mr. Hughes) and I are about to make. I shall speak for about nine minutes and the hon. and learned Gentleman for four or five, leaving half the time for the right hon. Gentleman to reply. My case is not one for or against the Government, nor is it for or against the hon. Member for Mossley (Mr. A. Hopkinson) but a case concerned with the procedure and the rights of the House. I am solely concerned with what the, hon. and learned Gentleman and I claim is the proper procedure when charges of the kind are made. The only bias that I will show is to say that I hope, if the procedure we advocate is adopted, the result of it will be to find that the charges against the Secretary of State and the Ministry are disproved. I hope that will be the case.
I should like to deal with what I conceive to be, judging from the answers given to the Questions, the points which the Prime Minister will make against the suggestion that there should be a Select Committee. The first, I imagine, will be that there has been an inquiry. I say on that that I can conceive of no more dangerous precedent to set up than, when a charge of a serious character is brought against a Minister and a Ministry, to say that, because a Government committee has investigated the charge, there is no need for any other inquiry. The result in subsequent Parliaments might be that when we have the ordinary process of Government and opposition the opposition might have an overwhelming case. It might charge a Minister with fraud and dishonesty and the Government of the day would say, "We have investigated this case. Our Law Officers have examined it and there is nothing in it. What right have the opposition to ask for an inquiry. In the days of the great Churchill Government exactly the same form of inquiry was refused."
That would be a most serious precedent to create. The second point that I suggest may be made is that the charges are too indefinite. I do not think that that contention can be maintained after what was said by the hon. Gentleman yesterday. I do not know if the House is aware of what he said. It was that he definitely charged the right hon. Gentleman with interfering with the conduct of a court martial. Could there be a more serious charge than that made on the Floor of this House? I am sure the Prime Minister would be perfectly entitled to say that these charges should be placed on a sheet of paper, or two sheets, and sent to him. I suggest that possibly another
point may be made by him. He might say that charges, however grave, brought by a single Member of this House ought not to be the subject of an inquiry by a Select Committee. I do not think such a contention would be on strong ground. There are many examples in the past, one of the most famous being that of Mr. Plimsoll, who for years brought certain charges in this House, and eventually the action he advocated was taken.
The Prime Minister might take another line, though I suggest it would be extremely difficult, even for him, with all his knowledge of Parliamentary procedure, to do so and to keep in Order.

He might take the line that one must have regard to the credibility of a particular Member and that the Member in question was not a person to whose credibility we should attach much importance. Lastly, the argument might be taken, and, indeed, has been taken in the answer which was given on more than one occasion, that it will be wrong in the midst of the greatest war of all time to submit Ministers and high officers to the burden of being examined by a Select Committee. I say that such an argument would be contrary to the whole moral basis of democratic government and British justice, which rests on the assurance that no subject of the Crown is immune from the process of judicial inquiry because of the high position he occupies.
I come in conclusion to my contention. I propose to put only one, and I think it is the most powerful one of all. It is that the only way to stop charges being made constantly in this House by the hon. Member below the Gangway—and incidentally they have been made in another place also—with much gossip in other places directed against General Critchley, who must be presumed to be a distinguished servant of the Crown, and against the alleged condonation of his alleged ill-conduct by the Secretary of State, is by having an inquiry. I am getting sick and tired—and I speak for a good many other Members—of what is a most distasteful procedure. Again and again we have the hon. Gentleman getting up and making these charges, some definite and some less definite, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State adopting the role of a sort of Roman senator, banging the Box and saying: "These charges are all untrue; I and my officers have investigated them, and there is nothing more to be said on the subject." We ought to put an end to it, because it is doing a mischief inside and outside the House. The only way to do that is by the ordinary process, which this House always adopts in such circumstances, of having a Select Committee. In saying this I consider that I am being a good and candid friend of the Government.
I apologise to the House for appearing to make an egoistic, although not an egotistic, point. The Prime Minister applied an epithet to me on the last occasion when I raised the matter. It was widely reported in the British and foreign Press, and it is necessary, therefore, for me to


explain my position. I am, as is well known, a most enthusiastic, 100 per cent. supporter of the Government. I am very happy and contented where I am, and I want nothing out of this from this Government or from any other Government. I am not in the position which my right hon. Friend and I have known certain people to be in, in the course of our long careers, of having some grievances against the Government. I am not, and no one knows it better than my right hon. Friend, suffering from any motive of pique or resentment because I have been an unsuccessful aspirant or mendicant for high office. I think, in the circumstances, that "cowardly" as an appellation of my action is one which, terminologically speaking, is wholly inaccurate. I hope that when my right hon. Friend comes to reply he will find a more appropriate epithet for what I consider to be my perfectly proper and legitimate action in bringing this matter to his attention and to the attention of the House. I can assure him of one thing; whatever invective he chooses to direct against me, nothing will prevent me from being a 100 per cent. supporter of this Government. Finally, I have never, in my 40 years' membership of this House, been deterred from putting a point affecting its right procedure by the disapprobation of any Prime Minister, however powerful he may be.

8.47 p.m.

Mr. Meelwyn Hughes: On 19th December I came to this House to listen to what I thought was the concluding stages of a Debate upon the Forestry Commission. Instead, I found myself listening to a speech by the hon. Member for Mossley (Mr. Hopkinson). His speech lasted for a considerable time, and although the hon. Member disavowed any intention of bringing any allegations, the implications which
he made to my mind were perfectly clear. He alleged that the British Overseas Airways Corporation, which is responsible to the Air Ministry who are responsible in turn to this House, had in fact prepared fraudulent balance sheets, and that the Air Ministry were cognisant of that and had condoned the production of those balance sheets.
He referred to the transactions that had taken place in a training wing about the sale of bacon, with which we are not con-

cerned, but he went on further to say that, in spite of replies that had been given, the full truth had not been given; in other words, that the Air Ministry again were concealing the full facts of the situation. He went further and said—these are the innuendoes from the hon. Member's speech—that there had been in the Air Ministry and on the part of the Secretary of State for Air, a conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice; beyond that, that those who had participated in this conspiracy had been rewarded for so participating. The final innuendo was that the Secretary of State for Air and the Air Ministry had been responsible for improperly bringing the legal advisers of the Crown in, to cover those misdeeds. Those are the insinuations that came to my mind as I listened to his speech.
I waited for the reply from the Minister. We had an inept, incomplete and unsatisfying reply. I know nothing of the merits on one side or the other. I am not concerned with the Secretary of State for Air or with the hon. Member for Mossley. I went straight out into the Library and drafted a Private Notice Question. That Private Notice Question was not accepted, and I drafted a Motion. [That a Select Committee be appointed to investigate the allegations made in this House on 19th December, 1944, by the hon. Member for Mossley concerning irregularities in the administration of the Air Ministry.] To that Motion I have taken signatures of Members in all parts of the House, including that of the Noble Lord who has preceded me. I could have had any number of signatures to it. I was only concerned to get a number of signatures, to show that this was a matter for the House of Commons to inquire into.
There are these allegations, and we find a reply for which I can find no comparison except the old classic case of instructions to counsel to defend for wounding with intent, robbery with violence and indecent assault, to which there was no defence at all, winding up with the instructions "Counsel is instructed to laugh it out of court." That was the defence propounded by the Air Minister on that occasion. In those circumstances, I submit that the request that we make for a Select Committee is, indeed, the only proper method by which Parliament can satisfy itself as to what is the right or the wrong of this matter.
That is the only way. That is the only tribunal. I am not deterred by the fact that the hon. Member for Mossley, when he began, said he would give no specific accusations, and yesterday said he had them plain before the House. I am not deterred by the fact that, at one time, he asked for a judicial inquiry, and now wants a Select Committee. On the other hand, I am reinforced by the attitude taken in this matter by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Air. Why is it the replies to these accusations have come forth to us piece by piece, section by section, delay after delay? There is nobody who has ever sat on a judicial tribunal, who does not know what value is to be attached to a witness with whom one has to take a long time to extract the truth. We have had this delay. We have had a great deal of material, some of it, I agree, which completely satisfies us, and provides an answer to the accusations put forward, but not the whole. And because not the whole has been answered, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to accede to our request and give us the only proper tribunal which can elucidate these matters—a Select Committee.

8.53 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): This brief discussion on the Adjournment is certainly not a time to go into merits, and although both the speakers who have addressed the House have recited certain charges that have been made, there has been no attempt to go into merits, and I certainly do not propose to do so. The Noble Lord has not attempted to go into merits. In fact I gather that his position is that he takes no responsibility for the charges. They may be true, they may be false, they may be exaggerated; but however it may be, he raises only the issue of principle, of Parliamentary usage and custom. As that is an important issue, I feel it my duty to deal with it myself, because although I am not the Father of the House I have been here a good deal longer than the Father.
I am a little astonished that there does not seem to be more general realisation of what the Parliamentary usage is about Select Committees in respect of personal charges made against Ministers. Nothing could be more clear than the Parliamentary usage. I will reduce it to the simplest terms. The Government advise the House,

and the House decides. The Government advise the House whether there should or should not be a Select Committee, and the House decides. The idea that there is any automatic procedure or bounden duty to take a particular course is utterly devoid of foundation. The three last cases of charges against Ministers which were made the subject of debate as to whether there should be a Select Committee or not were the Marconi case in 1912, where the Government proposed a Committee and the House accepted it, without a Division, after prolonged agitation and consideration on both sides; the Maurice case in 1918, where the Opposition proposed a Motion for a Select Committee and the House rejected it on the advice of the Government; and the Campbell case in 1924, where the Opposition proposed and the House accepted, the Motion for a Select Committee. The Government then resigned. In all these cases it is clear that the Government took their view and had the right to take their view, and the Opposition took, and had the right to take, their view; and the House decided what was to happen.
All these were in the days of party Government, when responsible bodies of men, working together in all the long-established groupings of a party, considered most maturely the merits and the proportions of the charges and took a collective decision. The Government of the day either accepted this decision or rejected it. Now the party system is in abeyance, and the Noble Lord asks us to lay down a new rule to the effect that when any charge is made by any
Member against any Minister's honour or integrity, the Government of the day are bound automatically to use their powers to appoint a Select Committee. No contention could be more absurd. It would be most injurious to the House, and absolutely contrary to its traditions if such a rule were made. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we refuse to countenance it. We have not only to think of this Debate, of this particular case or occasion; we have to think of the future. If this principle were adopted it would be open in future for any single Member, however irresponsible, however mischievous, however malignant, to bring any charge, however ill-founded, however worthless, however trivial, against any Minister; and thereupon, automatically, the whole ponderous machinery of a Select


Committee would be set in motion. I can imagine even that in days of party strife and-faction, when feelings run high and a score against the Government is a good thing to bring off, there might be a regular racket among half a dozen Members to bring charges against half a dozen Ministers, or to fling insults against them; and then, automatically, there would be half a dozen Select Committees sitting upstairs, investigating the charges and insults which had been made. Such a procedure would bring the whole principle of Select Committees into contempt, and might tend to rob Parliament of an invaluable weapon in its armoury. The fact is, that the Government remains master of its own conduct, and the House itself, the master of the Government, must decide for itself what action to take.
In this case, I have myself, personally, looked into the charges made both in what is called the "Farm Case" or the "Regents Park Case," and also about the general management of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, and, with the full agreement of the Cabinet, I have told the House that, in our opinion, there are no grounds for appointing a Select Committee. That is our position, and that is our advice to the House. I shall be asked "Will you give the House an opportunity to debate on a Motion the position which the Government have taken up? Will you give them the opportunity?" If it were the general desire of the House to discuss any matter under the sun, I should take pains to meet their wishes, but proof must be furnished—adequate proof must be furnished—of this general desire. In the days of party strife the Leader of the Opposition, in consultation with his colleagues, would usually express it, but, now, there is no Leader of the Opposition. The Government is a Government of all three parties at the present time, and, consequently, we have to ascertain whether a substantial body of Members desire, and think it sufficiently important, that this matter of the Select Committee should be debated and that time should be given for the Motion.
I say that if any substantial body of hon. Members wish for time to be given, or if there is a general desire made known through the usual channels, or if the larger parties in the House take it up as a matter on which they wish that such

an opportunity should be given, certainly we shall agree to find the time. I hope that the House will feel that this is a right and sensible way of dealing with the matter. The Government have the responsibility of advising the House, and if there is a substantial desire to challenge the Government's view, then a Debate can take place and the matter will be carried to its proper conclusion in a Division.
In this case, I am quite certain, and take upon myself the full responsibility of advising the House, that there is no sufficient case, no case worthy of investigation at all, and that it would be injurious to the House if the machinery of the Select Committee were invoked. I take it upon myself to say that, so far as we are concerned, we shall oppose that course, but, if the House in great body feels alarmed and feels that grave derelictions of duty have taken place on the part of the Secretary of State for Air, and that I, as Prime Minister, and my colleagues, are all condoning and conniving at some guilty act—

Hon. Members: No, no.

The Prime Minister: But that is the proposition.

Hon. Members: No, no.

The Prime Minister: How do the hon. Members say, "No, no"? If we are challenged, if we advise against a Select Committee and we are challenged, the reason is because our solemn statement, given in all honesty and good faith, is challenged and doubted by the House. I am not blaming the Noble Lord; I should not hesitate to express my view contrary to the Government if I were free to do so, but to pretend that there have been deployed any sufficient grounds or any sufficient evidence or to pretend that there is at the present time any great body of Parliamentary opinion in favour of a Select Committee is, in my view, quite incorrect.
I have only two more minutes to speak, and I will devote them to my Noble Friend, the Father of the House. There are two aspects of his conduct in this matter which surprise me. The first I have already touched upon—the foolishness of the rule which he seeks to establish, of the automatic reference of any charge to a Select Committee. Such a lack of Parliamentary comprehension is


lamentable in one who possesses unique claims to be our guide and mentor. The second is the levity which has allowed my Noble Friend to lend his weight to a demand for a Select Committee on the outpourings of the hon. Member for Mossley (Mr. A. Hopkinson) without ever having taken the slightest trouble to find out for himself whether any substance lies behind them. On both those grounds, his action is to be deplored. He is a comparatively young Father of the House; he has many years of life before him. We still hope they may be years of useful life in this House, but unless in the future his sagacity and knowledge of the House

are found to be markedly superior to what he has exhibited to-day, I must warn him that he will run a very grave risk of falling into senility before he is overtaken by old age.

It being half an hour after the conclusion of Business exempted from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House), Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order, as modified for this Session by the Order of the House of 30th November.

Adjourned accordingly at Six Minutes after Nine o'Clock.